The Battle of Stony Point: A Digital Staff Ride

The American Revolution in 1779: Strategic Overview

By 1779, the war in the northern theater had ground to a standstill. The Continental Army’s victory at Saratoga in 1777 had left the new nation’s northern flank relatively secure, while the British seizure of Philadelphia in 1777 had done little to cause the Revolution to falter. Congress simply moved its place of meeting while Washington’s army continued to be an aggressive force that threatened to cut off supply lines to overextended British forces at New York, Philadelphia, and Newport, Rhode Island. Due to this pressure, British General Sir Henry Clinton abandoned Philadelphia and retreated to New York in 1778. With the French now entering the war, time was not on Britain’s side. Because of this the British changed tack regarding their strategy for the North American theater. The British and their allies launched offensives against the periphery of the United States. At the end of 1778 and in early 1779, British forces began a new southern campaign in Georgia and the Carolinas, aimed at establishing a base of support there to be able to move northwards. Still, a substantial force of about 12,000 men under Clinton remained in New York City. This force threatened the Hudson River avenue of approach which controlled the corridor to Lake Champlain. It also threatened New England, Newport, Rhode Island and Boston, Massachusetts. For that reason, Washington’s main army remained tied to the Hudson Valley, with forces arrayed in a rough arc across New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut.

The British Sieze Stony Point and Kings Ferry: May, 1779

The river crossing at Kings Ferry near the rocky peninsula aptly named Stony Point connected the farmlands of New England with Washington’s army and American forces to the south. Washington made his headquarters north of West Point, with that vital position now entering a new phase of fortification. Following the loss of Forts Clinton and Montgomery in the summer of 1777, Washington’s engineers had settled on this position along an S-curve of the Hudson as the lynchpin for their defense of the Hudson Valley. Smaller defensive posts and redoubts were scattered down the river as early warning from a sudden British lunge up the river. Washington was wise to be wary of this, as Clinton indeed had orders from Lord George Germain, the British secretary of state for the American colonies, “to bring Mr. Washington to a general and decisive action at the opening of the Campaign.” Clinton knew he could not advance his entire force up the Hudson to threaten West Point. The terrain was not advantageous for synchronizing an attacking army. The many hills, valleys, and ravines broke up large troop formations making it difficult to mass troops at a single point. What he hoped to do, however, was to lure Washington from behind his defenses into an open battle. The Kings Ferry crossing on the Hudson, just north of Stony Point, was key terrain for the Continentals. If the British could block it and seize Stony Point on the west bank and Verplancks Point on the east bank, then Washington might be drawn into that “general and decisive action." Washington himself was very aware of the importance of the southern Hudson, writing, “The importance of the Hudson River in the present Contest, and the necessity of defending it, are Subjects which have been so frequently and fully discussed, and are so well understood, that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon them. ² ” To that end, he had fortified both Verplancks and Stony Points, with Fort Lafayette at the former and a wooden blockhouse on the latter. Clinton lost little time in the spring in organizing his expedition once the weather had improved to the point where roads were no longer mud-bound and the river was clear of ice. With about 6,000 British, German, and Loyalist troops, Clinton pushed up the river on 70 sailing vessels and 150 boats on May 30, 1779. This force, Clinton estimated, would be enough to deal with Washington when he sallied forth to do battle. First, Clinton seized Stony Point – the garrison of forty men set fire to the blockhouse and took off over Dunderberg Mountain. On June 1, the British cut the roads to Fort Lafayette and mounted guns on Stony Point, forcing the small garrison of North Carolina Continentals to surrender. Clinton’s trap was set. However, Washington declined the bait. While he moved troops in supporting distance of the fortifications at West Point, he did not attempt to retake the key positions he had lost. Clinton waited nearly a month before giving up on June 27 and withdrawing most of his force to New York City. He needed these troops for a raid on Connecticut since the Crown was not sending reinforcements. Approximately 600 troops were left behind, consisting of the 17 ^th  Regiment of Foot, two Grenadier Companies of the 71 ^st  Regiment (Fraser’s Highlanders), a company strength detachment of Loyalists drawn from the Loyal American Regiment, and a detachment of Royal Artillery. Lieut. Col. Henry Johnson of the 17 ^th  Foot had overall control of the troops left behind to garrison Stony Point. The 17 ^th  was a veteran regiment, having fought in North America since arriving in Quebec in 1776.

 ¹  Noah Trudeau, “The Battle of Stony Point,” HistoryNet, https://www.historynet.com/battle-of-stony-point.htm

 ²  Ibid.

Planning the Counterstroke: Washington Wayne Lookout

At first, Washington felt that he could do little to dislodge this British thrust against his logistical lifeline. However, he began to gather intelligence on the British almost at once. For this, he utilized Major Henry “Light-Horse Harry” Lee and his mounted troopers. This force was not only used to gather information about Stony Point but to screen the Continental troops gathering near the old site of Fort Montgomery (destroyed in 1777 by Clinton’s forces in a nod to assisting Burgoyne’s force penned up at Saratoga). One of the troopers, Capt. Allan McLane came in under a flag of truce escorting Mrs. Elizabeth Smith to see her sons who had run off to the British, and reported back that while the fortifications were indeed impressive, there were few protective positions built on the landward side and that most of the artillery consisted of naval guns which would be hard to maneuver to oppose an assault from the land. Under Washington’s orders, Brigadier General Wayne conducted a reconnaissance of Stony Point on July 2. He sent word back to Washington that it was a formidable position to storm, but that if they used surprise they might have a chance. Washington also viewed the position around July 6 and responded with a proposed plan of attack along the southern edge of the position. Knowing that both armies stood-to at dawn, Washington recommended a midnight attack.

The March on Stony Point: 1779 Trailhead

Washington approved the adjustments and the Light Corps assembled at Fort Montgomery on the morning of July 15. The Light Corps mustered approximately 1,200 men at this point, giving them a 2-1 advantage over the defenders. Their march to the assembly area led them further inland over grueling terrain to avoid discovery along the coast. This route exists today as the 1779 Trail and can be accessed via Fort Montgomery. It is approximately 9 miles and follows the path of the Light Corps nearly exactly until the modern town of Stony Point is reached. The Corps moved in single file and arrived at their release point 1.5 miles northwest of Stony Point around 2000 on 15 July.

The March on Stony Point: 1779 Trail End

The Columns Disperse: Springsteel Farm

Here, the men were given their orders and divided into storming parties. Synchronizing the movements of troops in combat to bring about the mass of all one’s combat power at the decisive point in the 18 ^th  century was difficult even in daylight. To do so at night was even more difficult. Communication with and between subordinate elements was limited to runners. Reliable maps were hard to come by. In an army of citizen-soldiers, fratricide was always a constant risk. That Washington would advise a night attack shows the trust he placed in Wayne and the Light Corps. At Springsteel Farm, leaders called for volunteers to lead the attack, a “Forlorn Hope.” These troops would be the advance guard of each column, with select numbers wielding axes to breach the enemy obstacles. Wayne had also given the order that the first man to enter the fort’s summit would receive $500, the second $400, and so on to the fifth. Washington approved this method of motivation for the troops. As a coordination measure, once the attackers had reached the Table of the Hill, they were to call out, repeatedly, “The Fort’s our own!” Each attacker was again admonished against having ammunition in his weapon. As an additional risk control measure, the attackers would wear white flashes of paper on their hats to help distinguish friend from foe: “Every Officer & Soldier is then to fix a peice [sic] of white paper in the most Conspi[c]ous part of his Hat or Cap to Distinguish him from the Enemy. ³ ”

 ³  Second Virginia, “2d Virginia Regiment Light Company, July 1779,” https://secondvirginia.wordpress.com/category/clothing/

An Overview Of The British Defenses and Outer Works: Parking Lot

The fortifications on Stony Point centered on the relatively flat plateau, known as the Table of the Hill, where the British constructed their command and control center as well as batteries to control the river approaches. Two artillery positions guarded the land approach to the Table of the Hill, as well as several unfinished infantry breastworks. A line of abatis in front of this provided a protective obstacle to slow and break up attacking enemy formations. Further down the hill, the British had taken advantage of the natural terrain and built three v-shaped fleches running from south to north and numbered consecutively. These positions could hold infantry and artillery. These would provide mutually supporting fields of fire from dominating hilltops overlooking the draws that led down to the marshes and the approach causeway. These, too, were protected by a line of abatis, although this was imperfectly tied into terrain as further events would demonstrate. An advanced line of pickets covered likely enemy avenues of approach. For additional firepower, a gunboat and the 14-16 gun sloop-of-war HMS Vulture lay just off shore. A formidable arsenal of firepower.

Taking the Point: Wayne's Plan of Attack

On July 14th, Wayne presented Washington with an updated plan for his attack on Stony Point. He drew on conventional tactics of the day, based on tactical plans as old as the Classical era with the Battle of Cannae: the double envelopment. Wayne would divide his force, with a southern and a northern column advancing at the same time to take the British position in both flanks. The attackers would go in with unloaded muskets with bayonets fixed to prevent the accidental discharge from betraying their position. It also removed the human inclination to stop, take cover, and return fire which habitually destroyed unit cohesion in the attack. Additionally, Wayne proposed sending a small force with loaded muskets to the causeway to cause a noisy diversion to distract the British from the decisive operations on the flanks.

Fleche No. 1: The Southern Attack Begins

Fleche 1 contained one short brass twelve pounder gun, dug into an embrasure for protection. This position was commanded by Lieutenant William Horndon of the Royal Artillery. Horndon’s men became alive to their danger only when the American diversionary attack of two companies of North Carolinians led by Major Hardy Murfree suddenly blazed to life, just to their right and down the slope in front of Fleche No. 2. The time was around midnight. Horndon could not move his gun to bring it to bear on the Americans on his right, but the blasts from his gun and others along the line suddenly revealed the shadowy forms of dozens of soldiers infiltrating the outer abatis on the left. Horndon tried to shift his fire to the left, but his fire was ineffective. He could only watch as columns of the southern attacking force crowded the riverbank, bypassing Fleche No. 1. The southern attacking force consisted of approximately 700 men. This force was led by the forlorn hope, a group of volunteers who – armed with axes – were to clear the way of obstacles for the southern flanking party. Twenty-one Lieutenant George Knox led the forlorn hope along the water line and found that their axes were not necessary as the abatis did not fully tie into the river. Skirting the abatis, they pressed on, followed by the advance party of about 150 men. This force was led by Lt. Col. Francois de Fleury, a French engineer who had already made a name for himself for his heroic defense of Fort Mifflin. Behind de Fleury came Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne and three regiments of the Light Corps. The Virginians and Pennsylvanians of the 1 ^st  Light Infantry Regiment under their veteran commander Lt. Col. Christian Febiger (another foreign-born officer, from Denmark), then the 3 ^rd  Light Infantry Regiment (Connecticut) under veteran Col. Return Meigs, and lastly detachment of four companies of Massachusetts Light Infantry under Major William Hull, another veteran officer. Members of the 2 ^nd  and 3 ^rd  Artillery accompanied both columns in order to take control of the enemy guns as soon as they had been seized. Between these three regimental commanders there was experience extending from Bunker Hill to Quebec City, Saratoga, and Monmouth. Officers and men all resisted the urge to fire back when the British line blazed into fiery life - aided by the fact that none of the men in the column had a loaded musket. They pressed on along the bank of the river towards the inner abatis.

Fleche #2: The Diversionary Attack

Fleche 2 held two Coehorn 3.5” mortars and two companies of the 17 ^th  Regiment. It was around midnight when the two companies of North Carolina Light Infantry from the 4 ^th  Regiment got into position. Major Murfree gave the order, and the small force blazed away as if they were a much larger force. The return volleys from the 17 ^th  Foot missed their mark and went harmlessly over the heads of the attackers. The artillerymen were never even able to get to their positions. The rapid volume of fire roused the British garrison from their slumber, and with it, Lt. Col. Johnson. Rushing from his post on the table of the hill with 15 or 20 men, he headed towards Fleche No. 2 in order to appraise the situation. However, the only orders he left behind were for men to stand at the ready. So groups of redcoats gathered at their appointed positions in the defenses with little idea of what was going on. Timing, in war, is everything. When Murfree opened fire, the northern attack was already through the outer abatis while the southern attack was just approaching it. The Light Corps had achieved coordination of a level that is enviable even in an age with instantaneous communications. 1,100 men were hitting the British lines all at the same time, presenting the enemy with multiple dilemmas.

Fleche #3: The Northern Attack

Two grenadier companies of the 71 ^st  Foot held this position on the night of July 15. Out in front of them was posted a picket line composed of men these companies. Lieutenant John Ross was in command of this post. As his men spotted the American northern column, they began to open fire with warning shots. Ross had his drummer beat to arms and his thirty men came together. “I saw no enemy,” Ross said, “and the night being extremely dark and very windy, made me suppose that what the men reported to me to have heard was occasioned by the wind rustling amongst the bushes. ⁴ ” Even with having been spotted and being fired upon, the northern column pressed ahead unmolested. Lieutenant James Gibbons led the forlorn hope along the north bank of the Stony Point, with Major John Stewart’s advance party not far behind. Colonel Richard Butler, a Pennsylvanian and veteran of several major battles, led this wing of the attack, about 450 men of Butler’s 2 ^nd  Light Regiment (Maryland and Pennsylvania Continentals). Gibbons breached the outer abatis without causing an alarm and began heading up the slope, veering towards the Table of the Hill. When Murfree’s diversion began, the guns of the barbette battery opened fire, which cut down several soldiers of the forlorn hope. Musket fire soon targeted the Forlorn Hope, killing or wounding all but three of Gibbon’s little force. Butler spotted the brass 12 pounder and two mortars in Fleche No. 3 and ordered part of his column to attack. The Fleche was quickly surrounded by bayonet-wielding Continentals, who overran the position before the guns could come into play. The remainder of Butler’s troops headed along down the waterline towards the base of the hill to attack the Table of the Hill from the northern flank.

 ⁴  Trudeau, “Battle of Stony Point”

The Barbette Battery: Johnson's Decision

In the chaos of the first moments of attack in the darkness, Lt. Col. Johnson assessed the greatest danger as coming from where the enemy activity was. He quickly moved to the sound of the guns, gathering up 15-20 troops to reinforce his center. In doing so, he set off a chain of events that left the garrison nearly frozen into inactivity. With no one to give them orders, the men at each of the various positions around the hill simply waited for events to unfold rather than being proactive and sending out patrols. When Johnson arrived at the center position, he cautioned his men to conserve their ammunition and only fire at what they could see. He was particularly worried about fratricide as he knew men from his pickets were collapsing back in on the main lines. With Johnson’s absence, that left Lieutenant William Armstrong by himself on the inner abatis to try to figure out what best he should do. The situation was chaotic. In the darkness, Armstrong, too, worried about fratricide. He ordered his men to cease their fire until they could figure out who was in front of them. In fact, what was in front of him by this point was mostly Americans. Despite these precautions, two men were wounded and one killed near Flesch No. 2 by being shot in the back by the defenders firing from the inner abatis.

The Southern Gazebo: Wayne's Main Attack

As the battle raged, the southern attack column pushed towards the inner abatis. The forlorn hope attacked it with axes but the breach was hardly clear before the advance party were on their heels. Men simply pushed, pulled, and bodily cleared a path or climbed over the obstacle in their frenzy to get passed it. Once through, each company reformed and pressed ahead, bayonets glinting. Led now by Lt. Col. de Fleury, the attack angled to the point where you’re standing at a natural crease in the steep incline. Scrambling up the hill, almost perpendicular in some places, de Fleury and the light infantry reached this point. Wayne was not far behind de Fleury, but suddenly was felled by a round that grazed his head. “Forward, my brave fellows, forward!” he cried as he collapsed. De Fleury and the rest pushed on towards the Table of the Hill and the British colors. Convinced the wound was mortal, Wayne told his aides, “Carry me into the fort. If I am to die, I want to die at the head of the column. ⁵ ” By now, fighting on the hill was general. “The men made free use of the bayonet,” said Major Hull after the battle. Countless small, personal battles took place in the small spaces around you as Continentals, British Regulars, and Loyalists fought it out in ferocious hand-to-hand combat.

 ⁵  Trudeau, “Battle of Stony Point”

The Final Assault: An Overview of the British Inner Works

In 18 ^th  century warfare, the colors were critical to a unit’s efficiency as they denoted the location of the unit as well as signifying the honor of the regiment. Major Hull remembered a “dreadful slaughter” as the Light Infantry and Regulars fought it out. The tough training imposed by Baron von Steuben that winter showed in the training of the Light Infantry as they gained the advantage in the hand-to-hand fighting.

The Flagstaff Battery: De Fleury's Charge to Glory

Through the mass of bayonets came Lt. Col. de Fleury, sword in hand, who leapt to the flagstaff and cut down the colors. The shout soon went up among the vigilant Continentals: “The Fort’s our own!” After a narrow escape with some American bayonets in Fleche No. 2, Lt. Col. Johnson disentangled himself from the general action and ran back towards the Table of the Hill. Surrounded by hundreds of baying Americans, Johnson realized that he no longer had any tenable defenses remaining. He surrendered to Lt. Col. Febiger who ordered him back to his tent. Back at Fleche No. 1, Lieutenant Horndon contemplated a breakout. He, too, realized the hopeless nature of his position: “My lads, I believe we are prisoners.” Indeed, they were. 543 British prisoners would be counted by daylight. Only two British officers would escape the cordon of watchful American cavalry under Major Lee, by swimming into the river towards Vulture. American artillerists immediately swarmed to the guns, which the British had not had time to spike or render unusable. They turned the guns on the river towards Vulture which slipped her anchor and headed downstream. Guns from Stony Point soon began ranging the British position on Verplancks Point.

The Lighthouse: Summary - "The Fort's our own!"

Casualties for the Lights were relatively light. Fifteen men of the Light Corps were dead, with eighty-three wounded. Between 20-40 British Regulars were killed, according to a letter from George Washington to Henry Clinton. Anthony Wayne did not, in fact, die. His wound was not mortal. Around 0200 on 16 July, Wayne sent a message to Washington: “Dear Gen’l, — The fort & garrison with Col. Johnston [sic] are ours. Our officers & men behaved like men who are determined to be free. ⁶ ” Lt. Col.  Febiger had a more laconic take on the battle. Writing to his wife a day after the battle, he said, “My Dear Girl: I have just borrowed pen, ink and paper to inform you that yesterday we march’d from Fort Montgomery, and at 12 o’clock last night we stormed this confounded place, and, with the loss of about fourteen killed and forty or fifty wounded, we carried it. I can give no particulars as yet. A musquet ball scraped my nose. No other damage to ‘Old Denmark.’ God bless you. ⁷ ” Washington was greatly pleased with the victory. He was true to his word. His cash prizes for the first men into the works went to de Fleury first, then Lieutenant George Knox, then Sergeants Baker, Spencer, and Donlop. De Fluery directed that his money, “be Delivered to my men 2d Lt Knox begs the same. ⁸ ” In addition, Congress struck medals for several of the participants – including de Fleury. This made him the only foreign officer that Congress bestowed this honor on. Today, the Engineer branch of the U.S. Army issues the de Fleury Medal to outstanding Army engineers. The medal is the mirror of that presented to de Fleury. One side reads, in Latin, “A memorial and reward for courage and boldness.” The obverse, with a stylized depiction of Stony Point, contains the inscription, “Fortifications, marshes, enemies overcome.” The Engineer branch remains the only branch of the U.S. Army not to give medals in honor of the branch’s patron saint, but in honor of the French engineer who aided the United States in its hour of need.

 ⁶  Eric Anderson, “’Our Officers and Men Behaved Like Men Determined To Be Free:’ The Battle of Stony Point, 15-16 July 1779,” National Museum of the US Army, https://armyhistory.org/our-officers-and-men-behaved-like-men-determined-to-be-free-the-battle-of-stony-point-15-16-july-1779/

 ⁷  William Abbat, Compiler, The Magazine of American History with Notes and Queries (Connecticut: Princton University, 1881), 194.

 ⁸  De Fleury to Wayne in Charles J. Stille, Major-General Anthony Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line in the Continental Army (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1893), 403.

The Legacy of Stony Point: "The officers and men behaved like men determined to be free."

The battle for Stony Point does not measure on the scale of Saratoga, Cowpens, or Yorktown in the ledger of American victories. However, the victory lifted the spirits of a flagging cause. The nation responded with an outpouring of rejoicing at this symbolic victory of American courage – bayonets at midnight – over the vaunted British foe. Washington himself was overjoyed. “I recollect how cordially he took me by the hand, remembered Major William Hull, “and the satisfaction and joy that glowed in his countenance. ⁹ ” Lt. Col. Febiger summed it up, remarking that if the British should attempt to come further up the river, “I think he will be damnably drubbed, as this most glorious affair has given double vigor and spirit to our men. ¹⁰ ” Sir Henry Clinton was scarcely overjoyed. Although Washington withdrew his forces, stores, and artillery on July 18 – the site was not worth losing more men over – and Clinton reoccupied it, the sting was very much felt by the British. They would abandon the site by October. The Hudson River was firmly in the hands of the Continental Army. In 1781, Washington would cross at Kings Ferry with his army en route to Yorktown, where Sir Clinton would have another headache to contend with. It was at Yorktown where another group of midnight, bayonet-only attackers led by Alexander Hamilton would seize another British fortification and bring the Continental cause one step closer to realization.

 ⁹  Ibid., 194.

 ¹⁰  Ibid.