Türkiye’s Confluence of Climate and Security Risks

Authors: Tom Ellison, Brigitte Hugh, Dr. Alex Naegele Maps and graphics: Christina Shintani Climate Analysis: Dr. David Byrne, Kelly Gassert, Dr. Alex Naegele, Dr. Christopher Schwalm Expert Consultants*: Dr. Dilan Okcuoglu, Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak *Expert input does not necessarily imply endorsement of report conclusions.

It is recommended to read this story-map on a desktop or tablet.

Türkiye sits in a geographic hot spot where extreme weather and natural disasters are already intersecting with climate-vulnerable development, geopolitical tensions, and both geologic and domestic fault lines—with climate change projected to exacerbate these challenges. In the coming decades, Türkiye’s climate impacts will include reduced water resources, episodic flooding, severe wildfire risk, and dwindling streamflow, particularly on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Domestically, these hazards are on course to fuel tensions among the government, the Kurdish ethnic minority, and opposition supporters, amplify socioeconomic trends feeding anti-refugee xenophobia, and strain civil-military relations as demand for disaster relief increases. Internationally, dwindling water resources will heighten tensions with Iran, Iraq, and Syria and incentivize further Turkish energy cooperation with Russia. 

Managing these climate security risks will require holistic policy actions, including:

• Investments in improved water efficiency to reduce water-related political grievances.
• More flexible regional water-sharing arrangements to mitigate disputes over shared rivers.
• Greater disaster relief assistance, including via military channels. 
• Intensified diplomatic support for human rights and democracy amid climate-related domestic tensions.

In Türkiye, increasingly dire climate conditions intersect with the country’s environmental and political vulnerabilities to create compound security risks. The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)  warns  that Türkiye and the wider Mediterranean Basin face above average rates of warming and rising frequency of extreme heat, wildfire, drought, and flood events. In  2021 , extreme heat and drought contributed to historic wildfires that strained Türkiye’s firefighting capacity and depleted the groundwater supply to a level  threatening  the water supply of major cities. These hazards are colliding with the aftermath of decades of environmentally disruptive economic development and demographic change, including state-supported  energy  and infrastructure projects, water-intensive  agriculture , physical expansion and  population growth  in  cities , and projects to attract tourism and foreign  investment . Since the 1960s, Türkiye has undertaken a massive industrial land and water management project in the southeast provinces–the  Southeastern Anatolia Project or GAP –emphasizing the project’s energy independence and socioeconomic benefits. The project included plans for 22 dams and 19 hydropower projects, but has provoked  objections  from downstream domestic communities and neighboring states. Elsewhere, Turkish citizens have also opposed and protested inadequate wildfire  response , environmentally destructive  mining , and wasteful infrastructure  projects .

Türkiye is the world’s 18th largest greenhouse gas  emitter , but its climate policies are “ critically insufficient ” and consistent with global warming more than 4°C, according to Climate Action Tracker. Türkiye delayed ratifying the 2016 Paris Agreement for five years and was the last G20 country to do so, out of dissatisfaction at being classified as a developed country with greater obligations to cut emissions quickly and provide assistance to developing nations. In 2021, Turkish lawmakers ratified the agreement but  noted  symbolically that they considered Türkiye a developing country and would accept no obligations that “harm its right to social and economic development.” 

Türkiye’s climate and environmental vulnerabilities intersect with its domestic political and societal challenges, including the long-running conflict with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Syrian civil war and refugee crisis, and political polarization amid democratic backsliding. 

The Kurdish population makes up nearly  one-fifth  of Türkiye’s population, largely concentrated in the southeast of the country. The PKK, a Kurdish group that Türkiye and the United States classify as a  terrorist organization,  and the Turkish state have been in conflict since 1984. The conflict has often taken place  across borders , as factions of the PKK have retreated into both Iraq and Syria. Additionally, because Türkiye’s GAP project has disproportionately  impacted Kurdish  communities,  some   academics   and   advocates  consider it a tool of state control in the conflict with the PKK. For example, the filling of the Ilisu Dam flooded the ancient Kurdish city,  Hasankeyf,  one of the oldest continually inhabited settlements in the world. 

Türkiye is also host to the largest number of refugees globally, including  3.6 million  Syrian refugees. The Turkish response to the Syrian refugee crisis largely  eschewed  camps in favor of government-financed diffusion of refugees throughout the country, reducing concentration at the borders and enabling Syrians to take advantage of diverse economic opportunities. However, Turkish citizens increasingly perceive that refugees are encroaching on their economic opportunities. UN-sponsored polls since 2017 show that perceptions of Syrians as dangerous burdens have eclipsed perceptions of them as victims of war, and  support  for deporting Syrian refugees has increased by 33 percent. 

Over nearly two decades of rule by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Türkiye, early efforts for democratic reform have given way to more populist and authoritarian  governance , which has  deepened political divides  along conservative/religious and secular/progressive lines. The 2016 failed coup attempt provided President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan further opportunities to sideline the opposition and centralize the government under  presidential control . The response to the coup included  targeting  independent government institutions, such as the judiciary, and decreasing the operating space for civil society, such as independent media, which has created a highly  polarized  information environment ripe for mis- and disinformation. Additionally, sluggish and poorly coordinated responses to the  COVID-19 pandemic  and the 2023 earthquake have deepened distrust of the central government and increased polarization among the populace. 

Internationally, Türkiye positions itself as a geopolitical middleman, balancing relations with the United States and Europe against ties to Russia. For example, Türkiye fields the second largest army in NATO, has diplomatically and militarily supported Ukraine, is at odds with Russia in Syria, and has cooperated–albeit unevenly–in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. At the same time, President Erdoğan has a  friendly relationship  with Russian President Vladimir Putin,  maintains  deep trade and energy  ties  to Russia, and in 2017 made a  deal  for Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles that prompted sanctions from Washington. Erdoğan has often used this position to extract concessions, act as a mediator, or posture politically in ways that pose benefits and challenges for Washington. For example, he  crucially mediated  the Black Sea Grain Initiative with Russia to continue Ukrainian food exports. However, he has  demonized the West domestically ,  held up NATO accession  for Sweden and Finland to extract anti-PKK commitments, and  repeatedly   threatened  to  send  “millions” of Syrian refugees to Europe over economic disputes and criticism of Turkish military incursions in Syria. 

This study’s climate projections through 2040 suggest that Türkiye will face worsening water shortfalls, flooding, and wildfires, which are likely to exacerbate domestic and international tensions.

This analysis indicates that the worst climate impacts—spanning from shortfalls in precipitation and streamflow to more intense flooding, in combination with widespread wildfire risks—are projected to hit hard in areas already in tension with the AKP government, as measured by election returns and incidents of violent conflict and protest. These climate impacts are projected to be most severe along the Mediterranean coast and southern and southeastern provinces, areas already politically opposed to Erdogan’s government–in some cases violently. These strains are likely to increase grievances among marginalized constituencies, and could make contentious adaptation measures–like infrastructure projects or  mandatory   evacuations –more politically fraught. Conversely, existing conflict could worsen vulnerability to climate hazards. For example, observers have  linked  fires to military munitions, land clearing, and other military and insurgent tactics used in the PKK conflict. Meanwhile, severe wildfire risk along Türkiye’s southern border adjoins Turkish-occupied zones in northern Syria engaged in conflict with the Syrian Kurdish militia, the Syrian People’s Protection Units (YPG).

Declining precipitation and streamflow will likely hinder hydropower production, which typically makes up about 25 percent of Türkiye’s  electricity generation . Upward pressure on electricity prices could add to  economic protests , especially in more electricity-hungry cities. 

Reduced streamflow and precipitation rates, heightened wildfire risk, and more intense heat will threaten agricultural livelihoods, accelerating a rapid decline in Türkiye’s agricultural employment in favor of urban service and industry jobs and continuing Türkiye’s rapid  urban population growth , which has risen 25 percent since 1985, outpacing the world and regional average. Intensifying rural-to-urban migration, perceived competition for jobs in Türkiye’s struggling economy, and future urban growth will consume additional agricultural land and scarce water. Such strains could motivate violence in urban areas against Syrians–who are almost entirely  located in cities  and have already faced a worrying  uptick  in  hate crimes  and  discrimination .

This backlash is likely to continue, as Türkiye has transitioned from a stopover state for migrants moving towards the European Union from conflict-affected regions in the Middle East to a  final destination . This shift is largely due to the Syrian refugee crisis and is likely to persist as climate-related migration grows worldwide.

Türkiye’s upstream position from water-scarce neighbors like Iraq, Iran, and Syria will make declining streamflow an increasing source of regional tension, whether Türkiye hoards water or is merely perceived to be doing so. Although access to continuous records of Tigris-Euphrates streamflow in Türkiye is limited, downstream countries report that streamflow has  steadily fallen  for decades. Since 2021,  Iran ,  Iraq , and  Syria  have all held Turkish dam-building responsible for their water woes, with Syria’s Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)—an offshoot of the PKK— claiming Ankara is providing  less than a quarter  of the share of Euphrates waters agreed to in 1987, and Iraq seeing  less than a third  of the Tigris waters that it received a decade ago. As domestic dissatisfaction over water scarcity increases, downstream countries will likely have more incentive to cast blame upstream to Ankara. 

Though shared water resources have historically often been a source of technocratic cooperation, unprecedented long-term declines in reliable water supplies and a fragile and fragmented political environment highlight a growing risk of water-related tension. Fixed water sharing  commitments  among Türkiye, Iraq, and Syria are dated and lack flexibility to adjust to changing climatic conditions. In the absence of major efficiency changes, consistent declines in streamflow risk forcing Türkiye to choose between supplying adequate water to its own priorities or to its neighbors, with failure to do either bringing potential security problems. As water scarcity and variability grows, Ankara may be tempted to instrumentalize water negotiations to gain concessions on other issues, as it  did  in 1987 when it extracted a commitment from Syria to cease support to the PKK in exchange for Türkiye pledging to provide 500 cubic meters per second of water.

Climate impacts on hydropower could pressure Türkiye more toward natural gas and nuclear power, deepening ties to Moscow. Given climate-driven heat increase and precipitation declines, Türkiye’s zero-emissions electricity is already being strained. For example, in 2021 electricity generation from hydropower  dropped  11.5 percent due to drought and was offset by increased natural gas. In 2022 Türkiye received roughly  45 percent  of its gas from Russia. Moscow granted Türkiye a politically useful election-year $600 million gas payment  deferment , and Türkiye has announced ambitions to cooperate with Moscow on a Turkish  hub  for the sale of Russian gas.

Meanwhile, Türkiye is also seeking to meet growing energy demand through nuclear cooperation with Russia, raising geopolitical and nuclear safety risks, as well as  Russian coal imports . By 2025, Türkiye aims to activate its  first nuclear power plant  in Akkuyu, Mersin, which will be built, owned, and operated by Russian Rosatom–a model of “plug and play” nuclear power Moscow is  offering to build influence  throughout middle-income and developing countries. Türkiye aims to build  two more nuclear plants  in Sinop and Igneada, and is  in talks with Russia  to construct those as well. In addition to giving Russia leverage via control of the expertise, hardware, and waste-disposal upon which Türkiye’s nuclear power will depend, Rosatom’s emphasis on  cost-cutting ,  complicity  in Russian targeting of a nuclear power plant in Ukraine, and  lack of transparency  call into question its safety credentials. This is of special concern given the fact that all three locations sit within 25 miles of active earthquake fault lines and in light of  threats climate change poses to nuclear safety –including impacts of sea level rise and storms on coastal facilities, extreme heat’s strains on facility cooling, and extreme weather disruptions of personnel and transportation networks. 

Policymakers should be prepared for these climate related strains across domestic and international political, security, and economic dynamics. Washington can take diplomatic, development, and defense steps to mitigate challenges and seize opportunities. 

Anticipate Domestic and Regional Tensions Climate change’s simultaneous worsening of water issues in Kurdish and opposition-leaning areas, strain on electricity prices and agricultural livelihoods, intensification of wildfires, and contribution to urban communal tensions will likely further polarize Turkish politics and potentially worsen regional tensions. This setting risks more finger-pointing and disinformation, such as how Türkiye and the PKK and YPG have traded blame for  wildfires  and  water   shortages  in recent years. These dynamics may also increase the politicization of vulnerable populations, previewed by Turkish presidential candidates’  demonization  of Syrian refugees or President Erdogan’s refugee  weaponization  to extract political concessions from Europe. To the extent that climate strains amplify tension between the Turkish government and the PKK, Ankara may increase diplomatic pressure on the U.S. or NATO allies over their counter-ISIS partnership with the YPG in Syria or posture toward alleged PKK supporters. Water-related conflict with Kurdish groups in northern Syria would put  nearby  U.S. troops  at risk  and pull YPG focus from counter-ISIS and other US priorities. Meanwhile, worsening communal tensions and xenophobia could incentivize Ankara to further politically weaponize refugee populations by threatening to send them to Europe or back to Syria. 

Mitigate Domestic Disputes over Disaster Relief Disputes could also emerge over coordinating or allocating disaster response resources among political constituencies, a dynamic previewed by accusations that earthquake recovery prioritized AKP bastions over  Kurdish areas  or  opposition  strongholds. For example, Türkiye’s opposition-leaning Mediterranean coast and southeast region are projected to face even worse fire risk, while AKP strongholds along the Black Sea will begin to see wildfire risk for the first time. Increased wildfire risk without commensurate government preparation could lead to increased scapegoating of minority groups, as happened during the  2021 wildfire season . This suggests that targeted disaster relief support from the United States and other countries could minimize the risk that one community or group is privileged over another, especially if such aid was made contingent on equitable distribution. 

Prepare for Civil-Military Tensions Washington should also prepare for how climate impacts and resulting public dissatisfaction may aggravate fraught  civil-military relations  in Türkiye, which has experienced eight attempted or successful military coups since 1960. As climate-related hazards increase in frequency and severity,  military forces in Türkiye and elsewhere are being  called upon as first responders . However, President Erdoğan has sought to purge and control the Turkish military since an attempted coup in 2016, reportedly  contributing  to the military’s lack of action in the crucial days after the 2023 earthquake. Sidelining the Turkish military’s disaster relief role may assuage Erdoğan’s coup fears, but could leave populations more vulnerable and perversely contribute to the type of  public dissatisfaction  that can motivate coups. U.S. diplomatic messaging, disaster relief, and military cooperation and education could help minimize potential civil-military tensions.

Encourage Regional Water Diplomacy Meanwhile, the United States can take steps to help Türkiye ameliorate the destabilizing tradeoffs it might face between its domestic water needs and those of its neighbors. As a first step, the United States and European Union should encourage productive water diplomacy among all regional states as a core diplomatic priority, push for water-sharing agreements that are adaptive to climate change, and support blended official and unofficial technocratic forums like  Blue Peace Middle East . This would require the transparency and open exchange of long-term streamflow records to ensure the consensus of observational data between riparian countries. The United States and its allies should also diplomatically and financially support programs in Türkiye and its neighbors to manage demand and improve  agricultural water use  efficiency. With water use efficiencies between  35 to 50 percent  throughout most of the Middle East, there is a need to reduce water loss via irrigation improvements at the level of individual farms to improve crop yields. 

Foster Cooperation on Resilience Separately, building resilience to acute climate hazards like wildfires may offer opportunities for trust-building and deescalation measures between rivals Türkiye and Greece, as relations potentially  thaw . Since 2021, despite at times threatening  military action  over their long-running dispute about territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, Türkiye and Greece have  provided  and  offered  one another assistance in combating wildfires, and Greece has  assisted  Türkiye in earthquake recovery. The United States could support military disaster relief training and exercises that build trust between Türkiye and Greece–such as through NATO, which includes both countries and is increasingly  engaged  on climate security.

Plan for Russia’s Nuclear Leverage The United States will also need to consider how Russia’s deepening  nuclear cooperation  with Türkiye could enhance Moscow’s leverage over Ankara. Under Rosatom’s build-own-operate model, expensive safety measures are disincentivized and Türkiye remains  dependent  on Russia for technology, expertise, and waste disposal, raising safety risks or the prospect of Russia weaponizing energy supply chains as they have over Ukraine. Though the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is a reality and restoring U.S. competitiveness in the nuclear energy sector is a long-term project, the United States can help Türkiye balance this dependence by building more domestic technological expertise and human capital and seek to assist Türkiye on nuclear safety and a stronger, more independent nuclear regulatory body. 

Globally, aggressively cutting greenhouse gas emissions is foundational to staving off the worst climate security impacts through 2040, and avoiding even more dire consequences over the longer-term. G20 nations, including Türkiye, jointly share this responsibility given higher current and historical cumulative emissions. Global policies must strengthen dramatically to approach the Paris Agreement’s goal of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050, with worldwide  coal  consumption, crude  oil demand , and  CO ₂  emissions  at record levels. At the same time, building resilience to climate impacts is critical under any emissions scenario, with dire climate impacts already occurring and global temperatures  set to rise for decades  under even the most optimistic emissions trajectories. This reality means anticipating and building resilience to the national security impacts of climate change will remain critical for decades to come, in Türkiye and around the world.