Distinctive markings on weapons used in Syria prison breaks

North-east Syria Field Dispatch, January 2023

Prison breaks

Conflict Armament Research (CAR) investigators in north-east Syria have documented materiel recovered from Islamic State (IS) forces after three high-profile ‘prison breaks.’ This includes the  Battle of Hasakeh  on 20 January 2022, which was the largest IS operation since the group lost territorial control in early 2019. In each recovery, CAR has observed weapons bearing a distinctive secondary marking. This mark, applied across a disparate set of materiel, identifies these weapons as having shared a common custodian, which CAR believes to be the Syrian National Army (SNA).

Working on the ground in north-east Syria, a CAR field investigation team has physically documented the weapons and ammunition that local security forces recovered from each of the three IS prison break operations:

Seizure 1: November 2021 from an IS cell in Abu Khashab.

Note: the shaded area on this map refers to SNA-controlled areas in north-east Syria.

The cell had been  planning a prison break  at al-Sina'a prison in Hasakeh City to free an estimated 4,000 IS members.

Seizure 2: January 2022 in Hasakeh City.

This recovery was made in the wake of the attack on  al-Sina'a prison  and ensuing ten-day battle launched by IS forces.

Seizure 3: September 2022 from an IS cell in Qayrawan.

The cell had been planning a complex attack on  Al-Hol camp .


'XXX~XXXX' marking

CAR has documented a total of nine weapons following these aforementioned seizures that all bear the same distinctive mark. This mark has been applied on a variety of weapon systems, spanning a range of models and manufacturers that share no common production origin: seven AK-pattern assault rifles, one light machine gun, and one rocket launcher.

The mark has been applied consistently across the weapons using a dot-peen machine and is uniform in size, font, and pattern. The mark pattern is ‘XXX~XXXX’ (where X indicates a digit).

The first three digits are separated from the next four by a highly unusual tilde (~) symbol.

Weapons with the 'XXX~XXXX' mark documented by CAR investigators in north-east Syria

CAR has not observed this mark on any of the more than 1,000 weapons it has documented in north-east Syria since 2020, nor previously in CAR’s  extensive documentation  of weapons held by IS in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2017.

None of these marks match the primary serial numbers on the weapons in any way, indicating that there is likely no relation between the manufacturer of the weapon and the entity that applied the dot-peen marking. Taken together, these observations indicate that these are post-production marks, applied further down the transfer chain by a common custodian.

CAR has not observed this mark on any of the more than 1,000 weapons it has documented in north-east Syria since 2020


Identifying the SNA

CAR’s analysis strongly suggests that these nine weapons were all at one point in the custody of Turkish-backed SNA forces. The SNA was formed in late 2017 and early 2018, when a wide array of armed groups unified in opposition to the Syrian government in Damascus.

The groups are structured in a military formation composed of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd legions, subdivided into divisions, each of which is made up of several brigades.

The SNA military formations have been mapped out by  the SETA Foundation . This graphic, which shows the breakdown of the SNA, is available  online .

According to the SNA military structure, the first three digits of each mark observed by CAR may be a code indicating, respectively:

  • (1) the legion,

  • (2) the division,

  • and (3) the brigade,

In this example, the mark would refer to the first brigade, third division, second legion. This is the Muttasim Brigade,  Firka Muttasim .

The remaining four digits could indicate a secondary serial number.

If this hypothesis holds true, CAR is able to assign the nine weapons recovered after IS operations that bear this code to six different brigades of the SNA.

CAR is able to assign the nine weapons recovered after IS operations that bear this code to six different brigades of the SNA.

CAR has corroborated its assessment of this mark with open-source analysts ­– who  first observed  these unique markings in Syria in late 2019 ­– as well as confidential sources in north-east Syria with knowledge of the SNA’s marking practices. The mark is also visible in  promotional material  issued by the SNA itself; a light machine gun observed during a training exercise conducted by the Muttasim Division of the 2nd Legion of the SNA bears the mark ‘231~1309’.

Still from  promotional video  issued by the SNA Muttasim Division on 19 October 2020.

Post-production marks are often applied to track stockpile inventory or firearm assignations to individuals or units. CAR cannot confirm the purpose of this specific mark. The diversion mechanisms through which IS sourced these weapons via the SNA are also unclear at this stage in CAR’s investigations. Researchers in Syria have reported on existing  links between some SNA factions and IS weapon smugglers . Other diversion mechanisms, such as capture or theft from SNA stockpiles, may also be possible.

CAR investigators are continuing to work with local security forces in north-east Syria to document weapons and ammunition recovered from illicit armed actors and are actively investigating the supply sources for materiel used by IS cells. As these investigations continue, CAR will further report on its findings into links between these recoveries and the procurement capabilities of IS since its loss of territorial control.


Further Resources

  •  Missile Components used in Drone Attacks in north-east Syria : Between September 2021 and June 2022, CAR investigations have documented the physical remnants of 17 air-to-surface missile attacks in north-east Syria. The missile systems were manufactured in Türkiye and likely fired from uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). This Frontline Perspective provides a technical overview of the missiles themselves, including CAR’s identification process and the internal components identified within the system. It then focuses on how electromagnetic brakes, which are used in accurate steering in missile technology, were manufactured by a company based in the European Union (EU) and were subsequently diverted from their stated end use in medical vehicles.
  •  Weapons of the Islamic State : The result of more than three years of field investigation into Islamic State supply chains. This report presents an analysis of more than 40,000 items recovered from the group between 2014 and 2017. 

About Conflict Armament Research

Established in 2011, Conflict Armament Research generates unique evidence on weapon supplies into armed conflicts in order to inform and support effective weapon management and control.

CAR field investigation teams document illicit weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in conflict-affected locations and trace their supply sources. The teams inspect weapons in a variety of situations—whether recovered by state security forces, surrendered at the cessation of hostilities, cached, or held by insurgent forces. They document all items photographically, date and geo-reference the documentation sites, and incorporate contextual interview data gathered from the forces in control of the items at the time of documentation.

CAR occasionally uses information and photographs from social media as background information but does not base its investigations on them, since the provenance of such data is often difficult to verify. Moreover, open-source information does not always provide the detailed physical elements—notably external and internal markings required to trace weapons and ammunition.

For more information on CAR's methodology, go to    www.conflictarm.com   

CAR investigators documenting weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in north-east Syria.

Published online by Conflict Armament Research

© Conflict Armament Research Ltd., London, 2023

First published in January 2023.

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union and the German Federal Foreign Office. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of Conflict Armament Research and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the positions of the European Union or the German Federal Foreign Office.

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Copy-editing: Emily Youers

All photographs © Conflict Armament Research unless stated otherwise.

Distinctive markings on weapons used in Syria prison breaks

Conflict Armament Research

Still from  promotional video  issued by the SNA Muttasim Division on 19 October 2020.