The legacies of Communism in Albania and Montenegro

Project Title: A comparative analysis of the institutional and societal legacies of communism in Montenegro and Albania.

July 20-31, 2022

Purpose:

In this project, we sought to explore and analyze the politics of nostalgia and the legacies of communism in Albania and Montenegro. We undertook a comparative approach between the two countries because, despite their geographic proximity, each had a markedly different experience under Communist rule. In doing so, we hoped to determine whether – or if – any endogenous factors can affect the likelihood of communist legacies (institutional or societal) assuming a dominant political role. As part of Yugoslavia, Montenegro’s communist experience was comparatively more ‘free’ than every other Eastern bloc state, whereas Albania was led for 40 years by the repressive Communist dictator Enver Hoxha, who isolated the country from the rest of Europe in an attempt to build a socialist autarky. These differences intrigued us and led us to try and determine how the countries' post-communist development has been impacted by their respective communist histories.

Methodology:

We wanted to learn how each country’s communist past is viewed today. While simple approval ratings and some qualitative analyses have been completed in recent years on Montenegrin and Albanian views on their communist histories, we want to complete a more thorough analysis: what do citizens of each country feel nostalgic about? What do they regret? How do they teach new generations about their history, what do they leave out, and what do they emphasize? How do views vary depending on Montenegrin and Albanian ethnicity?

To answer these questions, we spoke with people involved in politics and civil society, visited historical sites, and went to museums. Our research locations included the Albanian cities Tirana, Durres, Vlore, and Sarande, and the Montenegrin cities Podgorica, Cetinje, Budva, and Kotor.

Findings:

Albanian legacies of communism can be traced back to the authoritarian regime of Enver Hoxha. While in power, Hoxha modeled his regime after Stalin's and rejected the (comparatively) more liberal version of Communism practiced by Tito in Yugoslavia. His suppression of dissent and the resulting paranoia among Albanian citizens created lasting senses of insecurity, according to one of the people we interviewed. This insecurity was heightened by the nature of Hoxha's surveillance state, where the government encouraged citizens to spy on and report on their families, friends, and neighbors. Basic social ties and communcal trust disintegrated as Hoxha weaponized the populace against itself. This fundamental rupturing of the Albanian social fabric has played a lasting role in Albanian politics, as civic engagement organizations struggle to build coalitions and constituencies that can meaningfully participate in the democratic process.

For some Albanians, especially those living in rural areas, communism restricted their economic potential and excluded them from politics. Expected to produce much of the crops and livestock for the country, rural Albanians lacked modern tools and equipment, making their duties both essential for the rest of the country and brutally taxing. Those living in cities had better access to crucial resources such as water and electricity. Thus, people still alive from the communist era who lived in rural areas are often less nostalgic than those from urban areas.

One of our Montenegro contacts presented the legacies of communism similarly. While she described Montenegro as a democracy on paper, she said it was not one in reality. Corruption still dominates politics, a vestige of communist Yugoslavia. She also described how, despite the problems she saw in Albania today, it was better developed politically than Montenegro. One of the reasons given for Albania and Montenegro's divergence was the role of religion in both countries. During Hoxha's rule, Albania became the world's first athiest state. Though religion was still practiced covertly, and regained a wider prominence in Albanian society after the fall of the Hoxha regime, the lack of a widespread institutional structure has prevented religious fautlines from dominating the political landscape. The opposite is true in Montenegro. The Yugoslav regime did not crack down on organized religion to the same extent as Albania, and the Orthodox Church maintained a prominent foothold in society. After the fall of Yugoslavia, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church broke away from the Serbian Orthodox Church, leading to a protracted struggle between the two denominations within Montenegro. The divisions between the churches have created a divisive faultline in Montenegrin politics that has hampered the country's political stability and democratic development.

Personal Impacts

Both of us have extensively studied Balkan politics, communist history, and political identity for the better part of four years at Colorado College. It was a dream come true for both of us to be able to travel to the region, study these topics in person, and meet with people actively involved in the politics of these countries. Simply seeing the Balkans was also impactful; the communist-era architecture, the mountains, and the streets were foreign in a special way, revealing visual clues and wonders that led us to better understand the region. Both of us plan to return and continue researching the manifold political complexities of the region.

Implications

Whereas this research project solely analyzed the different political trajectories of two Balkan states, we hope that future research can expand the scope of the analysis to include other Balkan and Eastern European nations as well. Given the resurgence of explicitly nationalist and illiberal political movements in many post-communist states, it is increasingly imperative to understand how the formation of post-communist identities have manifested into right-wing political movements. Montenegro provides a prime example of the link between resentment towards the post-communist political order and the rise of an illiberal regime. By delving deeper into the political currents in Montenegro, we discovered that organized religion, by becoming a more salient force in society after the fall of Communism, has resulted in the creation of deep fracture lines that have led many people to support, implicitly or explicitly, the increasingly-authoritarian rule of President Milo Dukanovic. We hope that these findings can serve as a springboard for further research into the causes of increasing illiberalism in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, and that our conclusions can help inform future scholars studying this topic.