Brisbane in Flood: 1893, 1974, 2011

The city of Brisbane has become synonymous with the term ‘river city’. Over the years, the Brisbane River has become more than a water feature; it is a defining feature of Brisbane’s identity, a vital economic resource, and a source of both growth and challenge for residents. This river system, at the heart of the city’s urban design, unites suburbs, sustains economic growth, and provides natural beauty and recreation for the community. 

Despite these benefits, the Brisbane River has also been the source of recurring disasters, with major floods in 1893, 1974, and 2011. These major flood events have caused significant damage to local communities, infrastructure and the economy, leading to changes in how residents perceive and interact with the river.

Exploring these Brisbane floods and their lasting influence on human interaction with the river highlights the importance of understanding past disasters and learning from them. It also underscores the impact of public opinion on flood management and how residents’ perceptions can shape management approaches. Examining the effects of these historical floods reveals the evolution of Brisbane’s flood resilience and highlights how the city has adapted to the challenges of living in a flood-prone region. Additionally, these experiences have shaped contemporary flood management approaches, influencing policies aimed at balancing economic growth with the need for resilient, sustainable infrastructure in response to the recurring threat of floods.

The Brisbane river is approximately 309 kilometres long, and flows from Mount Stanley to the ocean at Moreton Bay. It cuts through the heart of Brisbane dividing it into two halves – north and south, with the inner city being established around the river system. The river, and surrounding areas are a low-lying floodplain that has a history of flooding. Despite this, settlement and significant development has occurred along the river, with properties being built along the riverbank. 

From colonial settlement in 1824 onwards, the Brisbane River was forever changed. Early penal settlers saw the economic and navigational potential that the Brisbane River and surrounding lands had to offer. The river offered the potential for an easily navigable system. It also held promise as an economic source, with abundant timber and fertile land in the surrounding area.This view, that the Brisbane River and surrounding land were a source of economic potential, continued from the start free colonial settlement in 1842 and beyond. The river showed its capacity to serve as an effective means of a water supply and a transport route. The land surrounding the river also presented the opportunity for housing development, in the form of large estates and cost-effective housing, often for working families. The fertile land also proved effective as farmland. 

During Brisbane’s early colonial occupation in the 1820s, signs of extreme flood events were noted by explorer John Oxley, specifically, inundation near Kholo Creek was observed. Explorer and botanist Alan Cunningham also recorded flood evidence, noting ‘water-borne debris well above the banks’. (Cook 2019, 6)

After colonial occupation but prior to 1893, floods also occurred in the years of 1841, 1843, 1844, 1845, 1857, and 1863. The floods in 1843, and 1863 were ‘big’ floods. There was also a ‘great’ flood in 1890, with local residents having to abandon their homes. During the course of the flood, residents were forced to seek shelter on their roofs for weeks at a time. Although the first flood classified as ‘major’ was in 1893, there were previous significant floods within the region.  

There is also evidence that First Nations peoples were aware of prior flooding events. As noted by Archibald Meston, the Cooyar people inhabiting an upper segment of the river, detailed a story of a significant flood in the area. Meston recounted that John Campbell, who was ‘on friendly terms’ with First Nations peoples, was told by an Indigenous leader named ‘Multuggorah’ that the floods would return (Meston 1893, 8). ‘Multuggorah’ informed Campbell that the flood of 1841, would return soon, and then not return until much later in life (Meston 1893, 8). 

Even though the knowledge of flooding in Brisbane was not new information, the local population in the floodplain continued to grow. By the 1891 Census, Brisbane had become the fourth largest city in Australia, with an approximate population of approximately 101, 000 inhabitants.The flood risk posed by the Brisbane River was not a deterrent for settlement within the region, as the economic potential of the region outweighed the flood threat.

In 1893, Brisbane’s first major flood event hit, with three separate flood peaks throughout February. Due to the significant growth of the Brisbane population, this unprecedented flood washed away homes, businesses and infrastructure including Victoria and Ipswich Bridge, causing significant damage to the local infrastructure and economy. The 1893 flood was a harsh introduction to the challenges of living alongside the river for colonial settlers and residents.

The flooding was also not isolated to one area of Brisbane, with all developed areas impacted in some capacity. Across the region, Queensland Government Hydraulic Engineer John Ballie Henderson estimated that 421 hectares in Ipswich, 128 hectares in North Brisbane, and 348 hectares in South Brisbane were inundated.

The flood had three main peaks, occurring throughout the month of February.The initial 1893 flood peak, February 5, was extreme, causing widespread damage. In South Brisbane, it led to the destruction of 198 buildings and damage to an additional 67. The second flood peak, February 12, was smaller than the initial flood peak. The third flood peak, February 19, reached a similar height to the first, with a peak only 0.2 metres below the its level.

 Although the first and third flood peaks reached similar levels, the main difference between them was the extent of destruction caused. Theophills Pugh described the third flood peak as “very similar to the previous calamity, only there were no bridges to carry away, and few houses, those within reach of flood influences having already succumbed” (Pugh 1894, 76).

The 1893 flood peaks caused severe damage to local infrastructure, most notably to Victoria Bridge, connecting North and South Brisbane. During the course of the floods, inundated houses and debris travelled downstream, becoming caught in and ultimately destroyed by Victoria Bridge. The destruction was described as, “hundreds of wooden houses, once the happy homes of owner or occupier, careered upon the flood, often remaining whole till they struck Victoria Bridge, when they crashed like matchboxes, and broke away into shapeless masses of wood and iron” (Brisbane Courier 1893, 2).

There were “grave” concerns for the security and structure of Victoria Bridge (Brisbane Courier 1893, 2). The bridge had sustained substantial damage from the debris; however, the Colonial Secretary assured people that steps would be taken to “remove the incubus”(Brisbane Courier 1893, 2). 

Despite hopes that the bridge would withstand the severity of the damage the northern section collapsed. News of the bridge collapse circulated quickly, with numerous residents gathering to view the damage. It was seen as the “climax of the awful series of catastrophes which had befallen Brisbane” (Telegraph 1893).

The bridge was essential to Brisbane as it connected the northern and southern sides of the river and serving as a central part of the city. Due to the bridges collapse, South Brisbane was separated from the north until the completion of a new bridge in 1897.

Indooroopilly Bridge, another calamity of the floods, sustained extreme damage that impacted transportation in the area. As the force of the flood waters continued to increase, there was concern raised as to the stability of the bridge which resulted in precautionary measures being taken on Saturday 4 February. Similar measures as previously taken during the 1890 Brisbane floods, resulted in a loaded train being placed on the rail bridge in hopes that the extra weight would help stabilise the structure, however, the force of the water was too great and caused the bridge to collapse.

This meant that the railway line between the central and western suburbs towards Ipswich was eliminated. Eventually, railway transport between the north and south was re-established. However, this did not occur for more than two years, until the construction of Albert Bridge replaced Indooroopilly Railway Bridge.

The flood events also caused damage to River Road, today known as Coronation Drive. Flood waters deposited mud and debris along the route and had “gouged” the road out in three locations (England 2007, 102). The road served as the main thoroughfare from the western suburbs into Brisbane, and the damage effectively limited access for farmers.

The repairs for the route fell under the purview of the Toowong Shire. At the time of the floods, the council were struggling financially. Therefore, in order to pay for the necessary repairs to River Road, the council implemented tolls along the route.

For two years after the floods, the tolls were implemented without disagreement. Eventually, however, the tolls proved too great an expense for farmers from St Lucia, Indooroopilly, Long Pocket, and other surrounding areas. Dairymen using the route to journey to the city could not afford the expense of the tolls. In response, animosity arose between the Toowong Shire Council and Indooroopilly and Taringa Divisional Boards.

The floods had widespread economic ramifications that were felt across Queensland. In the lead up to the 1893 flood, Brisbane was financially struggling and was the “most utterly bankrupt and poverty-stricken of all Australia’s capitals” (The Bulletin 1893). This perilous financial situation was no doubt exacerbated by the damage, and subsequent cost of repairs caused by the extensive flooding. Initially following the events, the damage caused was estimated to be approximately £2, 000, 000. However, a later estimate of the cost of damage places the sum closer to three million pound sterling.

The loss of Victoria Bridge and Indooroopilly Railway Bridge were severe economic hits to the Brisbane, in part this can be associated with a loss of profits and resources by the limited access between the northern and southern sides of the river. Additionally, the cost of reconstruction would also have been significant, as Victoria Bridge was valued at £140,000.

One of the greatest impacts of the flooding was the loss of 35 lives. Despite some discourse that the loss of life was “happily not [considered] great”, the devastation was felt widely (The Graphic 1893). 

This was reflected in the newspaper rhetoric of the time, which extensively discussed the loss of life. In particular, there was much media coverage surrounding the death of Constable James Sangster.

Constable Sangster lost his life during a rescue attempt to save the Jackson family. Members of the Jackson family drowned while attempting to reach high ground as their house was under threat of inundation. Some members, Mrs Jackson and her daughter Beatrice, were eventually rescued. The Daily Telegraph recounted the deaths of the members of the Jackson family, particularly noting that the “screams,…heard plainly by those left in the house, were most heartrending” (Daily Telegraph 1893).

The extensive discussion of the flood’s impacts within newspapers reflected society’s view of the flood event. Generally, that the floods were seen as “calamities” that “desolated Brisbane and the adjacent towns” (The Bulletin 1893). Particularly, the continued devastation and destruction caused by the floods and the impact on housing infrastructure, “every here and there were drawn faces and wet eyes, [the floods] … had driven hundreds from their homes in the pitiless rain, many leaving their little all behind them” (Brisbane Courier 1893).

Rhetoric that Brisbane was a victim of the river and its “evils” caused by the floods was commonplace (The Brisbane Courier 1893). Following the flood events of 1893, local residents appealed to the government to limit future flooding. Amongst local residents, there was the idea that Brisbane River could be altered to prevent future flooding, through the use of civil engineering solutions.

One solution, put forward by resident J. P. Thomson, was for the construction of water reservoirs, with the main purpose being water retention of the head flood waters of the upper catchment. The Brisbane Courier debated this solution and determined that the water storage would be “most valuable” (The Brisbane Courier 1893). This approach would balance water volume, provide water for irrigation, and address the issue of water supply during droughts. The major limitation of this solution was the practicality and cost of implementation.

Similar solutions were explored by James Baillie Henderson, whom the state government had appointed to investigate the floods, including the origins, and scope of the flood events, and potential future preventative measures. In response, Henderson published several reports of his findings.

Based on his final findings, Henderson concluded that modifying the river was the most viable and economical solution. This echoed the wider societal belief that the environment needed to be controlled to ensure human advancement. Henderson offered three main approaches, the first of which included reducing river corners at Bulimba Point, Norris Point, Kangaroo Point, and Gardens Point with the goal of widening the river.

This approach was estimated to have a total cost of £2,698,684. If completed, this solution would lower future flood levels, accelerate water discharge from the river, enhance ship navigation, and generate reclaimed land to offset project costs. The second solution mirrored the initial approach, with the addition of shortened river routes in Kangaroo Point and New Farm. This approach had a rough cost of £3,374,891. The final solution suggested by Henderson was implementing a portion of the initial approach before completing it at a subsequent time. This approach had an approximated cost of £2,047,360.

Despite the widespread and common belief that engineering based solutions were the most suitable, there was also a minority belief that sought other solutions. Particularly, the limitation and relocation of residential development on the floodplain should occur. The Brisbane Courier proposed laws that dictate that land “within ordinary flood mark”, not be used for residential development (Brisbane Courier 1893).

An anonymous individual, under the pseudonym “Exchange No Robbery”, put forth a similar suggestion (Brisbane Courier 1893). The author proposed that willing residents affected by the 1893 floods be allowed to exchange their land rights for areas of similar economic value within Crown lands, away from the river’s edge.

This approach was also supported by Henderson in his final report. Henderson recommended that preventative action be taken to limit construction within low-lying areas of the floodplain. 

Although there were differing opinions on flood mitigation strategies, it was universally agreed that a solution to address the floods was necessary. However, there was limited political support for the financing of flood mitigation strategies. Final solutions included increasing the river depth by 20ft in regions with low water depth (approximately 6 metres), cutting off various corners, and the construction of training walls near Hamilton, though this was not funded until 1898.

Between 1893 and 1974, Brisbane had remained relatively “flood-free” (Cook and Harrison 2022, 104). However, this came to an end in 1974, as throughout the Australia Day long weekend, Brisbane’s second major flood struck. Like the 1893 flood, this flood resulted in significant damage to infrastructure, particularly residential buildings, and the local economy. Once again, this flood served as a reminder to local residents of the flood risk associated with living on the floodplain. 

The 1974 flood occurred following major monsoonal rainfall due to Cyclone Wanda. Across Queensland, the effects were widely felt, as preceding weather patterns had caused most water bodies to flood numerous times from December 1973 to March 1974. Within Brisbane, the flood reached a peak of 5.45 metres. The flood resulted in the loss of 14 lives in Brisbane and had extensive impacts to infrastructure. 

The effects of the 1974 flood were greater than that of the 1893 floods due to the increased development across the floodplain. The flood damaged and/or inundated an estimated thirteen thousand buildings across the floodplain.

Although access between the north and south sides of Brisbane was not restricted, as it was during the floods of 1893, the damage was still widespread. Adrian McGregor, a correspondent for The Bulletin, recounted some of his personal flood experiences. In particular, McGregor noted the disappearance of four homes, with “only their concrete stumps” showing where they had been (McGregor 1974, 21). May James also detailed her first-hand flood experiences. “Brand new homes being inundated, some well past the top floor level. The sight was heart breaking and will live in my memory forever” (James 1974, 14). These first-hand accounts illustrate both the physical and emotional impact of the flood on individuals and communities. 

In total, the damage caused by the 1974 flood was estimated at $142 million, due to river inundation. Flooding also caused indirect damage, including the economic impact of loss of income. Approximations valued indirect damages to be roughly equivalent to $178 million.

Comparable to the 1893 floods portrayal within newspapers, the floods were again negatively depicted within the media. Notably, the flood was painted as “heartless or as angry and aggressive” (McKinnon and Cook. 2020, 1). In contrast to this, residents were described as “vulnerable and heartbroken, yet ultimately brave and honourable” within media (McKinnon and Cook 2020, 1).

In the aftermath of the flood, the level of damage was discussed at length within the media, particularly newspapers. This often-entailed first-hand retellings of this “great tragedy”, that highlighted the devastation caused by the flood (James 1974, 14). A 1974 article in Australian Women’s Weekly compared the aftermath of the flood to “viewing London’s bomb-shattered areas right after the end of World War II” (Australian Women's Weekly 1974, 4). Another article about the flood, entitled “Misery, death – trouble to come”, further conveyed the damage and destruction caused by the flood within the media (McGregor 1974, 21).

In the years following the 1974 floods, the devastation caused was continually perpetuated within the media. For instance, a documentary marking the ten-year anniversary of the flood discussed the types of memories that would live on past from the floods. The documentary highlighted that “memories of heartbreak, of loss, despair” would endure (McKinnon 2019, 208). Most importantly it noted that “memories of how a city had fought back and survived one of nature’s greatest assaults on its security” would persist after the flood (McKinnon 2019, 208). Accounts such as this further solidified the widespread prevailing belief among residents that the river was a relentless adversary, especially due to its recurring floods.

The engineering solutions that became the dominant response following the major floods of 1893 persisted beyoned the 1974 flood. Following the 1893 floods, Somerset Dam, located approximately 115 kilometres northwest of Brisbane, was constructed to partly serve as a water supply and in part, as a flood mitigation strategy, dam construction was completed by 1959 and changed flood patterns with the region. Subsequently, the dam also acted to reduce flood peaks. During the 1974 flood, it was estimated that Somerset Dam lowered the flood-water level within Brisbane City by approximately one metre.

Before the 1974 flood, plans for further engineering development were announced in 1971, namely the construction of Wivenhoe Dam. However, after the destruction in 1974, there was a renewed sense of urgency for the construction of the dam. Queensland Premier at the time, Joh Bjelke-Peterson, supported dam construction and said that it would serve as “flood mitigation” (Cook 2019, 114).

In 1984, Wivenhoe Dam was officially opened, ten years after the 1974 flood. Among local residents a lasting belief emerged that, thanks to the dam, Brisbane was now essentially “flood proofed” (McKinnon 2019, 209). This belief was dispelled less than forty years later when the next major Brisbane flood struck in early 2011. 

During January 2011, extreme flooding again occurred within the Brisbane River catchment. Intense rainfall was experienced, with the heaviest rainfall focused inland in the upper Brisbane River. Like the past major floods, the 2011 Brisbane floods caused severe damage and destruction to local communities, infrastructure and the economy. 

From 1974, urban development continued within the floodplain, regardless of the known the flood risk. Of particular concern was the fact that development under known flood levels continued to be approved. This exacerbated the damage caused by the 2011 floods, with an estimated 29,000 residential homes being inundated by flood waters. Within Brisbane alone, over 15,000 properties were flooded, with approximately 3,600 houses evacuated.

Damage to infrastructure was extensive, with total costs estimated at greater than $5 billion. Across Queensland, more than 200,000 individuals were impacted by the flood. One of the main economic factors that illustrated the extent of the damage was insurance claims. After flood damages, an estimated 52,600 insurance claims were submitted by residents, costing insurance companies $2.55 billion.

In the aftermath of the 2011 floods, public attention shifted from the damage to potential lessons from the events. Like the media rhetoric surrounding the 1974 event, there was substantial public discourse surrounding the role and management of Wivenhoe Dam in the floods.

The Insurance Council of Australia engaged hydrologists to explore the events that led to the 2011 flood. Notably, one of the main focuses was to investigate the claim that water releases from Wivenhoe Dam had partially caused the flood. Through the investigation it was determined that during the flood event, two major flood events occurred. The first flood event was attributed to rainfall and subsequent flash flooding, while the second event was attributed to the release of water from Wivenhoe Dam. As a result, within the media the idea that the flood was “man-made” was further perpetuated (Cook and Harrison. 2022, 109).

After the perceived 'failure' of Wivenhoe Dam to prevent flooding, the 2011 floods prompted further changes to government flood mitigation strategies. In response to community discontentment, the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry was created. The Commission published a report, with 177 recommendations for governments after the floods.

One particular project that followed the recommendations was the Brisbane River Catchment Flood Studies. This called for whole catchment management approaches with an increased focus on a “holistic approach to flood management”, to reduce flood risk as opposed to smaller localised management strategies (Cook and Harrison. 2022, 106). This included “engineering, land use planning, disaster management, communications and engagement, environmental management, infrastructure management, economics and architecture” (Cook and Harrison. 2022, 108). Although modernised, this approach still resembles previous management approaches that sought to control the environment.

The major Brisbane floods of 1893, 1974, and 2011 influenced subsequent interaction with the river, due to their widespread impacts on local communities, infrastructure and economy. 

Across all three floods, the media perpetuated a discourse regarding the extent of damages and the loss of life and livelihood caused by the floods. Despite the significant damage endured in each flooding event, however, public perception and mitigation strategies mostly aimed to alter or control the river system to better serve human needs and decisions, such as continuing to build and live in flood prone areas. 

From 1893 onwards, there has been a focus on engineering-based solutions to lessen flood levels and mitigate flood impacts by changing the natural structure of the river or by building structures to contain the river water. This has had some success, evidenced by lowering expected flood levels. However, after 2011 the need for a multi-disciplinary approach was acknowledged following extensive investigations due to the significant financial consequences of the flood. This investigation showed the need to develop broader strategies that include communication, disaster and environmental management and improved land use planning.   

There is no doubt that Brisbane and the river need to find a way to co-exist and minimise the community disruption and economic impacts from future flood events. An under-explored option that could supplement other existing strategies is to look at the past and learn from First Nations peoples, who respected flood cycles and coexisted with the river with minimal impact.

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