Investigation inside the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone

Greenpeace Germany radiation survey of the Russian military impact

Above: Jan Vande Putte (left) and Mathieu Soete (right), Radiation protection advisors from Greenpeace Belgium, at work taking samples of radioactive earth from the location where the Russian military dug trenches and built defensive structures in their March 2022 occupation. In Ukraine, 17 July 2022. © Jeremy Sutton-Hibbert/ Greenpeace



Impact of Russia’s invasion



Jan vande Putte

I’m Jan Vande Putte and lead the radiation team in Chornobyl. Our aim is to investigate some of the many complex radiation issues in Chornobyl, including using our Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) drone technology and in field laboratory to try and understand some of the radiation hazards that exist inside the 2600km 2  Exclusion Zone, including where the Russian military were present.

Denys Tsutsayev

I am Denys Tsutsayev, logistician and translator of the Greenpeace mission in Chornobyl Exclusion Zone. Doing such a research during the war time has it's restrictions, much more stress for the whole team and of course more security concerns. We have spent just 4 days in the Exclusion Zone, trying to get samples of radioactive soil and it was a huge challenge. This mission showed us how huge the risks are for those who work there everyday, trying to protect people from radioactive pollution with the immediate threat to their lives from explosives which are scattered everywhere after the Russian invasion.

Laurence Bergot

I am Laurence Bergot, French radiation protection advisor. During the Chornobyl field trip of my colleagues I am remotely monitoring radiation risks in Ukraine 24/7 with colleagues from US and Europe. We especially look at forest fires in the Exclusion Zone, wind direction, and monitor and track the status of operating nuclear power plants at risk of major radioactive releases related to the war.

Shaun Burnie

I’m Shaun Burnie, senior nuclear specialist with Greenpeace Germany, and I have had the privilege to be part of the investigation team into some of the environmental radiological impacts of the Russian military’s seizure and occupation of the Chornobyl nuclear plant. The investigation is also about learning from those scientists and workers at the Chornobyl site about the many challenges to their work which have been so affected by the war and how going forward their vitally important work can be better supported.

The radiation monitoring and analysis equipment for the trip to Ukraine’s Chornobyl Exclusion Zone - at Greenpeace Germany’s Hamburg office, Germany, 7 July 2022 © Jeremy Sutton-Hibbert/ Greenpeace

The equipment and devices used in the field survey includes

  • A  Multirotor UAV drone designed and constructed for the Chornobyl mission to conduct  aerial radiation scans with gamma spectrometers.
  • Handheld measurement and sampling devices for alpha, beta and gamma radioactive particulate and emissions. (Georadis RT-30 Nal scintillator, Identifier Nal scintillator, alpha & beta sensor, alpha air sampler …etc.)
  • Portable personal radiation detectors (Thermo RadEye PRD, Thermo PD, Graetz GM)
  • Contamination monitor device (mini monitor with GM, Berthold contamination monitor)
  • Kromek Quant GR1: Portable sample measurement and analysis equipment with gamma spectrometry. 

Greenpeace Main Findings

The Greenpeace investigation team in Chornobyl main findings

1. Russian military actions have caused severe damage to essential laboratories, databases and radiation monitoring systems of the Chornobyl scientific infrastructure that was developed with the international scientific community.

2. Damage to the lab equipment needed to study the impact of radiation on people and the environment, threatens the safety of current and future generations.

3. Russian landmines throughout the Exclusion Zone put the lives of scientists at risk and prevent them from conducting their essential environmental work, including providing vital information to firefighters, the public and international community.

4. Radiation levels in areas where Russian military operations occurred to be at least three times higher than the estimation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

 5. Wide variations in contamination of Cs-137 concentrations ranging from 45000 Bq/kg to below 500Bq/kg.

6.Russian army disturbance of the soil layers can both bring to the surface low contaminated soil from deeper layers or higher contaminated soil from other layers. This can lead to a higher level of migration of radionuclides in the environment.

7. Measurements with a purpose-built UAV (drone) operating at 100m reveal much higher radiation levels in a wider area towards the south.

8. Around 200 cps (counts per second) were measured above the Russian camp, whereas 600-700 meters to the south the highest activity was almost 8000cps, a factor 40 higher (not corrected for saturation).


  • The Russian Federation launched an invasion into Ukraine on 24 February 2022. On the first day of the invasion, Russian Forces seized and took control of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant and surrounding 30km Exclusion Zone.
  • The Russian military forces that occupied Chornobyl was fairly small, likely to be battalion strength (approx 600 personnel).
  • Analysis of multiple sources of data, including satellite imagery, CCTV, social media and Russian order of battle tables suggests the main force used to seize territory within the Exclusion Zone was Russian Airborne (VDV) forces. Once captured, it is likely that control of the territory within the Exclusion Zone was passed to Motor Rifle (Mechanised Infantry) elements of the 36th Combined Arms Army.
  • Most activity was focused on an administrative building close to the plant and an encampment in the Exclusion Zone close to the Red Forest, adjacent to a road junction. The encampment expanded over the reporting period and involved the digging of trenches, shell scrapes and more substantial revetments.

  McKenzie Intelligence Services  are a team of ex-military intelligence professionals and remote sensing experts who specialise in delivering market-leading analysis of the impacts of natural disasters and conflict. Using the very latest in remote sensing technology, we provide insights into the circumstances of property damage and environmental degradation for our clients in industries such as insurance and media, as well as to NGOs and governments.  




IAEA radiation communication

“This is the truth and this is what people should understand.”

Above quote was how IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi reported the results of the IAEA Chornobyl radiation survey, on 28 April 2022. Greenpeace are concerned that for some reason the IAEA appears to be not interested in explaining the complex radiological environment that exists in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone. The IAEA conducted a survey at the abandoned Russian military camp at Yanov on 27 April 2022. It concluded that radiation levels, “were as low and within the operational range measured in the Exclusion Zone since it was established, and therefore considered that they posed no hazard to the public.” Samples were also taken but as of 20 July 2022 no publication of the results had been made.

IAEA nuclear safety experts conduct radiological measurements at the abandoned Russian military camp Yanov, Exclusion Zone, Chornobyl Ukraine. 27 April 2022. © IAEA

In considering the IAEA’s approach, Greenpeace stated in Kyiv that the IAEA exclusive focus on the external dose rate at the Yanov camp site misrepresents the complexity of the radiological risks. The IAEA did not even mention the greater risk of internal contamination, and that as confirmed by the Greenpeace survey, much higher radiation exists only hundred meters from the Yanov site; and there is a high variety of contamination within the camp site itself. None of these have been explained by the IAEA and their communications so far are inadequate.

Greenpeace is concerned that the IAEA is severely compromised in its role on nuclear safety and security in Ukraine by its ties to Russia’s nuclear state agency, ROSATOM, including its current IAEA Deputy Director Mikhail Chudakov, a long term ROSATOM official. Greenpeace in March 2022 wrote to DG Grossi asking for his suspension (Right) . The IAEA’s credibility is directly undermined by having a former ROSATOM official in such a senior position. There remains an  on-going nuclear crisis in Ukraine, as a consequence of Russia’s illegal war. It is not acceptable that at this time,  that the credibility of the IAEA and DG Grossi is in such doubt.  There are  serious questions to be answered by the IAEA on these matters.


History and risk of nuclear power

History of the Chornobyl disaster and containment

The Chornobyl site is the scene of the worst disaster in the history of nuclear energy. On 26 April 1986 reactor unit 4 suffered a catastrophic failure leading to meltdown, explosions and fire. Thirty-six years after the nuclear disaster at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant, the many complex radiation hazards at site remain, but the people of Ukraine are now suffering the catastrophe of an illegal war waged by the Russian government.



Chronology of the disaster

Google Earth time series images show the New Safe Confinement (NSC) construction process during the last 2 decades.

Data source: Google Earth Pro


Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-68, VIENNA, 2021

Over the decades, nuclear security specialists commissioned by Greenpeace have presented analysis to governments on the risks and consequences of the use of military grade weapons and tactics against vulnerable nuclear plants and materials. Those warnings have generally been ignored by the  IAEA  and the nuclear industry – and largely for one reason. To include potential military attacks into the design of a nuclear reactor would effectively exclude the possibility of ever building and operating commercial nuclear power plants.

The invasion of Ukraine by the Russian military poses an unprecedented nuclear threat, with the country’s 15 commercial nuclear reactors at risk of potentially catastrophic damage. An attack or even an accident at any of these plants could render vast areas of the European continent, including Russia, uninhabitable for decades.




DISCLAIMER: Greenpeace is politically independent and does not take sides in territorial disputes. Boundaries on maps reflect legal requirements and/or the data source used.

Content

Shaun Burnie, Jan Vande Putte, Adrian Kaul

Field photographer

Jeremy Sutton-Hibbert

Field videographer

Christian Åslund

StoryMaps producer

 Greenpeace East Asia

Jan vande Putte

Denys Tsutsayev

Laurence Bergot

Shaun Burnie

The radiation monitoring and analysis equipment for the trip to Ukraine’s Chornobyl Exclusion Zone - at Greenpeace Germany’s Hamburg office, Germany, 7 July 2022 © Jeremy Sutton-Hibbert/ Greenpeace

IAEA nuclear safety experts conduct radiological measurements at the abandoned Russian military camp Yanov, Exclusion Zone, Chornobyl Ukraine. 27 April 2022. © IAEA

Data source: Google Earth Pro

Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-68, VIENNA, 2021