Myanmar section (draft 3)

The Burmese Army, also known as the Tatmadaw, are the main drivers of the Rohingya genocide according to the UN fact-finding report about the crisis. It is unlikely, however, that the leaders responsible will ever face domestic prosecution within Myanmar, a majority-Buddhist country. The Tatmadaw's power over the country is near absolute, including over its land and natural resources.

All natural resources and land belong to the State by default under Myanmar's constitution. This means the Tatmadaw, who had special provisions within the government even before their hostile takeover in February 2021, have outsize power on investment and land.

Through its principal conglomerates — Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) — the Tatmadaw own or control at least 106 subsidiaries across diverse sectors of the Myanmar economy. This means a resource-rich state like Rakhine, with convenient access to the Indian Ocean, has historically been a site of heavy land use by the military. The Rohingya genocide has caused this land use to escalate.

Here is the village of Kan Kya, in Maungdaw Township in Rakhine State in September 2017. In late August that year, the Tatmadaw moved into the village and violently uprooted the hundreds of residents. Kan Kya was completely abandoned and taken over by the army.

Here is that same site, what was once Kan Kya, in October 2019. The Tatmadaw razed the whole area to build an army base. In this image, a helipad and other military installations are clearly visible. Local sources  report multiple such bases  in the years following the displacement campaign, built over more than  400 destroyed villages  and stopping the displaced Rohingya from ever coming back to their land.

Here is that same site in March 2021, with further helipads and military installations visible. Kan Kya (or where it once was) has now been folded into the larger nearby of Maungdaw. The Tatmadaw have said the bases are necessary to thwart local ethnic militia, citing terrorism and instability as the cause. But the large-scale military installations also have a larger purpose - protecting local resources and investment zones.

Why does Rakhine in particular hold such importance for the Tatmadaw? The presence of oil and natural gas, anchored by convenient access to the Indian Ocean and the geostrategically important Strait of Malacca, means it isn't just vital for the Burmese government but for foreign investors. Land in Rakhine, and who controls it, is an international concern.

(Graphic: Rakhine State Government)

The need to protect investments and resources isn't just reflected in the whole of the Rakhine offensive, but in Kan Kya itself. On this map, the proximity of the upcoming Kanyin Chaung economic zone is contrasted to the location of the army base on what was Kan Kya. It is surrounded by  multiple such destroyed villages . Work also only started on the project in late 2017, well after the Rakhine offensive had begun its widespread displacement of locals.

It is undeniable that the Rakhine genocide is also driven by Buddhist nationalism and Islamophobia in Myanmar, given its long history of underdeveloping Rakhine.

But the Rohingya genocide could not carry more international consequences. That is a fact reflected in the UN report, which details the foreign countries backing the Tatmadaw and supplying them with arms, either directly through state-controlled corporations or through multinationals. Most of them have stakes in Myanmar and Rakhine, such as India, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Singapore.

(Image Credit: " Bangladesh, 2019 - Humanitarian response " ( CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 ) by  UN Women Asia & the Pacific )

One of the countries supplying arms to the Tatmadaw, however, stands above the rest – China. By far Myanmar's biggest foreign investor, Rakhine's geostrategically important location means it features heavily as part of China's global investment into the Belt and Road initiative, a worldwide funding project to ease access to goods and services.

(Image Credit: Lommes, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons)

One of the biggest projects of the Belt and Road initiative is the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).

Pictured here is the proposed railway line, linking Kunming in China straight to the  the disputed Kyaukphu SEZ  in Rakhine state. The CMEC passes through conflict zones in Shan and Rakhine states.

The CMEC adjoins existing and proposed gas lines that link multiple Special Economic Zones – providing an easy route for resources to flow from China to the Indian Ocean and beyond. The Shwe natural gas port and Kyaukphu Special Economic Zone in Rakhine are fundamental to this investment plan.

The Chinese and Burmese states have signed multiple MOUs for a proposed transnational railway and transportation line as part of the CMEC, with  local ethnic groups protesting  that appropriate consultations over land were not done for multibillion-dollar projects.

Indeed, onflict is an inextricable part of land consolidation for the Burmese state and army. Its long-running conflicts with ethnic groups and armed militia are over disputed land and rights.

Conflicts with the army  often directly coincide with the locations of (proposed or otherwise) foreign investment in Myanmar .

Pictured here are the various Special Economic Zones (SEZ) created for foreign investment. Chinese companies are  heavily involved  in the creation of SEZs. ( Geospatial data: MIMU )

International observers have long analyzed the Rohingya conflict through the lens of Islamophobia and localized unrest. But the land use since 2017 by the Army, and its importance for multinational investment, means Rakhine's land may have been the ultimate goal, and not just its unfortunate people.