Russian Minority Populations in the Baltics
Do they show similar characteristics as those in Ukraine?
Conflict in Eastern Ukraine has led to concerns for several eastern European nations, particularly in the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. An armed separatist movement in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, home to large Russian populations, has led to increased political instability and has been claimed to be fueled by Russian influence and interference (Loshkariov and Sushentsov, 2016). With Russian minority populations of their own, each of which, like Ukraine, share a common border with Russia, the Baltic States have reason to worry if similar tactics and scenarios will play out within their borders (Muiznieks, Rozenvalds, and Birka, 2013). Furthermore, each of the Batlics are members of both NATO and the EU, prompting concerns that if what happened in Ukraine occurs in the Baltics, that there is a high potential for a major crisis and confrontations between Russia and the West (Takacs, 2017).
In Ukraine, economic and social divides between Ukrainian nationalists and Russian minority populations existed prior to the armed rebellion in the Donbass Region. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a significant Russian minority continued to live within the borders of newly independent Ukraine (Loshkariov and Sushentsov, 2016). Ukrainian politics were split between deciding whether to focus more on economic and political engagement with the EU or to focus on maintaining strong economic and historical ties to Russia (Strasheim, 2016). A division was between Russian populations concentrated in the Donbass, primarily Luhansk and Donetsk, and the wider Ukrainian population. Russian populations under Ukrainian leadership were increasingly marginalized. There was little representation of Ukraine’s Russian population at the national level. Further, after independence, Ukrainian nationalism and pride ran high, and politicians focused on enhancing the nation state. Use of the Ukrainian language was widely celebrated and promoted with the Russian language being marginalized. Due to political, economic, and social marginalization, a separate Russian political identity formed among the Russian populations in the Eastern regions. With an additional lack of political and cultural support coming from Russia, due to Russia’s own political and economic crises following the fall of the USSR, segments of Ukraine’s Russian population eventually staged an armed rebellion (Loshkariov and Sushentsov, 2016).
Figure 2. Pro-Russian Protests against Ukrainian Government in 2014
Armed groups seized control of the Ukrainian Donbass provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk. Russia, now ruled by Vladimir Putin and seeking to reassert Russian hegemony over its former Soviet territories, became a major player in the conflict. The use of non-state actors in the form of “Little Green Men”, masked Russian forces claiming to be Russian Ukrainians, to train and coordinate the various armed groups in the Dobass against Ukraine, displayed Russia’s interest in the conflict (Allison, 2017). While Russia claims to have acted in defense of Russian speakers, ethnic Russians, and Russian citizens, others fear that the intentions go further and are explained by a desire by Russia to expand into former Soviet territories (Allison, 2017; Takacs, 2017). A similar scenario played out in Crimea, another region in Ukraine with a Russian majority. The Russian population (and “little green” men) in Crimea seized control of the province, then held a referendum for independence from Ukraine and reintegration with Russia. Claiming support for Crimean self-determination and political integration, Russia formally annexed this part of Ukraine in 2014 (Allison, 2017)
In both cases, Russia utilized plausible deniability (“Little Green” men) to appear as if they have been acting in favor of the local populations, while at the same time being involved militarily and exerting influence in the region (Allison, 2017). Some fear that if Russian involvement continues and Ukraine relinquishes more territory, that Russia may be emboldened to further assert its influence in other parts of its post-Soviet sphere, such as the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Secrieru, 2014).
Figure 3. Map of the War in Donbass, 2014
The Baltic States, similar to Ukraine, contain large Russian minority populations. In light of the events in Ukraine, the Baltic States have a common goal in promoting better integration. However, following independence, integration has yet to be fully realized (Muiznieks, Rozenvalds, and Birka, 2013).
Lithuania has arguably been the more successful integrating its Russian populations compared with Estonia and Latvia. Lithuanian leaders focused on early inclusion of Russian minorities following independence (Muiznieks, Rozenvalds, and Birka, 2013). By providing citizenship early on, Lithuania was able to avoid conflicts along ethnic lines and a stronger national Lithuanian identity was forged. For example, in Lithuania, Russian children are more likely to attend Lithuanian-language schools over Russian-language schools. While integration of Russian populations has proven more successful in Lithuania, there still exists problems with an even larger Polish minority (Duvold and Berglund, 2014)
In Estonia and Latvia, integration of Russian minorities has been less successful. In both countries, the minority Russian populations have experienced marginalization similar to those in Ukraine. Russian speakers have experienced higher unemployment and are more likely to be excluded. Both Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws, upon independence, created non-citizen groups, a majority being Russians. Language policies additionally focused on Estonian and Latvian as official languages in place of Russian (Muiznieks, Rozenvalds, and Birka, 2013). Both set out to form a single national identity at the expense of the minority Russian populations living within national borders. Even in education, tensions can be found with textbooks painting a different picture of the Soviet Union than how Russians see it. Despite changes having to be made in order to join the EU, problems have been found with a lack of incentives for further progress being offered once member status was achieved. In addition, several protests and controversies have occurred. In 2004, a conflict occurred over Russian being cut back as a language in Latvia. In Estonia, ethnic riots erupted over the removal of a red army soldier in Tallinn in 2007. Several were injured and one death was recorded. The conflicts and clashes highlight continued divisions and strained relations between ethnic populations. In both Estonia and Latvia, Russians are more likely to identify as Russian first signifying the continued struggle for integration (Duvold and Berglund, 2014).
Figure 4. Protests over the Bronze Soldier Statue in Tallinn, 2007
The aim of this project is to determine if the minority Russian populations in the Baltics display similar characteristics and circumstances as the Russian populations in Eastern Ukraine. If similarities are found, implications regarding security concerns pertaining to Russian intervention will be discussed. Three different types of information are examined: 1) the distribution of ethnicities and Russian language speakers, 2) the geography of income, and 3) the geography of national election results. A series of maps for each Baltic country were created to visualize the separate criteria being investigated.
- Lithuania:
Ethnicity was examined due to mother tongue not being collected in the national census.
In Lithuania, the municipality of Visaginas is the only location with a substantial Russian population.
Other locations with higher Russian ethnicities include Vilnius, Zarasia, Svencionys, and Klaipedos, but their percentage of the population are small. Relative to the other Baltic States, Lithuania has a much smaller Russian minority.
For income, Vilnius County represents the highest class and the lowest class of income is represented by Utena County in the Northeast. Utena is also the location of Visaginas, home to a larger Russian population.
In terms of voting, the Russian populations do not appear to vote along similar lines, as do the Latvian and Estonian Russian populations. In Lithuania, the parties that collected the largest vote in Russian locations were split between the Homeland Christians and Peasants and Greens Parties, both with a pro-Europe focus and the latter taking a strong stance against Russia ("Lithuania Parliamentary Elections", 2020)
The Visaginas Municipality represents a special case. The municipality is nearby the Ignalina Power Plant (Figure 5). This facility was operated by a large number of Russians who lived there due to Russification under the Soviet Union (Roache, 2019).
Estonia:
The majority of Russian speakers can be found in the Northeast along the border with Russia and around the capital Tallinn in the North along the coast. There is also a smaller cluster of Russian speakers that are found along the Eastern border as well.
In terms of distribution, the map conveys clustering of Russian speakers in Narva City and Johvi Municipalities in the Northeast and Tallinn as well.
Other municipalities located outside of these main areas include Peipsiaare and Valga City. Outside of the Northeast, Russian populations are found largely in cities.
In Estonia, higher incomes are found mainly in the North with a small cluster in the South. The lower incomes are much more dispersed.
Higher incomes in Estonia are mainly found in the capital Tallinn, but also Tartu in the South.
For areas of lower income, the distribution is spread evenly around the country with no clear clustering. One aspect to note is that several of the locations with a high percentage of Russian speakers are also the locations with the lowest income. These include Narva City, Peipsiaare, and Valga City.
The winning party in a majority of the primarily Russian speaking locations was Eesti Keskerakond, or the Center Party. The party has largely been seen by Estonian voters as supporting the minority Russian population (Martyn-Hemphill, 2016). They claim that there is a problem with importance not given to minorities. As such, the Party sees problems with a high number of non-citizens and several Estonian and Russian communities that function separately (Keskerakond.ee).
In the past the Center Party has been linked with Russia through a cooperation protocol signed with Vladimir Putin’s party, United Russia. In recent years the party has distanced themselves from United Russia, but has not outright dismissed the connections (Martyn-Hemphill, 2016).
Latvia:
Similar to Estonia, clustering of Russian speakers is also seen in Latvia.
A large majority of Russian speakers are located in the Southeast along the border with Russian and Belarus, including the City of Daugavpils, Kraslavas District, and Zilupes District, with a second major cluster being found in the Capital, Riga.
Additional clusters include the coastal cities of Ventspils and Liepaja.
Similar to Estonia, in Latvia, the locations of higher income are clustered. One difference is that lower income municipalities also appear clustered.
- The locations with the highest monthly income are located in and around Riga in Central Latvia.
The extent for the lowest income is mainly found along the Eastern and Southeastern sections of the Latvian border. These locations represent where the largest cluster of Russian speakers is found.
Saskana, or the Harmony Party, received the highest number of votes in the majority Russian speaking clusters in the South and Riga. The map highlights how the Russian minority population tends to vote similarly, as Saskana was not found having the largest vote in locations outside of the Russian clusters.
Saskana is the major party representing Russian interests in Latvia. Similar to the Center Party in Estonia, Saskana had signed a cooperation protocol with United Russia until 2017 (Bergmane, 2019). The protocol was dropped due to other parties not wishing to cooperate with Saskana as a result of Russian links. Despite this, the party claims their views on Russia have not changed ("Latvia’s Saskana party ditches agreement with Putin’s United Russia", 2017).
The maps provide three indicators toward understanding the geography of Russian minority populations in the Baltics. These include: 1) The distribution to determine whether they are clustered in particular areas, 2) the distribution of income levels for the total populations in the Baltics, and 3) the party with the largest vote per municipality in the latest elections for each State. For example, are there clusters that overlap with lower income locations? In addition, are parties that gain larger votes in minority Russian locations different from the parties elected in non-Russian areas?
Regarding the distribution of minority Russian populations, concentrations are found in Estonia and Latvia. Further in each of these countries several of the concentrations have municipalities with over half of the population being Russian. Lithuania stands apart as the only locations similar to the clusters in the other two States is Visaginas. This appears to represent an outlier as the municipalities surrounding Visaginas show a clear lack of Russian populations.
Concerning the distribution of income, all three States show similar patterns, with wealthier municipalities being located near each country’s capital and lower income areas found along the periphery near the borders, this being Russia for Estonia and Latvia. While Lithuania does border Russia along the border of Kaliningrad, the lowest income location appears along the border with Belarus. In Estonia and Latvia Russian several clusters can be found in the wealthier capital precincts, however the largest clusters are found along the border with Russian in the lowest income municipalities. While populations located in capitals tended to bring in a higher monthly income, the fact that larger Russian populations are mainly in the lowest income municipalities signifies that Russian populations have been hurt following the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Finally, election results were examined in order to determine if areas with significant Russian populations and those of lower income, coalesced around different parties than non-Russian speaking municipalities. In Estonia and Latvia, the lower income Russian municipalities voted for the major party protecting Russian interests: the Center Party (Eesti Keskerakond) in Estonia and the Harmony Party (Saskana) in Latvia. This suggests that Russian minorities have formed stronger political identities apart from the majority populations. The occurrence of past riots and conflicts in each country have shown the divide that still exists between Baltic nationalities and Russians, particularly in Estonia and Latvia.
The geographical criteria examined here further adds to the picture on the ground. Minority Russian populations are seen as being geographically clustered, economically marginalized, and politically united in the protection of their interests. Integration appears to still be a slow process, especially in lower income areas and, for example in Estonia, following party platforms that detail increased separation among communities along ethnic lines. In Lithuania, the picture is less divided. The Peasants and Greens party gained the largest vote in several municipalities across the country, including the areas with concentrations of Russian minorities. This follows the results of early integration efforts attempted by Lithuania following independence from the Soviet Union.
Comparing and contrasting the Baltic States with the situation in Ukraine, there are similar characteristics that can be seen between the Baltic populations and the Russian populations in Ukraine. First, in Ukraine, there is a strong divide between the Russian populations in the East and Ukrainian populations in the West. Similarly, in Estonia and Latvia, the minority Russian populations are clustered in the Northeast (Estonia) and Southeast (Latvia), areas that, like Eastern Ukraine, border Russia. Both populations also appear to be dealing with marginalization and poorer economic conditions. Across all three Baltic States, the larger Russian populations were all found in the lowest income precincts. Further, in Estonia, one of the major Russian supporting parties identified the struggle with separated communities and continued structural unemployment, a characteristic also attributed to the Russian populated locations in the Donbass.
Figure 6. Vladimir Putin at VIII Congress of United Russia Party in 2007
While there are similar shared experiences in the Baltics as with Ukraine, interference from Russia in the same manner as the Donbass may not be as likely. The protocols signed with both Saskana and the Center Party with United Russia at first represent Russia’s continued desire to have a role to play in the Baltics through the support of Russian interests. The termination and distancing from the protocols from the parties in recent years, however, signify a distancing from Russia, despite the parties claiming that their views have not changed. Furthermore, in the case of the Estonian Center Party, actual interaction with United Russia was limited and not super involved (“Overview: Center Party’s cooperation protocol with Putin’s United Russia”, 2016). This speaks to a lack of interest in maintaining influence in the Baltic States by Russia. The role of EU and NATO member status may also be a factor in the lack of interest as greater influence may garner increased pushback from the West. In this view Russia appears to place less focus on exerting pressure in the Baltics and the minority populations may not be as large of a factor in radicalization as those in Ukraine.
References:
Allison, R. (2017). Russia and the post-2014 international legal order: revisionism and realpolitik. International Affairs, 93(3), 519-543
Bergmane, U. (2019). Latvia’s ‘Harmony’ in Jeopardy. Foreign Policy Research Institute. Retrieved from https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/04/latvias-harmony-in-jeopardy/
Duvold, K & Berglund, S. (2014). Democracy between Ethnos and Demos: Territorial Identification and Political Support in the Baltic States. East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 28(2), 341-365
Loshkariov, I, Sushentsov, A. (2016). Radicalization of Russians in Ukraine: from ‘accidental’ diaspora to rebel movement. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 16(1), 71-90
Martyn-Hemphill, R. (2016, November 20). Estonia’s New Premier Comes From Party With Links to Russia. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/europe/estonia-juri-ratas-center-party.html
Muiznieks, N, Rozenvalds, J, Birka, I. (2013). Ethnicity and social cohesion in the Post-Soviet Baltic states. Patterns of Prejudice, 47(3), 288-308
Roache, M. (2019, December 27). HBO’s Chernobyl Has Led to a Surge in Tourism for This Forgotten Nuclear Town. Now, It’s Trying to Redefine Itself. Time. Retrieved from https://time.com/5754581/visaginas-nuclear-town-chernobyl/
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(2020). Lithuania Parliamentary Elections. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/programs/european-election-watch/lithuania
(2017, September 10). Latvia’s Saskana party ditches agreement with Putin’s United Russia. ERR. Retrieved from https://news.err.ee/635146/latvia-s-saskana-party-ditches-agreement-with-putin-s-united-russia
(2016, August 11). Overview: Center Party’s cooperation protocol with Putin’s United Russia. ERR. Retrieved from https://news.err.ee/119629/overview-center-party-s-cooperation-protocol-with-putin-s-united-russia
Figures:
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- Butko, A. (2014). Ukraine vs Pro-Russian [Photograph]. Global Panorama. https://www.flickr.com/photos/121483302@N02/14690671827
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- Hietanen, L. (2007). Tallinn Bronze Soldier-Protests [Photograph]. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tallinn_Bronze_Soldier_-_Protests_-_26_April_2007_day_-_017.jpg
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- Пресс-служба Президента России. (2007). Vladimir Putin at VIII Congress of United Russia Party [Photograph]. Kremlin.ru
