Credit signing for Kenya financial parastatals technical assistance project. Seated from left to right: Mr. James S.A. Funna; [unknown]; and Mr. Edward V.K. Jaycox.

'Welcome to Kenya, IMF's Little Colony'

A Digital and Spatial Analysis of Neoliberal Transformation

Kara Moskowitz

During the late twentieth century, the global order transformed. Oil price hikes led to increased unemployment and rising food prices, alongside soaring debt and inflation. Like many other countries in the Global South, Kenya undertook structural adjustment programming – loans tied to conditionalities, based on free-market, neoliberal ideologies – which cut public spending, while also devaluing the Kenyan shilling. By 1992, debt service was equal to 40 percent of export earnings. 1  Economic insecurity rose sharply, further exacerbated by the withdrawal of state-sponsored social services. For Kenya’s middle class and poor, the last two decades of the twentieth century brought immense hardship.

This digital project examines some of the specific economic policies of structural adjustment, such as the privatization of state-owned industries, the capitalization of natural resources, and the withdrawal of social services, as well as the effects these policies had on ordinary Kenyans and on Kenyan society. Thus, it also tracks rising urban poverty, the theft of communal land, and school protests. In doing so, the project reveals the deep imprints structural adjustment made on Kenyan lives.

  1. James Howard Smith, Bewitching Development: Witchcraft and the Reinvention of Development in Neoliberal Kenya (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 33.

Privatizing State Corporations

01 / 05

The first Uchumi Supermarket opened in Nairobi in 1976 to much fanfare. By the end of the year, the capital city was home to three stores, including what was billed as the largest supermarket in East Africa. Uchumi, government officials frequently noted, was “100 per cent owned by Kenyans,” as a state corporation. Envisioned as a modern, convenient space for urbanites to shop, as a venue for marketing Kenyan-produced goods, and as a means to lowering the price of commodities, Uchumi Supermarkets symbolized entrepreneurship, self-sufficiency, and the economic promise of the new nation.

The remarkable growth of Uchumi occurred amidst a backdrop of economic decline. Compelled by international financial institutions and bilateral donors, Kenya undertook structural adjustment programming. Structural adjustment led to a rise in the cost of living, increased urban poverty, and the end of government set prices for foodstuffs, making it impossible for many Kenyans to afford whatever basic necessities were still available on supermarket shelves. Uchumi’s initial promise wore off.  

Though once acclaimed for being a “company for the wananchi [citizens],” by the last decade of the twentieth century, Kenya succumbed to international pressure to enact parastatal reform, announcing in 1991 the intention to sell shareholding in 139 state corporations, including Uchumi. By 1992, the supermarket had been privatized through sale on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. In the first few years after its sale, the supermarket saw continued success, as profits grew. With new management at the turn of the century, Uchumi began rapidly expanding. The expansion deviated from long-established strategy of careful, gradual growth and was an attempt to increase Uchumi’s value ahead of a proposed sale to a South African company. Despite over two decades of profitability, in a matter of years, the company became overleveraged and insolvent. In 2006, Uchumi closed its doors and went into receivership. Though the government intervened to bail out Uchumi, the store never fully recovered, frequently teetering on the edge of bankruptcy.

Translated from Swahili, “uchumi” means economy. At its founding, Uchumi’s mission was emblematic of the priorities for the Kenyan economy – import substitution industrialization, Africanization, consumer price protections, and marketing support for producers. By 1992, however, loan conditionalities attached to structural adjustment programs (SAPs) forced wholesale shifts in these policies, as state protections and support for Kenyan industry, trade, and consumers became replaced by market rationality.

The map to the right shows the locations of all the Uchumi outlets, at the height of its expansionist era. Though primarily centered in Nairobi, Uchumi eventually set up stores in other Kenyan towns, such as Mombasa, Eldoret, Nakuru, Meru, Nyeri, Kisii, and even abroad in Kampala, Uganda. From three grocery stores to thirty in less than three decades, Uchumi grew rapidly. Readers should use the zoom function on the map navigation to more closely examine specific locations, particularly in the Nairobi metropolitan area. They may click on any point, to get further information about the date of the store's opening, the branch name, and a location note.

As a parastatal, or state-owned company, Uchumi Supermarkets saw lots of success. Between 1982 and 1989, Uchumi’s profit increased by more than ten times. 1  Beginning in the 1986/87 financial year, profits grew substantially. In the financial year ending June 30, 1987, Uchumi reported profits of Sh36.5 million. By 1990/91, profits had skyrocketed to Sh133 million. 2  These numbers are especially impressive given the economic circumstances during this period. Though Kenya experienced a turn of economic fortunes in the mid-80s with strong coffee prices, these were reversed by the end of the decade, and with currency devaluations, price increases, and runaway inflation, urban poverty grew and consumer purchasing power declined.

  1. Samuel Nduati, “Uchumi profits exceed Sh27m,” Daily Nation, November 22, 1989.
  2. Francis Makokha, “Firm doing well – Uchumi boss,” Daily Nation, October 13, 1992; Peter Warutere, “Finance,” Daily Nation, November 25, 1989; “Supermarket posts Sh97m gross profit,” Daily Nation, August 1, 1991.

For many Kenyans, but particularly urbanites, the last two decades of the twentieth century were marked by recurrent recessions, intractable inflation, currency devaluations, price increases, food shortages, accelerating unemployment, and growing precarity, as austerity measures reduced social services and safety nets. Kenya’s inflation first began rising in 1973, after oil price shocks created adverse terms of trade. 1  Inflation remained high in the early 1980s and was accompanied by a growing fiscal deficit and deteriorating balance of payments, driving state officials to seek assistance from the World Bank and the IMF. 2  Nonetheless, Kenya’s inflation continued to fluctuate wildly, moving from 20 percent in 1981, down to 10 percent in 1985, back up to 20 percent by the end of 1990, and to 34 percent in 1992. 3  Inflation peaked in 1993 at an annual rate of 46 percent, finally beginning to fall in 1994. 4  Though these figures were oft-debated, two decades of high inflation undoubtedly hurt Kenyan consumers. 5 

The Kenyan state was also compelled to devalue its currency. 6  In a period of twenty months, between 1981 and 1982, the Kenyan shilling was devalued by 35 percent. 7  In May 1993, the Kenyan shilling was devalued by 30 percent, the third devaluation in three months. Devaluations substantially increased the cost of imports, ultimately increasing the price of locally manufactured commodities and agricultural produce, which relied on imported goods, such as oil, fertilizers, and machinery.

Part of Uchumi’s “original mission” had been “to take care of basic human necessities...” 8  Yet, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many consumers could not find essentials, nor afford them. 9  Maize, milk, and sugar, especially, were absent from store shelves. Shortages resulted from hoarding prior to expected price increases, inadequate incentives for producers, and the ineffectiveness of statutory boards tasked with regulating and distributing products. Many stores suspended selling ahead of an expected price rise. The image to the right shows customers waiting in line at an Uchumi, during a shortage.

Stock of essential goods was intimately tied up with pricing, and as part of their lending agreements, the Kenyan government was forced to, first, increase set prices and, later, to liberalize production, trade, and pricing. Price increases occurred frequently and affected many products, from necessities such as food and soap, to beer, cigarettes, soft drinks, and deodorant. Throughout the 1980s, prices rose, often by substantial amounts, and slowly the government decontrolled pricing, beginning with less sensitive items. By the end of 1993, all goods had been decontrolled, and the price of maizemeal had jumped by as much as 70 percent, following its complete liberalization. 10  Though maizemeal prices did eventually fall, they remained about 40 percent higher than prior to liberalization. 11  The price hikes not only threatened the urban poor already verging on destitution, but upset any semblance of expectation Kenyans possessed about estimating their costs of living.

  1. World Bank Group Archives (WBGA), Lewis T. Preston, President, “Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed IDA Credit of SDR 16.10 million (US $23.2 million) to the Republic of Kenya in Support of a Parastatal Reform & Privatization Technical Assistance Project,” November 9, 1992.
  2. The National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNAUK) FCO 31/5864, “Mrs Chalker’s Visit to Kenya: 26/29 January 1989: Kenyan Economy.”
  3. TNAUK OD 137/327, “Draft of the PEC Submission, Kenya: Programme Food Grant, £5 Million,” April 15, 1994.
  4. International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics, “ Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) – Kenya .
  5. TNAUK FCO 31/6137, JF Gordon, BHC, Nairobi, to Stuart Innes, Esq, EAD, FCO, “Kenya Round-Up 21 April – 6 May,” May 4, 1990.
  6. Robert W. Blunt has shown how inflation and devaluation “generated deep consternation about money and the morality of exchange and led to a profound sense of anxiety.” Blunt, For Money and Elders: Ritual, Sovereignty, and the Sacred in Kenya (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019), 138.
  7. “Economic Recovery on Its Way at Last,” Weekly Review, December 23, 1983.
  8. “Uchumi’s long march to fame: The weekly interview,” Daily Nation, November 24, 1992.
  9. Globally, rising food prices catalyzed popular protest. John Walton and David Seddon, Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1994).
  10. Ancent Kaloki, “Maizemeal price continues to rise,” Daily Nation, December 31, 1993.
  11. TNAUK OD 137/327, “Draft of the PEC Submission, Kenya: Programme Food Grant, £5 Million,” April 15, 1994.

           

Despite its initial success, On September 18, 1992, the government announced its intention to sell 40 percent of the company’s equity to private shareholders. 1 

Following the announcement, Uchumi launched an aggressive marketing campaign, calling it “The Greatest Sale in Kenya.” The text of advertisements noted: “Every day over 50,000 people pass through the doors of the twelve Uchumi Supermarkets making it the most successful retail operation in the history of Kenya.” 2  Many anticipated a “sensational public shares issue,” given the company’s success and popularity. 3  Uchumi was only the third state-owned company to be privatized through the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE).

The images to the right are advertisements ahead of the sale, published in newspapers and magazines.

  1. Francis Makokha, “Govt to float Uchumi shares,” Daily Nation, September 19, 1992.
  2. “The Greatest Sale Advertisement,” Weekly Review, October 30, 1992.
  3. “Good signs on investment front,” Daily Nation, November 10, 1992.

Neoliberal policies deconstructed the nationalized institutions of the economy, and the protections for Kenyan farmers, manufacturers, and consumers. Uchumi demonstrates the material effects of these policies for ordinary people, as their locally-owned grocery store went from affordable to empty shelved to closed, their purchasing power declined, and their cost of living grew, bringing ever more urban Kenyans to the brink of destitution.

The image to the right shows a lock on the door of an Uchumi branch in Nairobi after it went into receivership in 2006.

Capitalization of Natural Resources

01 / 06

Tourism, primarily in the form of wildlife viewing, became Kenya’s top revenue-generator in the late 1980s, a moment of economic crisis when external actors intervened aggressively. Tourism and environmental management, especially of fauna, became increasingly privatized and commodified during this period.

With growing debt and unstable markets for export commodities in the 1980s, IFIs, bilateral donors, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) promoted conservation through wildlife viewing. Kenyan tourism grew, producing, for the first time, more revenue and foreign exchange than agricultural exports. Simultaneously, poaching threatened elephants, rhinos, and the fledgling tourist industry. The Kenya Wildlife Service transformed into a paramilitary unit, garnering aid to fight poachers. Transnational conservation NGOs focused on endangered species through the funding of private game reserves. These reserves were established in the name of conservation, often by white Kenyans who adapted struggling cattle ranches. Not only did the new game reserves dispossess communities of land and resources, but ultimately, they contributed to the privatization of wildlife conservation, benefitting the white owners and the international safari-going elite.

The map here shows the locations of Kenya's most visited national parks in teal, and of private conservancies which were established during the early neoliberal era in the 1980s and 1990s, primarily in what is now Laikipia county. Readers may use the zoom function on the map to get a closer look at any region. Clicking on a park or conservancy will provide the name.

In Kenya, national parks were a colonial creation, which dislocated communities and served as a recreational outlet for white settlers. The establishment of the parks fit seamlessly into colonial policy, founded on the displacement of Africans for the advantage of Europeans. At independence, white supremacy over natural resources was partially undone. Africans could purchase farms in the highlands, and though white Kenyans and expatriates continued to work in the parks service, many jobs were Africanized. The postcolonial government encouraged the growth of the safari industry, establishing in 1965 the Kenya Tourist Development Corporation (KTDC), a parastatal which facilitated investment in tourism.

The image here is the sixth edition of the  "Kenya Safari" booklet  published by the Kenya Government Information Services in 1962, one year before independence. It reveals the expectation of white "consumption" of Kenya's fauna via safari.

Beginning in the 1980s, both the number of NGOs and the available funding grew, and conservationist organizations sought to intervene in wildlife preservation efforts with greater autonomy. Kenya’s Wildlife Fund Trustees (WFT), was charged with collecting and distributing donor funds for wildlife projects. All donor money was supposed to be channeled through the Wildlife Fund. 1  Even so, NGOs began circumventing this institution. While the WFT and Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife were eager to accept assistance, they still sought to determine the dynamics of these relationships, with Minister Ogutu reminding NGOs in 1979 that “donations with strings attached will not be acceptable as there should be good faith in Government of Kenya to administer worthy projects.” 3 

A decade later, much had changed. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) staff of the Nairobi office had grown from two to seventeen people in a matter of years, their own donor list a panoply of acronyms. 4  Kenya’s strapped treasury greatly underfunded the ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, which had not balanced its accounts since the 1979/80 financial year and had unpaid bills totaling 328 million Kenyan shillings. 5  Kenya’s parks and reserves were thus forced to rely increasingly on aid, which senior officials and bureaucrats continuously solicited. 6  

The image here shows the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Annual Report from 1986, with an elephant on its cover. NGOs centered their fundraising drives on endangered species. By 1980, the WWF had “made elephants the focus of major fund-raising effort,” and expected to raise more than one million U.S. dollars. 7  Indeed, the WWF had been among the first organizations to use lurid marketing campaigns to fundraise.

  1. Kenya National Archives (KNA) BA/1/44, “An Address by Hon. Mathew Ogutu, M.P. Minister for Tourism and Wildlife at the Joint Press conference of the Wildlife Fund Trustees Board / Wildlife Donor Organisations in Kenya,” 3 October 1979.
  2. KNA KW/8/1, “The Minutes of the 16 th  Meeting of the Board of Wildlife Fund Trustees,” 13 September 1979.
  3. KNA KL/19/5, “An Address by Hon. Mathew Ogutu, M.P. Minister for Tourism and Wildlife at the Joint Press Conference of the Wildlife Fund Trustees Board/Wildlife Donor Organizations in Kenya,” 2 October 1979.
  4. KNA KL/2/1, “IUCN Regional Office for Eastern Africa, Annual Report 1987.”
  5. KNA KW/2/6, Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Heads of Departments,” Utalii House, 12 April 1988.
  6. “Olindo gets more aid pledges as he ends tour,” Daily Nation, April 13, 1987
  7. KNA BA/1/68, “DRAFT: WWF/IUCN Position Statement on African Elephant Ivory Trade,” 14 February 1980.

By the 1980s, NGOs channelled resources towards other institutions, and as neoliberal ideologies became more entrenched, wildlife became commercialized. These shifts culminated in the creation of private conservancies, owned and operated by white Kenyans and expatriates. While these sanctuaries started as small endeavors, within a few years, many had expanded into full scale conservancies, creating trusts and conservation NGOs to manage the land and wildlife, while attracting tourists and donor money.

The handful of private sanctuaries that opened in the 1980s occupied vast tracts of land, and the majority were sited in Laikipia District (now County). Laikipia lies on a plateau and is bordered by the Rift Valley to the West, the Aberdare Mountains to the South, and Mount Kenya to the East, placing the plateau between two of Kenya’s most significant water catchment areas and wildlife habitats.

By 1990, there were at least six privately-run wildlife sanctuaries in, and around, Laikipia, all of which were owned and managed by people of European descent. This land had been inhabitated by Maasai pastoralists, displaced from the region in 1913 by the colonial government. Some of this land had been purchased by one white family from another in the twentieth century, but other pieces of land had been passed down for generations within a single family.

Though the white owners of private conservancies emphasized their dedication to environmental preservation, there were both real monetary incentives and new policy inducements, which likely motivated white landowners to shift away from cattle ranching and to ecotourism. The cattle ranching industry had become unpredictable, while both tourist revenues and conservation funding increased exponentially.

Sanctuaries – small and heavily-guarded – increased animal populations, while also drawing tourists. By 1986, 20 percent of Kenya’s rhinos were located on Solio ranch, owned by American Courtland Parfet, and by 1991, 45% of rhinos in sanctuaries were located on private land. 5  By 2012, half of Kenya’s black rhinos, three-quarters of its white rhinos, and 7,000 elephants – the nation’s second largest population – could be found in Laikipia, which has no national parks or reserves. 6  If tourists wanted to see the “big five,” private conservancies offered some of the best opportunities.

The image here shows a map of Ol Pejeta Conservancy. Lord Delamere – one of Kenya’s wealthiest and most influential white settlers –acquired Ol Pejeta in the 1920s, likely buying the farm from the former British soldiers allocated blocks of land after World War I. 7  His son, Tom Delamere, inherited Ol Pejeta and increased the acreage from about 60,000 acres to 110,000 acres through the purchase of neighboring farms. 8  The land then changed hands a few times, and was incorporated as a private cattle ranching company in 1953, before changing its status to a publicly traded company in 1965. 9  Adnan Khashoggi, a Saudi arms dealer, became the principal shareholder of the company in 1976/77. 10  Khashoggi transformed part of the ranch into a private game park for his billionaire family and friends, with renovations including a private airstrip and the Ol Pejeta Ranch House. 11  In 1987, Khashoggi sold the ranch to the multinational corporation Lonrho, led by Tiny Rowland, and Lonrho opened Sweetwaters Game Reserve at the end of 1988, which would become Ol Pejeta Conservancy. 12 

  1. “George and his land buying spree,” Daily Nation, November 22, 1999.
  2. “Ol Pejeta: A place in a class of its own: The club makes you enjoy the lavish lifestyle of a billionaire without being one,” Daily Nation, April 9, 1993
  3. “Ol Pejeta picks up in a good climate,” Daily Nation, June 5, 1989.
  4. Sources conflict here. At times, John and Jane Kenyan and then Marcus Wickham Boynton are mentioned, but at others, Dandy Wallace and Parfitt, Cath and Rouse are listed.
  5. “The Khashoggi Link,” Weekly Review, January 20, 1984
  6. “Lonrho estate sale explained,” Daily Nation, March 23, 1999.
  7. KNA DC/LKA 1980, “Laikipia District Annual Report for Year Ending 31 st  December 1980”
  8. KNA KW/5/2, “El Karama Ranch,” 1980.
  9. KNA KW/5/5, P.R. Jenkins, Senior Warden Planning, Wildlife Department on behalf of Lewa Downs Limited, “Lewa Downs Rhino Sanctuary Project,” May 1983.
  10. KNA KW/5/5, Ian H. Craig to Sindiyo, WCMD, 17 December 1982.
  11. Anthony Denton, “More help for Kenya’s special Black Rhino,” Daily Nation, May 14, 1986; R.A. Brett, “The Black Rhino Sanctuaries of Kenya.”
  12. Brock Bersaglio, “Green grabbing and the contested nature of belonging in Laikipia, Kenya: A gengealogy,” (PhD Thesis, University of Toronto, 2017), 127-28.

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, private conservancies in Laikipia were attracting large amounts of funding, while bringing in growing tourist revenues. In 1989, Prince Philip of the British royal family pledged sustained support from the WWF, presenting Sh1.6 million for the Nakuru, Ol Ari Nyiro, and Ngare Sergoi sanctuaries. The latter two were privately owned by white Laikipia families and received the bulk of this funding. 1  Ngare Sergoi had begun as a 5,000-acre rhino sanctuary, ensconced in a larger ranch. With the creation of the Lewa Wildlife Conservancy (LWC) in 1995, the entire ranch was set aside for conservation, increasing the area to 55,000 acres. By the 1997/98 financial year, less than fifteen years after the creation of the rhino sanctuary and just two years after the creation of the broader conservancy, Lewa's net tourism revenues had reached $139,550. Four years later, in the 2001/2002 financial year, revenues had more than doubled to $280,844, and by then, Lewa had a yearly operating budget of $850,000. 2  The operating budget relied on income from tourism, but also, funding from international donors, such as the World Bank’s Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the WWF, Switzerland’s Zurcher Tierschutz, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Ford Foundation, among others. 3  By 1997, wildlife contributed Sh2.8 million to Ol Pejeta’s profits. 4 

Private conservancies’ rapid success drawing both tourists and donor funding was due in no small part to the networks of their owners and managers. Kuki Gallmann – a wealthy Italian socialite and owner of Ol Ari Nyiro – had a personal relationship with Laurence Rockefeller, who pledged $100,000 to the Gallmann Memorial Foundation in 1991, and Isabella Rossellini joined the foundation’s board in 1992. 5  Charles Njonjo, Kenya’s Attorney General from 1963 to 1979, was both a shareholder and director, of Solio Ranch. Jessica Craig, the daughter of Ian Craig, longtime manager of Lewa, was rumored to be Prince William’s first girlfriend. The prince visited Lewa numerous times and even proposed to Kate Middleton there in 2010. 6 

Such connections not only ensured a flow of resources, but also provided conservancy owners with a layer of protection. Donor funding and support strengthened property owners’ claims to contested lands. 7  On various occasions, members of Parliament called on the government to appropriate large ranches for redistribution to landless Kenyans. 8  In a parliamentary debate in April 2000, Mr. Kihoro articulated these views: “We need proper land reforms in this country…I have seen that Ol Pejeta Farm is today now up for auction. Imagine 100,000 hectares for one individual! That does not happen even in heaven. God will never give you 100,000 hectares. It can happen in Kenya but not in heaven.” 9  Nonetheless, it was  Fauna and Flora International  – with financing from the  Arcus Foundation  – that would purchase Ol Pejeta in 2004. The Craig family also handed over ownership to a non-profit organization, the Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. Moving title deeds out of the hands of private owners further safeguarded the future of this land to remain under white management.

  1. Kwendo Opanga, “Prince praises Kenya for effort to protect rhino,” Daily Nation, February 21, 1989.
  2. Rockefeller Archives Center (RAC) Lewa Wildlife Conservancy (10151487), “Lewa Wildlife Conservancy – Kenya, Interim Report,” July 2002.
  3. RAC Lewa Wildlife Conservancy (10151487), “Grant Activities.”
  4. “Ranching firm’s earnings top Sh20m,” Daily Nation, February 18, 1997.
  5. RAC Kenya Gallman Memorial Foundation, The Gallmann Memorial Foundation, “News from Kenya,” December 1992.
  6. Paul Palmer, “Will Plans His Secret Safari,” London Evening Standard (published in the Daily Nation) December 17, 2004.
  7. Bersaglio, “Green Grabbing,” 144-45.
  8. Irungu Ndirangu, Lucy Oriang’ and Chris Musyoka, “Wamae calls for takeover of ranches,” Daily Nation, March 29, 1984.
  9. Parliamentary Debates, April 5, 2000.

In the early postcolonial era, Kenyan state officials had prioritized the Africanization of both conservation and tourism, supporting indigenous business owners, training Kenyans, and investing in tourist infrastructure, particularly hotels and lodges. By the 1980s, however, NGOs played a growing role in the conservation sector, often channeling resources away from Kenyans and Kenyan institutions, and wildlife became marketized. These shifts culminated in the creation of private conservancies, owned and operated by white Kenyans and expatriates, who benefited from the new ecotourism economy by drawing funding and tourists, while also diverting state resources away from public institutions.

School Protests

Structural adjustment lending conditionalities compelled states to restructure their economies, their governments, and their societies through a whole host of new policies. Neoliberal ideology took aim at large states and bureaucracies and the spending of public resources for social services, such as education.

Under these circumstances, the Kenyan state cut funding to primary and secondary schools, as well as to public higher education. Teachers were fired, classrooms became overcrowded, and supplies and textbooks grew harder to come by. Spaces at the public universities became increasingly difficult to secure. Those lucky enough to be admitted contended with over-crowded classrooms without chairs or desks, missing materials, shortages of equipment, and the absence of promised student accommodations. 1  Education, which Kenyans deeply valued and had long been seen as a path to upward mobility, became another reason for disappointment and another arena of societal decline.

As schools became increasingly dysfunctional, they turned into sites of resistance. The map to the right tracks school protests at four public universities during the late twentieth century -- University of Nairobi, Kenyatta University College (now Kenyatta University), Moi University, and Egerton University. All four university campuses remain in the same locations, but each has expanded through satellite campuses.

The University of Nairobi was established in 1956, but only became an independent university in 1970, when the University of East Africa split. It remains Kenya's largest university. Kenyatta University College began as a teaching college and constituent of Nairobi University, and then later, officially became the third public university in 1985. Moi University is considered Kenya's "second university," established in Eldoret in 1984, under President Moi, and with the aim of training the Kenyan workforce and of easing overcrowding at Nairobi. Egerton University has the longest history, with its establishment in 1939, though it began as an agricultural college for colonial white settlers. In 1979, it expanded, becoming part of the University of Nairobi system and, in 1987, it became an independent, chartered public university. Other post-secondary institutions existed at this time, including institutes of science and technology, polytechnics, and teachers' colleges, along with private universities.

Readers should use the legend on the left side of the map. School protests are divided by the decade in which they occurred, and by the type of protest, whether in response to the economy, politics, or university policies. Readers should also use the zoom function to take a closer look at the protests which occurred on each campus. Clicking on any mapped point provides additional information about the protest, including the date, whether it led to a campus closure, mortality numbers, and a description.

  1. KNA ACW/20/31, A.S. Amisi, Hassan Bagha, to Mr. Nanga, Mr. Mule, “2 nd  Special Meeting of the University Council,” 31 March 1980.

As the map reveals, political, economic, and university issues all catalyzed campus protests in the late twentieth century. This was a period not just of economic decline, but also, of political turmoil. Indeed, the very first protests tracked through this project commemorated the anniversaries of J.M. Kariuki's death, a populist, socialist politician, who was assassinated in 1975. University students also protested the Kenya African National Union's decision to prohibit some Kenyans from running for office in general elections, the arrest of student union leaders, the murder of Cabinet Minister Robert Ouko in 1990, ethnic land clashes, and the government crackdown on opposition politicians, among many other political issues.

Economic and university issues were often entangled, because the nation's economic hardships resulted in structural adjustment lending agreements, which led to cuts, and thus contributed to student discontent. Students protested crowding in their residence hall accommodations, poor university food, tuition hikes, reduced allowances, high exam fees, and the easing of entrance requirements for those who could pay their own tuition. At the heart of these protests, then, was the decline of the public university system, which had initially offered promising students the ability to complete an undergraduate degree, but increasingly, excluded the poor and middle class who could neither afford to pay the higher fees, nor gain entrance when wealthier students were favored.

Though university financing had been a problem since the early 1980s, these issues - and the protests which followed - climaxed in the late 1980s and 1990s. In 1988, the government drastically reduced funding for public universities. As a result, student allowances for food and lodging were phased out, and tuition and other fees raised continually. By 1998, students who could pay the full tuition had to meet fewer entrance requirements for admission to public universities. Entry to university was already highly sought after and extremely competitive, and this new policy only inflamed feelings of discontent and injustice.

Protests became, as the Daily Nation article to the right notes, "a feature of life on campuses." Often, protests disrupted students' education, as the government or school leaders closed universities for weeks or months at a time in response. Increasingly, police responded with violence, and student injuries and deaths were not unheard of. A student at Moi University was shot to death during protests over a new annual tuition fee on June 30, 1991, and another four students were shot to death during protests in late 1996 and early 1997. Many others were injured during protests.

Intimately tied up with higher education was primary and secondary education. Not only were they part of the same educational system, but postsecondary institutions were intended partially to train the teachers of the future for primary and secondary education.

In April 1983, the Ministry of Basic Education announced that Kenya would change from a 7-4-2-3 system to an 8-4-4 system. The latter, which fixed primary education at eight years, secondary at four years, and postsecondary at four years, had been recommended by the 1981 Presidential Working Party on the Establishment of the Second University. Initially, much public attention focused on the logistical challenges of extending primary education from seven to eight years. Since the majority of Kenyan students ended their education after primary school, this change entailed adding extra classrooms to every school building and creating new curriculum, but also hiring additional teachers, buying new books and equipment, and funding an extra year of school milk and food programming.

Soon, the implications came to universities as well. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, universities had to contend with "double intake," as those completing their "A" levels in the old educational system and those completing their fourth year of secondary school in the new 8-4-4 system, entered university at the same time.

Administrators only resolved this issue through the "relay system," where the university remained open all year long, with three-quarters of the student body on campus and one quarter on holiday at any given time. Lecturers were required to work the entire year without break, and facilities were overcrowded. As a statement from the university senate noted after the closure of Egerton University, following a student protest: "It is a system which if not managed with patience and determination can abort the whole academic year..." 1 

As the political cartoon to the right, published in the Daily Nation in July 1993 makes clear, the 8-4-4 system on the whole remained unpopular for years. The new system, which was rapidly and haphazardly implemented, combined with major cuts to educational funding, only increased student and public discontent.

  1. KNA ACW/3/345, “Why Egerton University Had to Close: A Statement by the University Senate for Information of Parents, Guardians and Members of the Public.”

In spite of the decline in funding for public education, and in turn, the increasing burden placed on university students to pay for their educations, the Kenyan state sought to expand the university system in the early 1980s. When state actors considered the establishment of a second university in 1981, financing was a critical question. Kenyan bureaucrats acknowledged that they could not raise the funding from within the country, and that it would be "necessary to make appeals to practically all our international friends, for financial assistance." 1 

Moi University opened in 1984, though most facilities were initially makeshift. State actors still sought additional financing for the institution, and construction of academic buildings carried on for years afterward. When Margaret Thatcher sought to visit Africa in early 1988 -- and most African leaders refused, given her stance on apartheid sanctions -- President Moi happily invited her, using the opportunity to seek aid. Thatcher's visit was the first by a serving British prime minister to Kenya. 2  While Moi -- under increasing political and economic pressure -- needed Thatcher to confer some prestige, Thatcher also needed Moi, because "Britain's standing in Africa" had become "so poor." 3 

The images to the right show Thatcher's visit to Moi University, where she planted a tree, visited the library, donated scientific laboratory equipment, and pledged further assistance to the library. It is unsurprising that Moi University made it on Thatcher's brief itinerary; not only did the eponymous name honor Kenya's president, but he considered the university a pet project meant to balance out what he saw as the elitist, urban, and politically dissenting students and faculty of the University of Nairobi, by selecting a more rural location - Uasin Gishu - close to his home area for the new institution.

Indeed, in 1994, Moi University opened a new library, The Margaret Thatcher Library. A product of the promises Thatcher had made during her visit, the new building was completed with £8.4 million of British aid. 4  Aside from Thatcher's involvement, the name befits the historical era. Thatcherism helped usher neoliberal ideologies and policies into the United Kingdom and beyond, and Kenya's second university - established at a time of state retraction and public funding cuts - became a truly neoliberal institution.

  1. KNA ACW/1/362, J.T. arap Leting, PS Ministry of Higher Education, to Y.F.O Masakhalia, Esq., the PS Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, “Financial Grants for the Second University Under Technical Assistance,” 3 November 1982.
  2. “Thatcher goes on tour in Africa,” The Guardian, 4 January 1988.
  3. Victoria Brittain, “Flags of Shame,” The Guardian, 5 January 1988.
  4. "British aid to Kenya continues to grow," Daily Nation, 14 June 1995.

Acknowledgements

Thank you to the Taylor Geospatial Institute for assistance. Research for this project was conducted at the Kenya National Archives, the National Archives of the United Kingdom, the World Bank Group Archives, the International Monetary Fund Archives, the Churchill Archives Center, the Rockefeller Archives Center, and the New York Public Library Archives, as well as with historical newspapers, particularly the Daily Nation and the Weekly Review.