Cuban Solidarity and American Division

Emerging from decades of Portuguese rule in 1975, the people of Angola found themselves in an exceedingly precarious geopolitical position. The MPLA, a leftist militant organization with a popular political wing, was favored to lead the country but faced strident opposition from the FNLA and UNITA, right-wing militant organizations with even harsher authoritarian bents and shoddy political capacity. More perilous still, the nation shared a border with the Union of South Africa, which proved itself willing to deploy force internationally to extend its racist hegemony. It was in this environment that Cuba and the United States intervened, with the former supporting the established MPLA government and the latter joining South Africa to back the insurgent FNLA and MPLA. 

The main driver of Cuba’s Angolan intervention seemed to be Castro’s own revolutionary idealism, characterized by U.S. intelligence as a “messianic sense of mission,” which had the objective of “free[ing] the people of the Third World from the misery and the oppression that tormented them,” (Gleijeses 25). Arguably, there was also a strong strategic (and so, self-interested) logic behind this. An aide to Che Guevara explained that “Cuba defends itself by attacking its aggressor… The Yankees were attacking us from every side, so we had to challenge them everywhere,” (Gleijeses 25).  Angola was indeed an ideal theater to foil and distract the U.S., but the timing of the intervention, launched in the middle of President Carter’s (consequently aborted) push for détente, ensured that the “Yankee” threat would be strengthened rather than weakened (Gleijeses 22). The main objective, then, was to “hold the line against apartheid,” (Gleijeses 526).

By the 70s, Apartheid South Africa had amply displayed its imperial tendencies and racist policies of oppression. The post WWII institution of pass laws inaugurated the precipitous decline of the already limited rights of nonwhite people in South Africa (Hall 2). When people gathered in Sharpesville in 1960 to protest these injustices the South African security forces massacred dozens and stamped out hope for civil political opposition (Hall 2). Also in the wake of World War II came the suppression of similarly meager civil rights in Namibia, then occupied by the South African government, which had overstayed its UN administrative mandate. Ever eager to extend its buffer zone, South Africa sought to install a friendly government in Angola and, faced with what Pik Botha termed “requests [from U.S. officials] South Africa to go in and assist UNITA,” they decided to invade in October 1975 (CNN "Cold War").

U.S. involvement in Angola began with this startlingly oversimplified explanation. This epidermal, self-absorbed approach would define the United States’ strategy going forwards. The term “self-absorbed” rather than “self-interested” is employed because it was actually against the material interests of the U.S. to engage in a protracted Angolan conflict. “Western countries, foremost the United States” Gleijeses notes, “were Angola’s major trading partners,” even years before the U.S. deigned to recognize the government (Gleijeses 159). Even in international diplomacy, where a communist government might be assumed to oppose the U.S., Americans were “pleased with the constructive role Angola had played in the Namibian negotiations,” (Gleijeses 160). The issue of contention, then, seems to have been purely on the ideological principle of anti-communism. This was enough to justify over a decade of diplomatic and material support for Angola's right-wing, Apartheid-friendly insurgents.

It was in this geopolitical context that the Cuban government intervened. Over more than a decade of Cuban involvement, tens of thousands of soldiers would be joined by 43,257 aid workers, including “doctors, nurses, engineers, and university professors,” (Gleijeses 518). Additionally, over six thousand Angolans “studied in Cuba on full scholarships funded by the Cuban government,” (Gleijeses 518). These were enormous provisions of aid, all the more so coming from a fellow underdeveloped nation. However, the Cuban government made very little use of this immense potential influence.

The last great contribution of the Cubans, and to a certain degree one where they took creative liberties with subordination to Angolan interests, was in the contribution of their negotiating prowess. In all talks with the U.S. and South Africa the Cubans were “clearly the senior partner,” and they retained their right to sign off on the timetable for troop withdrawal (Gleijeses 440). This “leading from the front” rather than “supporting from behind” attitude is out of keeping with proper solidarity, but it removed much of the diplomatic pressure exerted upon Angola. The MPLA government was very weak and vulnerable, thus likely to be forced into undesirable concessions. The Cubans provided the military might and sense of invulnerability necessary to rebuff pressure and force positive concessions. In this sense the Cubans met Steve Biko's prescription that allies should "serve as a lubricating material" for the liberation struggle (Biko 26). With this approach the Angolan-Cuban joint front were able to secure South Africa’s withdrawal, a promise to end South African aid to UNITA (the FNLA had become politically and militarily irrelevant in relatively short order), and free elections in Namibia.

The contest in Angola between the Cubans and the U.S. was one defined by diametrically opposed conceptions of pride. For the Cubans under Castro, the Angolan intervention was not only a means of countering U.S. interests, but a means of furthering global liberation as a whole and that of the Angolan people in particular. This solidarity-based pride carried through in the respectful, transparent manner in which the Cuban government engaged with the Angolan government, subordinating themselves in almost all cases to the interests and desires of the Angolan government. They rejected the temptation to use their enormous influence to manipulate the political landscape, as illustrated by their refusal to engage in purely domestic disputes. The pride which animated the U.S., by contrast, was one based upon a shallow Cold War mentality. They arguably mirrored the Cuban’s self-sacrificing opposition to imperialism in their self-sacrificing opposition to leftist (and later, Cuban) influence, insofar as the MPLA showed all signs of being willing to profitably collaborate with the U.S. (as its oil sector already did even without government recognition). The crucial difference is that the Cuban intervention was in the best interests of Angolan sovereignty and, to the best of their knowledge, of the Angolan people. Furthermore, their profuse provision of aid and scholarships ensured that their presence left a positive impact. The U.S. offered no significant civilian aid, and deliberately pursued courses of action that would, to the best of their intelligence, be inimical to Angola and Angolans. In the final analysis the U.S. had no substantial interest in Angola besides enforcing principles without a purpose. Cuba’s intervention, defined by respect and compassionate self-sacrifice, was an example of truly radical solidarity in a deeply cynical global order.

Works Cited:

Biko, Steve. "I Write What I Like." London: Bowerdean Press, 1987.

CNN. “Cold War: Good Guys, Bad Guys.” Last modified July 22, 2009. Video.   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c35COXObeo8.

Gleijeses, Piero. Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991. Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 2013.

Hall, Amanda Joyce. “The U.S. and Apartheid South Africa at the United Nations: The Possibilities and Limitations of UN World Governance.” Live lecture. February 3, 2021.

i24NEWS English. "Military History: South African Involvement in the Angolan Civil War." Last modified November 26, 2019. Video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kQUj7Q6kveM.

Stone, Oliver. "Comandante." Last modified September 27, 2015. Video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ui8Nd6Gzuw4.