Making Sense of China's Involvement Within Africa
Promises, Challenges, and Narratives
In prior decades, China's involvement with Africa has waxed and waned depending on the era, motivated by either socialist solidarity, anti-colonial sentiments, anti-imperialist sentiments, or economic pragmatism (Shinn and Eismann 39-41). In recent years, China has been increasing its involvement within the African continent while simultaneously growing in economic power. In 2009, China surpassed the United States to become Africa’s largest trading partner; by 2010, trade between China and African nations reached up to $128.5 billion (Shinn and Eismann 52). As of 2018, China has financed about $148 billion in African debt (Acker et al. 4).
The growing monetary value of China's involvement with Africa has garnered the attention of scholars, policymakers, laypeople, and government officials alike; sometimes, however, the discourse on China-Africa relations is inaccurate, reductive, and misleading (Brautigam 280). The main thrust of this project, then, is to offer a perspective from which a reader can resist the reductive narratives which surround contemporary China-Africa discourse.
Of course, it’s arguable that the scholars who research the issues (and come to a conclusion which can be considered, broadly speaking, either optimistic or pessimist regarding China’s involvement within Africa) are nuanced and judicious enough to understand the limits of their claims; however, once such claims enter the realm of the public domain, they are weaponized and perverted to feed into other ongoing narratives and political agendas regarding the global political situation. If one doubts the claim that even initially well-meaning academic conclusions or discussion can be distorted by today’s news-media cycle, one can simply turn on the news or do a web search about the events that have taken place within the last year or so to gain a better understanding of how quickly things which a certain group of people takes to be fact can be completely dismissed by another group of people. In that strain, if something like say COVID-19 can be disputed and the source of endless debate --- i.e. is it a hoax , is it a conspiracy by the Chinese government (or a joint conspiracy between the Chinese government and the democrats to get Trump out of office), etc.--- then one mustn’t strain one’s imagination to understand how more nuanced, less scientific, more difficult to study, and more dynamic political, economic, and cultural notions involving China-Africa relations can be distorted, warped, and/or weaponized (Lajka; Scott).
As such, it is imperative, and a goal of this project, to guide readers to a better understanding of the myriad of phenomena occurring within the larger paradigm of modern China-Africa relations so that they may break free from pernicious narratives regarding China as being antithetical to liberalism and the west, a rogue donor , so on and so forth; moreover, the same principle applies for the complementary narrative which may have readers naively believe that China is the panacea for African nations (Brookes and Shin 9; Naim).
In an effort to accomplish the aforementioned goal of providing the reader a perspective from which to resist reductive narratives surrounding modern China-Africa relations, this project will be divided into three parts. The first part of this project will briefly explicate China and Africa's historical relationship; in this part, we will provide an outline of key moments and paradigms that shaped the dynamics at points in history --- thereby providing us with useful context from which to ground an understanding of current China-Africa relations and resist ahistorical accounts of Sin-African relations. The second part of this project will engage with the two major perspectives surrounding contemporary China-Africa relations by analyzing some of the major claims of each camp. The modern discourse, despite its complexity, can be divide into two groups: optimists and pessimists (Shinn and Eisenman 10). We will explore the optimists' claims regarding China's involvement in Africa being a "win-win" relationship, based on notions of "mutual benefit" and a long history of southern solidarity and friendship (Brautigam 1; Shinn and Eisenman 12,13; Hanauer and Morris xi). In addition, we will engage with the pessimists' claims which characterize China as a rogue donor, whose presence and involvement in Africa leads to the deterioration of liberalism and good governance within the area (Hanauer and Morris xxi). This project, as previously alluded to, maintains that although both the pessimists and the optimists have valid perspectives, we ought not to take either account as being wholly representative of the reality of the situation, which is complex, multifaceted, and still in flux.
Finally, we will conclude by presenting various videos that one can use in order to get a better understanding of the issues at hand. The goal of the project is to be an introduction to China-Africa relations, which will allow readers to critically engage with the uncertain future of our global society and the myriad of erroneous, reductive accounts of modern China-Africa relations.
Part 1: China and Africa, a Brief History
Below is a sidecar that outlines the nature of early interactions between China and Africa. Most of the early interactions between China and Africa involved trade. These interactions were mediated, in the early years, by intermediaries such as Middle Eastern traders (Shinn and Eisenman 18). The interactions elucidated below occurred before the 1950s; as such, they, arguably, aren't seen as being as consequential in shaping modern relations and policy decisions as the interactions between China and Africa that occurred during and after the 1950s. Nonetheless, they warrant our attention as some of the interactions, such as admiral Zheng He's trips to Africa (1405 - 1433), are still referenced within the modern discourse surrounding China-Africa relations and because historical context allows one to a broader, more holistic lens from which to analyze the modern moment (Shinn and Eisenman 21).
Early Interactions
There is evidence of trade between Ancient China and Africa dating back to the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE). If you scroll further down, you can interact with a map that shows various places in which there was evidence of trade between China and Africa; moreover, the points on the map will tell you from what period of time the evidence indicates interactions occurred.
Image: Han Dynasty Men
Early trade between China and Africa seemed to be confined to the north-east regions of the continent (Shinn and Eisenman 17).
Chinese products dating back to the Han Dynasty have been found around, inter-alia, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, present-day Sudan, Egypt (Shinn and Eisenman 17). Chinese porcelain and coins from the Tang (618 CE - 907 CE) and Song Dynasty (960 CE –1279 CE) were also found in various places; in addition to porcelain from the Yuan Dynasty (1279 CE –1368 CE), as indicated by the map (Shinn and Eisenman 18).
The Ming Dynasty (1368 CE –1644 CE) had a wider range of influence with its trade and interactions, with some artifacts being found as far south as South Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 18).
Eventually, China exported colored satins and cotton cloth, taffetas, sandalwood, pepper, beans, ivory boxes, lacquer goods, arts, gold, silver, and copper to Eastern Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 18). Africa exported, inter alia, elephant tusks, rhino horns, "frankincense, myrrh, tortoiseshell, aloes, precious stones," rare woods, oil of storax (used for medicine and perfume), and ambergris (used for perfume) (Shinn and Eisenman 18).
There is also evidence of Africa exporting "giraffes, zebras, ostriches, and other animals" (Shinn and Eisenman 18).
Zheng He's Expedition
Hung-wu, the first Ming Emperor, valued building up China's naval capabilities (Shinn and Eisenman 20). As such, Yung-lo, the third emperor of the Ming Dynasty, inherited a strong navy (Shinn and Eisenman 20). This allowed Yung-Lo to act upon his desire to expand trade with foreign nations. Enter Zheng He, a Muslim eunuch, and naval admiral; his fleet made seven voyages into the world beyond China (Shinn and Eisenman 20). The fifth voyage (1417–1419) reached the Somalian coast (Mogadishu, Brava, and Kismayu), and likely also reached the Kenyan coast (Malindi and Mombasa) and Tanzania (Mafia Island) (Shinn and Eisenman 20). Zhen He's sixth trip made a return to the Somalian coast (Shinn and Eisenman 20).
After his voyages, internal political changes led the Chinese to focus on domestic matter and leave behind external exploration (Shinn and Eisenman 20).
Zheng He's Relevance in Modern Times
Modern Chinese leaders often allude to Zheng He's expeditions to Africa to reemphasize notions regarding the current "going-out" policy and its general growth and expansion as being non-threatening (Shinn and Eisenman 21).
For example, State councilor Dai Bingguo (who is pictured within this slide) said the following statements to the head of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2010:
"Zheng He is still remembered as an envoy of friendship and peace...’’
‘‘...China is not to be feared."
- QTD in Shinn and Eisenman 21
Statements such as these are made, because, inter alia, Zheng He's voyage, compared to that of other visitors, such as the Europeans, was peaceful. Zheng He was not a conqueror or immigrant but was a navigator and merchant who treated the Africans with "courtesy and restraint" (Shinn and Eisenman 21).
Chinese Laborers and Traders in Africa
After China's turn inwards, there was little significant interaction between China and Africa save for through intermediary Arab traders (Shinn and Eisenman 22). This trend of little contact lasted until the late 16th century when the first group of Chinese laborers came to Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 22). There are rich accounts of Chinese laborers (in addition to Chinese "traders, merchants, and service providers") bringing brought (or immigrating) to, inter-alia, Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, and South Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 23-26). Most of these laborers had to leave after their contracts were up (Shinn and Eisenman 26). In some cases, like in Mauritius, Chinese laborers who were brought against their will had to be given permission by the Imperial government to leave the country that they were brought to work (Shinn and Eisenman 22). Although we cannot go into great depth, it's worth noting the presence of Chinese laborers, traders, merchants, etc. as currently, there is an influx of Chinese professionals into the African continent, and they bring with them, inter alia, a whole host of challenges associated with integrating within African countries, countries, and cultures -- whether it be permanently or temporarily.
Image: https://www.prints-online.com/chinese-coolies-leaving-south-africa-1907-4384841.html
The Republic of China and Africa (1912–1949)
The Republic of China (ROC) was established in 1912 by Sun Yat-Sen who was later succeeded by Chiang Kai-shek, and it ended China's imperial era by replacing the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) (Shinn and Eisenman 27). During this time (between 1912-1949) only three African nations had their independence: Ethiopia, Liberia, and white-ruled South Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 27). The ROC had a few treaties and sparse relations with African nations; whatever relations it had created were collapsed following its defeat at the hands of communist forces in 1949 (Shinn and Eisenman 27).
In addition, the ROC began to jumpstart its interests in and interactions with African nations after the ROC was driven from mainland China (Shinn and Eisenman 29). This newfound interest in African nations was driven by the competition between mainland China and the ROC to be recognized as the sole representative of the true China (Shinn and Eisenman 29).
Image: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Republic_of_China(1912%E2%80%941928).jpg
As we continue our exploration of China and Africa's historical relations we dive into the more recent material from 1949 to the present day; we will engage with this material via the sidecar method as well. Some key trends to notice include the transitions involved in China's posture towards Africa: whether it engages African nations through its commitment to revolutionary idealism, south-south solidarity, or economic pragmatism. This illustrates, inter alia, that the relationship between China and Africa is dynamic and ever-changing depending on a variety of circumstances.
Early Interactions Between Africa and the People's Republic of China (PRC)
Directly following the "long march," China, under Mao was relatively disengaged from the rest of the world, including Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 32).
During this time (1949-1955), there were some state visits from African leaders, and much of the contact with Africa was facilitated by Soviet-funded international conferences (Shinn and Eisenman 32).
There were only a handful of African countries that had their independence, and of that select group, there were even less countries what were candidates for a partnership with China before 1955 (Shinn and Eisenman 31).
During its early years, China placed special importance is its "rhetorical and material support for independence movements and revolutionary groups that opposed several established African governments" (Shinn and Eisenman 35). One such example is China's support for Algeria’s National Liberation Front, established in 1954 (Shinn and Eisenman 35).
By the 1970s the PRC halted its practice of supporting revolutionary groups against established African nations; instead, the PRC began to take a more pragmatic approach in Africa, supporting African leaders regardless of their political leaning (Shinn and Eisenman 41; Shinn 66). The fruits of this practice can be seen to this day, but also during the 1970s -- we will cover this later on in the project when we attend to the PRC's admission to the UN in 1971.
Beginning in the second half of 1954, there was a noticeable shift in China's attitude towards Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 33, 35).
Image: https://schoolshistory.org.uk/topics/world-history/mao-china-c-1930-1976/communists-start-long-march/
The Bandung Conference (1955) and the Beginning of the Afro-Asian Period
The Bandung Conference was a major turning point in Chinese foreign policy in relation to Africa. Representatives from six African countries and twenty-three Asain countries were present, making the conference the first large scale Afro-Asian conference (Shinn and Eisenman 33).
A year prior to the Bandung Conference there was a shift in China's perspective regarding African nations (Shinn and Eisenman 32).
For example, Zhou Enlai, the premiere of the PRC, in his report to the First National People's Congress, prior to the Bandung Conference, advocated for the establishment of business relations between China and the Middle East and African nations (Shinn and Eisenman 32). Moreover, the PRC, after the Bogor Conference (a prelude to the Bandung Conference,) began to notice the similarities between the concerns of African nations and China (Shinn and Eisenman 33).
People's Daily, in 1954, noted the nature of Africa's colonial past: stating that Africa has suffered due to colonialism, wars, and imperialism (Shinn and Eisenman 33). Eventually Zhou Enlai, and others, advocated that China aid African nations in their struggle for independence from colonialism (Shinn 64,65).
During the Bandung Conference, this new perspective, which was the prelude to Afro-Asian solidarity was reaffirmed through Zhou Enlai's speech (Shinn and Eisenman 33).
Image: https://www.reddit.com/r/HistoryPorn/comments/gkg9a1/world_leaders_gathered_at_the_bandung_conference/
Bandung Conference ... continued
During the Bandung Conference Zhou Enlai criticized colonialism and imperialism in Africa; he openly supported the independence movements in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia; and he supported Egypt’s claim to the Suez Canal amidst a contention regarding its ownership (Shinn and Eisenman 33).
Moreover, during the conference the ‘‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’’ were incorporated in order to create the ‘‘Ten Principles of Bandung.’’ These original five principles of peaceful coexistence were a keystone in China's posture towards Africa, and still are today (Brautigam 30).
The Five Principles:
...for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
...in each other's internal affairs.
... for mutual benefit.
The principle of equality and cooperation can be seen as the basis for the win-win rhetoric today, and the fact that Chinese aid is not to be seen (according to some) as one way charity, but as a mutually beneficial relationship (Brautigam 30). Moreover, the principle of mutual non-interference within each others internal affairs can be seen in China's insistence on the One-China policy (Brautigam 30).
Image: https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1940427/what-beijings-ideologues-can-learn-zhou-enlais-restraint
Afro-Asian Solidarity and Anti-Imperialism
Shortly after the Bandung Conference, Afro-Asian solidarity against colonialism and imperialism became a key component in Chinese foreign policy (Shinn 64). Some examples of China's commitment to its goal of fostering such solidarity include Liao Cheng-chih, speech criticizing US imperialism and supporting African independence movements and China's involvement within the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) (Shinn and Eisenman 32).
In the time leading up to the first AAPSO, China held a rally which, inter alia, showed its support for the African liberation movements happening in Algeria, Kenya, Cameroon, and Uganda, among others (Shinn and Eisenman 32).
After the first AAPSO (1957-1958) in Cairo, Liao Cheng-chih, China’s Chairman of the Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, reaffirmed the PRC's adherence towards the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and criticized colonialism, and US imperialism (Shinn and Eisenmann 34). In fact, he posited US imperialism to be the greatest threat to the struggle for African independence, and proposed Afro-Asian solidarity as being the defense against such imperialism (Shinn and Eisenman 34). As such, Liao Cheng-chih announced that China was to defend ‘‘national liberation struggles of all oppressed nations" (QTD in Shinn and Eisenman 34).
Eventually, AAPSO was brought to a close because it could not withstand the Sino-Soviet split; the fourth and final AAPSO occurred in 1965 in Ghana (Shinn and Eisenman 34).
Image: https://www.chinosity.com/2020/08/26/the-historical-lessons-of-afro-asian-solidarity/
The Great Leap Forward (1958 to 1962)
The Great Leap Forward was meant to be China's second five year plan; however, its nominal goal of creating a communal society with collective farms and backyard steel rigs failed to come to fruition (Brautigam 33). Instead, the Great Leap Forward was characterized by natural disasters and famine: twenty million Chinese people lost their lives due to famine (Brautigam 33).
This failure limited the PRC's ability to maintain aid programs within Africa (Brautigam 33). Nonetheless, the PRC sought to gain influence in Africa in a relatively affordable manner, so it chose a method of engagement which is still in effect today: contact of high level officials, and the establishment of people-to-people relations through a variety of methods including the creation of organizations (Shinn and Eisenman 36).
Parallels to the Modern Package Strategy
This attention that's paid to the softer parts of engagement is highlighted in China's Package Strategy, which is still in effect today (Shinn and Eisenman 6). In the 1960's China sought to cultivate its relationship with Africa through organizations like the China Peace Committee, Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, Chinese-African People’s Friendship Association (an umbrella organization to oversee the myriad of other people to people groups the PRC was involved with), and the organizations managed by the Chinese People’s Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries for each African nation that the PRC established diplomatic relations with (Shinn and Eisenman 36).
To this day, China's involvement within Africa is marked by "high-level visits, cultural exchanges, student scholarships, and less expensive technical assistance" (Shinn and Eisenman 3). In other words, the PRC spends energy and resources on establishing political relations with the nation that it is giving aid to, and it takes a multi-pronged approach to its involvement with the African continent (Shinn and Eisenman 4). The multifaceted nature of China's approach towards Africa can be illustrated, in part, by China's efforts to develop lines of dialogue with "African political parties, parliamentary delegations, cadres, cultural and educational groups... opposition political parties, NGOs, and, increasingly, civil society" (Shinn and Eisenman 5).
Image: https://chineseposters.net/themes/great-leap-forward
Zhou Enlai’s Ten Country Tour of Africa
In late 1963 and early 1964, Zhou Enlai embarked on a historic tour of ten African nations. This was significant because it marked a shift in Chinese foreign policy, in which there would be regular state visits by high ranking officials of the PRC (Shinn and Eisenman 37). Such a practice continues to this day (Shinn and Eisenman 37).
Moreover, during this tour of Africa Zhou Enlai unveiled the Five Principles guiding China's relations with African and Arab countries and Eight Principles concerning Chinese Aid (Shinn and Eisenman 37). The Five Principles guiding China's relations with African and Arab countries is still quoted by modern Chinese scholars and officials; they were, nonetheless, modified in 2006 (Shinn and Eisenman 37).
Five Principles Guiding China's Relations with African and Arab Countries
- "China supports the African and Arab peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism and old and new colonialism and to win and safeguard national independence;"
- "It supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and nonalignment by the governments of the African and Arab countries;"
- "It supports the desire of the African and Arab peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice;"
- "It supports the African and Arab states in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultation; and"
- "It holds that the sovereignty of the African and Arab countries should be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed."
-QTD in Shinn and Eisenman 37
Image: https://chineseposters.net/themes/zhouenlai
The Cultural Revolution (1966 until 1976)
The Cultural Revolution was Mao's idea to make China the blueprint for other countries looking to launch the socialist revolution (Shinn and Eisenman 38). It was bloody, violent, and terrifying for many of the people involved (Brautigam 37).
In terms of China-Africa relations it generally meant a downsizing in the aid, involvement, and high-level state visits (Shinn and Eisenman 39). The extremity associated with the Cultural Revolution (for example the Red Guard) was enough to unsettle some of China's African allies; thus, this was a turbulent time for Chinese foreign relations (Shinn and Eisenman 39). An example which illustrates this is the fact that by 1969 four fewer African nations recognized the PRC than in 1965 (Shinn and Eisenman 39).
China quickly rebounded from the setbacks caused by the Cultural Revolution on its foreign policy (Shinn and Eisenman 40).
Image: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/asia/china-cultural-revolution-explainer.html
The PRC's admission into the United Nations
The damage done by the Cultural Revolution to the PRC's relations with Africa was quickly repaired; the turnaround can be most noticeably observed by virtue of the fact that in 1971, the PRC won admission to the UN and replaced the ROC on the Security Council (Shinn and Eisenman 40).
The PRC needed to receive votes from two-thirds of the nations in the UN in order to gain admission (Shinn and Eisenman 40). It gained thirty-four percent of its votes from twenty-six African countries. Of the fifteen African nations that sided with the ROC, ten of them sided with Beijing over the next few years (Shinn and Eisenman 40).
Winning the support of African nations who joined the UN had long been a policy goal of the PRC (Shinn 64). It was, and still is, a goal of China to support those who adhere to the One-China policy --- acknowledging mainland China to be the only true China (Shinn and Eisenman 36,46).
The 1970s, as noted previously, marked the beginning of a more pragmatic period in Chinese relations with Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 41).
1970's: Beginning of Pragmatism
The revolutionary idealism that permeated Chinese policy during the Cultural Revolution gradually dissipated, making room for a pragmatic route forward, beginning in the 1970s (Shinn and Eisenman 38,39; Brautigam 37).
Some evidence of China's growing emphasis on economic pragmatism follows. In 1970, China became the largest communist foreign aid donor to Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 40). Moreover, China stopped supporting revolutionary groups aimed at overthrowing established African nations; instead, it began supporting liberation movements against colonial powers and white-ruled governments in Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 40). In addition, the PRC began dealing with and cultivating relations with countries whose governments were not necessarily aligned with the PRC's political leanings (Shinn and Eisenman 41).
Image: Deng Xiaoping
TANZAM Railway and the Three Worlds Theory
China committed to creating the TAZAM railway during the cultural revolution; this explains, to some degree, why the project was inundated with revolutionary rhetoric regarding solidarity and anti-hegemony (Monson 33). The railway was also known as the “Freedom Railway,” because it connected Zambia to the Indian ocean, allowing the country freedom from dependency on colonial ruled, or white-ruled nations (Monson 2).
Therefore, it serves as an excellent entry point into an analysis of China's early path of economic pragmatism in addition to being a case study of how the theoretic framework of the Three Worlds Theory shaped practical policy decisions regarding development and the relationship between China and Africa.
The Three Worlds Theory was conceived by Mao Ze Dong in the 1960s. It became foundational to China's foreign policy in the 1970s. The theory, as articulated by Deng Xiaoping, in front of the UN General Assembly in 1974, posts that ‘‘the world today actually consists of three parts, or three worlds, that are both interconnected and in contradiction to one another. The United States and the Soviet Union make up the First World. The developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other regions make up the Third World. The developed countries between the two make up the Second World’’ (QTD in Shinn and Eisenman 42).
This perspective is in line with the policy of China during this time period; it was steering away from revolutionary idealism which dominated the zeitgeist during the Cultural Revolution and moving towards anti-hegemony and eventually, economic pragmatism (Monson 34; Shinn and Eisenman 41).
During the construction of the TAZAM railway, this was put into practice through the Eight Principles of development, which included: African and Chinese railway workers would live side by side in the same conditions; the work ensured that African got skills and know-how from the Chinese technicians; workers were not seen as the underclass (Monson 34).
The 1980s: Increased Pragmatism and Relative Pullback from Africa
The budding pragmatism of the 1970s took greater shape in the 1980s; however, China's focus on its domestic economy made it so it had relatively fewer funds and resources for aid to Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 44,45).
Instead of providing loans, the PRC shifted its strategy to incorporate more commercial contracts, joint ventures, provision of technical services, and rehabilitation of previous aid projects (Shinn and Eisenman 45; Brautigam 57). In addition, there were fewer high-level state visits from China to Africa during the 1980s (Shinn and Eisenman 44).
Nonetheless, one important trip by Premier Zhao Ziyang during the later part of 1982 through the early part of 1983, inter alia, reaffirmed China's interest in Africa; support for its liberation struggles; South-South economic cooperation; and explained that African nations no longer have to choose between the Soviets and Beijing (Shinn and Eisenman 44). Through his visit, Zhao Ziyang set the foundation for modern interactions between Africa and China, inter alia, by articulating the "Four Principles on Sino-African Economic and Technical Cooperation" (Shinn and Eisenman 44). This visit set the tone for modern relations in a variety of ways, one such way was it allowed China to be free from the "sovereignty trap" (Brautigam 57).
To elaborate, turnkey joint ventures were traditionally supposed to be handed over to the host country to manage; however, many of these projects would benefit from Chinese management (Brautigam 57). This would entail, however, according to some, an infringement upon China's commitment to not meddle with a recipient country's internal affairs (Brautigam 57).
Beginning in the 1980s, these projects would incorporate a long-term partnership between China and the recipient country (Brautigam 58). This, instead of being seen as a violation of a country's internal affairs, was interpreted to be China aiding the other country in building its self-reliance (Brautigam 57).
Another key trend that affected China-Africa relations in the 1980s was Sino-Soviet reproachment; this made it so Africa was no longer seen as an area of contention. This is a stark difference from the policy in the 1970s which revolved around the Three Worlds Theory and posited the Soviets as being a grave threat to African interest (Shinn and Eisenman 42).
In line with this move away from revolutionary socialist idealism, China began to criticize some African leaders who adopted socialist rhetoric or policies without much care; for example, Deng Xiaoping's warning to Tanzania's Vice President, regarding socialism and poverty, not being synonymous (Taylor 445,446).
The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was marked by the Tiananmen Square Massacre (Shinn and Eisenman 45).
Image: Deng Xiaoping (left) and Zhao Ziyang (right)
The 1990s: Post Cold War
China-Africa relations in the 1990s revolves around the events which followed the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 (Taylor 443).
The Tiananmen Square Massacre invited severe criticism from China's western allies. China's response to Western criticism was one of indignation; the PRC, and other allies, believed the criticism to be a pretense, in which the true goal was oriented towards the arena of power-politics (Taylor 451).
The PRC believed that as the world entered a multipolar era, sovereigns ought to respect the internal decisions of other sovereigns (Taylor 451).
In line with this, in 1997 the PRC presented a concept known as ‘‘The Four No’s’’ (Shinn and Eisenman 49). These included "no hegemonism, no power politics, no military alliances, and no arms races" (Shinn and Eisenman 49). The Four No's were later endorsed by Hu Jintao in a 2004 speech (Shinn and Eisenman 49).
African nations were more silent or overtly supportive regarding the incident -- viewing it as an internal matter of the PRC or, in the case of North African countries, a reasonable response of a government that was threatened (Shinn and Eisenman 45,46).
Being condemned by the west and supported by the African nations, led to the PRC reaffirming their support of African nations and their commitment to third-world solidarity (Taylor 447). China's posture towards Africa following these events transformed from one of "benign neglect to one of renewed emphasis" (QTD. in Taylor 447). In fact, the third world became a "cornerstone" for the PRC's foreign Policy (Taylor 447). China took up the mantle of being the leader of the developing nations in the world, and resisting hegemony (Shinn and Eisenman 47; Taylor 451).
This political commitment translated to economic involvement. During the 1990s China was experimenting and implementing reforms in order to find new ways to engage with Africa economically (Brautigam 69). They, inter alia, increased their commitment to joint-ventures and created three policy banks: The China Development Bank, The China Export-Import Bank, and the China Agricultural Bank (Brautigam 201,80). These banks, the EXIM bank are indispensable to China's involvement within Africa in modern times. As such, one can see how the 1990s laid the foundation for China's involvement within Africa during the 21st century (Shinn and Eisenman 47).
Under the Jiang Zemin era, Chinese economic activity in Africa grew noticeably (Shinn 73). China Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) within Africa reached about $4 billion by the beginning of the 2000s (Shinn and Eisenman 47). Moreover, in 1993, China became a net importer of petroleum (Shinn and Eisenman 47). China during this period had an increased appetite for raw materials in Africa; also, trade between China and African nations grew significantly: from $1 billion during the end of the 1980s to over $10 billion by 2002 (Shinn and Eisenman 47).
Image: Tiananmen Square, 4 June 1989
The 21st Century
We have now arrived at relatively modern material; some of the themes will be covered below when discussing the claims of optimists and pessimists, but two significant developments regarding the early 21st century China-Africa relations, which ought to be mentioned within this section, which covers major paradigms, include the development of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the emphasis on international order building within China's foreign policy program.
FOCAC
As China and African relations strengthened throughout the years, there was a need to create a multilateral system to coordinate the relations between China and the many African nations and guide the parties to create deals that might benefit the entire continent ; thus, FOCAC was created in 2000 (Shinn and Eisenman 48; Tiezzi). The first FOCAC conference was held in 2000 in Beijing, eighty ministerial-level officials from China and more than forty African countries attended (Shinn and Eisenman 48). Since then FOCAC has only grown. In 2006, for example, the FOCAC conference was hosted by nearly every African head of state or government that recognized Beijing (Shinn and Eisenman 48). FOCAC has been successful in improving cooperation between China and African countries (Shinn and Eisenman 48).
International Order Building:
Within the twenty-first century, China's posture towards Africa centers around, inter alia, the ideas of ‘‘peaceful development,’’ ‘‘The Four No’s,’’ and the ‘‘harmonious world’’ (Shinn and Eisenman 52). All of these ideas, articulated at various points, center around China's goal of increasing its political and economic power without frightening African nations, or the rest of the world (Shinn and Eisenman 53).
Peaceful Rise (Development)Zheng Bijian, a former CPC official, proposed the concept of China's "peaceful rise" in 2003 (Shinn and Eisenman 48). The main thrust of the message being that China will not seek external expansion, and China will uphold the principles of "peace, mutual cooperation, and common development" (Shinn and Eisenman 48). In 2005, Hu Jintao replaced the word rise with development, because "peaceful rise" seemed too threatening, and, as such, not in line with the message (Shinn and Eisenman 48).
Zheng Bijian, a former CPC official, first introduced the concept of China's "peaceful rise" in 2003 (Shinn and Eisenman 48). The main message was that China's rise did not mean destabilization of the global order; it emphasized that China did not seek external domination, and is committed to principles of "peace, mutual cooperation, and common development" (Shinn and Eisenman 48). In 2005, in response to some viewing the "rise" in "peaceful rise" as being too threatening, Hu Jintao replaced it to create the motto of "peaceful development" (Shinn and Eisenman 48).
Harmonious Society and Harmonious World: Both of these policies highlight China's willingness to step into more of a leadership role within the internal stage, without causing disruption to the current state of affairs (Shinn and Eisenman 49). One can see China taking action in regards to this position through its commitment to sending more troops to UN peacekeeping missions; settling of international crises, such as in Sudan; reserving ships to send to aid anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden; working with African nations to resolve differences in approach to climate issues; etc..(Shinn and Eisenman 51).
In articulating the Harmonious Society in 2005, Hu Jintao urged Asain and African nations to "‘promote friendly coexistence, equality-based dialogues, and common development and prosperity of different civilizations, in order to create a harmonious world" (QTD. in Shinn and Eisenman 49).
Ultimately, there is a myriad of policy reports, papers, publications, and speeches from this period that reaffirm China's commitment to being a global player and maintain a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship with African nations; this development, as we will see later on during this project is an auspicious sign for those optimistic about China's involvement within Africa (Shinn and Eisenman 51,52).
To reiterate, China and Africa Relations are affected by various political circumstances. In the early years, China limited its involvement, for a variety of reasons, to supporting various African revolutionary movements (Shinn 62). Then, relations were affected by the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the Cold War, which meant that China was competing with the west and the USSR for influence (Shinn 62,79). This was followed by a rise in economic pragmatism and a shift in emphasis to China's domestic matters under Deng Xiaoping (Shinn 62). In response to the international criticism China received after the Tiananmen Square Massacre, Jiang Zemin spearheaded efforts to strengthen China–Africa relations (Shinn 62). Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping have both worked to increase economic involvement with Africa through trade, aid, and development (Shinn 62). As stated above, a historical understanding can allow readers to resist reductive arguments, narratives, and claims regarding the modern moment. For example, one claim which exists in the current discourse is that China is a newcomer to Africa ; this, as we have seen, is a myth (Bräutigam 27:00-27:22).
In addition, understanding the historical context of the China-Africa relations can allow a reader to spot themes that occur in the relationship. Some key themes have been brought to light by scholars studying such a historical relationship: China is the one that initiates and sets the tone for the relationship; China relates with Africa through a multi-dimensional or a "package" strategy; China's approach in Africa is experimental and iterative; China is by-and-large indifferent towards the kind of government in power --- China makes an effort to establish a foothold amidst the status-quo (this new model based in economic and political pragmatism is a shift away from China's earlier stance of revolutionary idealism); Chinese communities within Africa are seeing noticeable growth; and, China is steadfast in its efforts to rid Africa of official relations with Taiwan (Shinn and Eisenman 3-8). These themes can be used as entry points into evaluations of major claims from both the optimists and the pessimists; below, we will briefly touch upon some of these themes and the considerations and debate that they engender.
China Initiates the Relationship
China, because of the fact that it is one country with a strong, centralized political structure, has traditionally been the one to initiate the relationship and establish its pace (Shinn and Eisenman 3). This is because the African nations of fractured, and different nations have different needs, goals, and capabilities, making it difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate regarding economic and political issues (Hanauer and Morris xi). This leads some critics to assert that modern China-Africa relations rest of an unfair power asymmetry (Hanauer and Morris xi).
This asymmetry can be seen in various manners including, inter alia, by looking at China's GDP, trade metrics, and population as it compares to African nations. An analysis of China's GDP ($10.1 trillion in 2010) compared to the GDP of African nations --- the largest of which is South Africa ($524 billion in 2010) (Shinn and Eisenman 3) --- illustrates that China greatly out scales African nations in terms of GDP (Shinn and Eisenman 3). An analysis of China's trade metrics and population reveals a similar story: China's total trade value was more than double that of the value of the entire African continent combined, in 2008 (Shinn and Eisenman 3). China, as a single country has a population of 1.3 billion, whereas the entire African continent has a population of roughly 1 billion. As such, critics find it hard to fathom the possibility that the relationship is truly a "win-win" and mutually beneficial because, as we have seen above, African nations are splintered and have less trade volume and resources than China; as such, they have less leverage when negotiating deals with China (Gakunzi 227). Nonetheless, China, as alluded to above, tries to posit its relationship with African nations as being one based on mutual benefit and as it is a win-win situation for both parties involved (Shinn and Eisenman 52).
The existence and growth of FOCAC seem to be reasonable indications that some progress regarding coordination of the interests of African nations is being made. Moreover, the logic which states that due to the immense leverage China has over smaller African nations ignores some of the realities regarding how China's engagement works. Chinese capital, for example, according to C.K. Lee in her book, The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa, is a heterogeneous mix of entities, structured in relation to the status, resourcefulness, and connection the entity has relative to the Chinese government (Lee 4). This heterogeneous nature of Chinese capital made it more willing to negotiate and compromise with local authorities and laborers, making it significantly less "imperialistic than traditional private capital (Lee 155). As such, it follows that the relationship between China and Africa is highly dependent upon the decisions made by the leaders of African states and the nature of the relationship which is formed (Shinn and Eisenman 3).
Leaving aside the issue of leverage, the debate regarding whether or not China's dealings in Africa are truly a "win-win" also emerge when discussing the nature of China's activities in Africa; many pessimists claim that China is engaging in a neo-colonial project, in which China is exploiting African nations for their natural resources and natural resources, leaving them dependent on Chinese debt, thereby nullifying this notion of the relationship being mutually beneficial (Hanauer and Morris xii; Alden and Jiang 641). For example, they argue that China's resource for infrastructure deal structure leads nations to forfeit the rights to their natural resources, which could be developed within the nation instated of being exported to China (Gakunzi 227)
Those who are more optimistic regarding China's activities within the continent of Africa, like Brautigam, respond by arguing, inter-alia, that China’s involvement within Africa is not solely driven by a desire to extract resources, as some critics suggest (Brautigam 278). Instead, she argues that the principle of “mutual benefit” is a key component of China’s involvement within Africa. She points to the"roads, bridges, sewer systems, and power plants built with Chinese finance in places such as Botswana, Kenya, Rwanda, Madagascar, Mauritius, and so on," as evidence that China's involvement in Africa is not driven by a desire for resource extraction (Brautigam 280). Moreover, Brautigam continues her case by explicating the nature of China’s development projects in Angola and DRC. In Angola, China has built roads, irrigation systems, and hospitals; this infrastructure, unlike what a critic would claim, does not contribute to China’s ability to extract resources as Angola’s oil reserves are miles off of its coast (Brautigam 280). In the DRC, China has funded a myriad of infrastructure projects ranging from roads to universities (Brautigam 280). Brautigam also cites the work of Chinese telecommunication giants as a means to prove the mutually beneficial nature of Chinese involvement within Africa. Huawei, in its effort to construct phone systems across the continent, generated the most revenue out of any other Chinese engineering company worldwide (Brautigam 279). Meaning, in these cases, Chinese investment within Africa lives up to the nominal goal of mutual benefit.
Despite such evidence regarding the mutually beneficial nature of China's activities in Africa, there are many areas of concern that exist. For example, pessimists in their criticism of resources for infrastructure loans, argue that the projects funded by such loans rarely, if ever, generate enough revenue to repay the loans; as such, this leaves African governments at the mercy of Chinese lenders (Gakunzi 228). Optimists try to dispute such concerns regarding high leverage by pointing to due diligence that is conducted on the part of Chinese entities when making these loans (Lee 53). For example, Brautigam claims that "Chinese loans closely fit a country’s ability to repay, they are not likely to create a new debt crisis for Africa," and that because China ties aid with investments, it is comfortable with temporary high debt in order to spur long term growth; China champions this approach based on its own experience (QTD. Lee 53; Deborah Bräutigam 56:40 - 57:20). However, researchers find that debt levels are reaching concerning levels, which may lead to a crisis in the future (Lee 53). Such concerns come to the forefront when one thinks about the prestige projects which are sometimes funded by Chinese capital; these projects do little to increase the productivity of the debtor nation (Brautigam 138). As such, the question remains, what happens when the enthusiasm wanes, and the funds need to be paid? What will African nations do then (Gakunzi 228)?
China's Package Strategy
This strategy has been implemented and beneficial to China when funds were too sparse for aid to be confined only to the monetary realm (Shinn and Eisenman 3). The lack of capital for foreign aid or investments was supplemented and replaced by "high-level visits, cultural exchanges, student scholarships, and less expensive technical assistance" (Shinn and Eisenman 3). Nonetheless, as time progressed, China, as we can see, cleared up some capital to spend on involvement within the African continent; the multifaceted nature of China's approach towards Africa still holds true and can be illustrated by China's efforts to develop lines of dialogue with "African political parties, parliamentary delegations, cadres, cultural and educational groups... opposition political parties, NGOs, and, increasingly, civil society," moreover the PRC facilitates "cultural and educational exchanges, Mandarin language training, and a robust public diplomacy campaign". (Shinn and Eisenman 5; Hanauer and Morris xii).
Another example of the multifaceted approach of China in Africa is the fact that China is helping Africa develop Special Economic Zones (SEZs). SEZs were first proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 (Brautigam 98). Like in China, SEZs, also known as free-trade zones, is meant to, inter-alia, attract foreign investment and business (CITE). They are zones in which companies vie to have the right to operate within --- they engender many critics and advocates (Brautigam 98).
Labor rights activities, unions, and the like often are averse to the notion of SEZs because they have more lax labor restrictions and wage recruitments relative to the rest of the country (Brautigam 98). Others criticize SEZs on the basis that they lead to isolated growth which is confined to within the zone, and don't provide a spill-over effect to the entire country (Brautigam 98). Nonetheless, proponents of SEZs have called them “cheat code” of sorts, insofar as they allow the host country to experiment with various policies without having to adopt such policies nationwide (Brautigam 97,99). In addition, they allow for mature industries from China to be exported to Africa, allowing both countries to move up the value chain (Brautigam 99).
This multifaceted nature also spills over to Chinese capital; as alluded to above, Chinese capital takes on a unique characteristic, different from other capital insofar that its goal is not profit maximization (Lee 155).
China's Non-Interference Policy
This theme opens up a discussion for a major claim of the pessimists; namely that China's investment activity in Africa leads to the promotion of illiberal, corrupt regimes, fiscal (Shinn and Eisenman 13). In addition, pessimists accuse China of being a rogue donor, citing China's willingness to deal with illiberal, corrupt, totalitarian regimes as being a destabilizing and detrimental force within the region (Green et al. 5).
Over the years China has developed a pragmatic, non-interference approach to its relations in China --- meaning it will attempt to foster relations with, give aid to, and invest in a country without trying to make the country adhere to any structural adjustments or political conditionalities, save for ensuring that a country follows the One-China policy (recognize PRC as being the representative of the one true China and cut relations with the ROC) (Brautigam 240; Green and Glaser ). This approach differs from that of Western donors, like the IMF (Brautigam 76; Shinn and Eisenman 154). This, inter alia, allowed China to maintain relations with African nations and its leaders even when the political situation was dynamic and changed often --- i.e. China developed the ability to maintain relations with African nations in quick succession (Shinn and Eisenman 6,51).
China's decision to maintain the status quo of the African nation it is involved with has led to some criticism. Pessimists accuse China of being a rogue donor, citing China's willingness to deal with illiberal, corrupt, totalitarian regimes as being a destabilizing and detrimental force within the region (Shinn and Eisenman 10; Green et al. 3). The main thrust of the argument is as follows: as a result of its non-conditionality, China offers financial lifelines to anti-democratic, brutal dictators, human rights abuses, and corrupt regimes; consequently, these critics posit China as being a force that works against western efforts to promote good governance and democracy in Africa (Dreher and Fuchs 989).
Brautigam tackles this concern by arguing that it is not in line with the reality of the situation. She argues that China is not acting much differently than traditional donors act insofar as traditional donors still donate to countries with horrible human rights records, democratic practices, and civil liberties scores --- Ethiopia and Cameroon, for example (Brautigam 286). She argues that donors like IMF and World Bank don’t offer loans based on conditions regarding democracy or human rights, rather on whether or not a country is financially sound --- i.e. doesn’t show signs of financial corruption (Brautigam 286). Moreover, she argues that points out in recent years China seems to be associating democracy with economic stability, and has taken actions to promote democracy in the continent (Brautigam 286). Some examples include: when China sent an envoy to persuade Burma to move more rapidly toward democracy after Burma had just violently suppressed peaceful protests, in 2007; and when the "Chinese ambassador in Sierra Leone joined the other foreign ambassadors in an effort to persuade the incumbent president, defeated in the elections, to step down peacefully” (Brautigam 286).
Growth of Chinese Communities Within China
There is a growing presence of Chinese communities in Africa; there are three groups of Chinese migrants who come to Africa for professional reasons (Shinn and Eisenman 8). The first group consists of Chinese who work at the “embassies, aid missions, and large Chinese companies and serve as project managers” (Shinn and Eisenman 8). The people that fall under this category generally come to Africa with a family, speak at least one of the local dialects, and assimilate well with the communities they chose to be a part of (Shinn and Eisenman 8). The second group consists of the “tens of thousands of contract Chinese laborers;” they usually come alone, don’t speak the local languages, and live with other Chinese workers on compounds (Shinn and Eisenman 8). Both the first and second group of people leave Africa once their assignments are finished or their labor contracts expire (Shinn and Eisenman 8). The third group consists of traders and entrepreneurs; some of them have been around for many decades while others are recent migrants (Shinn and Eisneman 8). Some of them have families, whereas others do not. They usually live with other Africans and are proficient enough at the local languages to engage in commerce (Shinn and Eisenman 8). Some of them will choose to stay in Africa for a variety of reasons which include but are not limited to: profit, security, personal/family concerns, and business connections (Shinn and Eisenman 8). There has been some noticeable racial tensions between the influx of Chinese within Africa and local African communities; these racial tensions and narratives which stop China’s rhetoric of win-win, mutual benefit, and equality from becoming reality, as it is arguable that day to day interactions affect people's perception regarding a situation more than official rhetoric does (French 12).
Regardless of official rhetoric, people may not have experience with other cultures; this initial ignorance leads to potential conflict. For example, when Yang, the son of a Chinese businessman who migrated to Mozambique, first arrived in Mozambique the locals would flee upon seeing him because they thought that Chinese people were cannibals (French 44). Moreover, the harsh treatment of Chinese companies towards their laborers causes tensions and conflicts within the community and increases anti-Chinese sentiments and sometimes violence (French 76).
Moreover, day-to-day racial tensions and conflicts fueled by prejudice or cultural beliefs, known as casual primary racism, has the potential to fester into systematic racism (French 74). There is already evidence of such a worrying trend becoming a reality. In his book China’s Second Continent, French interviews a variety of people and elucidates various manifestations of casual primary racism and sexual racism; in addition, in one of his interviews of Hao, a chinese businessman who moved to Mozambique, points out, Hao points out that Chinese bureaucrats don’t know how to communicate with the African locals, or the “blacks” (French 20). This is an indication of early racial tensions or barriers which might lead to systematic racism.
Below is some artwork by Michael Soi, China Loves Africa, which touches upon various themes associated with China-Africa relations. One can see allusions to sexual colonization, and an over exaggeration of each group's physical features.
At this point, we hope the readers understand that the nature of China's involvement in Africa is multidimensional, resists reductive narratives, and is still dynamic and in-flux --- highly dependent upon what the next few years hold (Shinn and Eisenman 1). Future research could include a more in-depth look at certain issues which have been raised within this project; m, or something that hasn't been raised. Below are some videos to continue your exploration of this subject.
Part 3: Videos
The Global China Interview Series: China-Africa relations
In this video, Dr. Johanna Malm discusses a variety of issues pertaining to China-Africa relations: the BRI initiative, the validity of the narratives regarding African nations falling into a debt-trap set by China, the rise in authoritarianism in African nations, and the historical beginnings of the current China-Africa moment --- which Malm posits is the "going out" policy. Besides being a generally insightful video, the video hold value for our purposes as Malm attempts to debunk the notion of China engaging in "debt trap diplomacy." Moreover, Malm goes into a brief discussion regarding the details of the EXIM-Bank cycle, or the loans that China gives out. Interestingly enough the Debt-Trap narrative assumes that China wants to increase country's debt burdens in order to increase its sphere of influence; however, this assumes two things incorrectly, that capital is deployed without the intention of getting it back and that China has the same development aid model as the west. This, as noted by Malm, Brautigam, and other authors, is not the case. Western nations believe that a developing nation must have a low debt burden in order to advance; whereas, China, drawing from its own development experience, advances that high debt burdens are acceptable, if they lead to an increase in the countries revenue generation capabilities.
In line with the Buddhist parable, "There is no path to happiness, happiness is the path," the difference between Chinese and Western ideas of development could be as follows, "There is no path to development, development is the path."
Why Development in Africa Is So Difficult
In this 2012 video interview, Richard Dowden, a British journalist who specializes in African issues, explains how the legacy of colonialism has made it difficult to invest in African development. He lays out detrimental aspects of African states, which used to de-incentivize investments into the continent. This goes to show the thinking that was prominent largely before China's growing interested and involvement in Africa --- the kind of thinking that left African nations by the wayside, abandoned by western capital. This, in part, led to Africa being labeled the "failed continent" (Brautigam 2).
Gyude Moore: "China in Africa: An African Perspective"
In this video, Gyude Moore who previously served as Liberia’s Minister of Public Works, and other roles within the government, gives his perspective on Chinese involvement within African nations; this is what the video calls "an African perspective." He speaks about the inadequacy of Africa's former relationships, the suitability of China as a partner for Africa, and the outlook for the future of this relationship. The video is overall very informative and has many clips that can be used. For example, Moore explains that it is natural for people who are hearing about China's involvement within Africa from the US government, to be less than enthused about such a prospect, due to the fact that the US has declared the Chinese government a strategic enemy. Although this view of China and America being strategic enemies has been disputed by several US presidents including George W. Bush and Barack Obama, many scholars still believe globalization (even in a post-cold war era) to be a zero-sum game (Hanauer and Morris xiii).
Lecture 17: Filling the Void - China in Africa
This lecture conducted by Christina Seyfried, a Ph.D. candidate at Yale University, in addition to elucidating key issues surrounding the nature of Chinese engagement within Africa, offers a framework to think about African bargaining power with China.