Dating newly produced Russian missiles used in Kyiv attacks

 Read the latest update to this Dispatch (December 2023). 

Conflict Armament Research (CAR) investigators have documented new evidence that cruise missiles deployed by Russian Federation forces in a recent attack in Kyiv were almost certainly manufactured at most two months prior to their use. CAR’s latest documentation shows that Russia is still able to manufacture guided weapons after months of sanctions.

On 23 November 2022, Russian Federation forces launched a large-scale missile attack on Ukraine. Missile strikes in the capital city Kyiv impacted critical civilian infrastructure,  resulting in power outages and water shortages .

Two days later, a CAR field investigation team, present in Kyiv during the attack, documented remnants of two of the missiles that hit the city. These missiles were Kh-101 air-to-surface guided weapons, a latest-generation model of Russian cruise missiles that entered into service in 2013. The remnants bore marks indicating that the weapons were produced between July and September 2022 (see Figure 1) and between October and November 2022 (see Figure 2).

CAR has obscured the final digits, which would uniquely identify each missile, in accordance with its tracing  methodology .

Cruise missiles deployed by Russian Federation forces in a recent attack in Kyiv were almost certainly manufactured – at the latest – just two months prior to their use.

Kh-101 guided weapons display a 13-digit production code from which CAR investigators have inferred a date of manufacture.

On the same day, CAR investigators documented the remnants of two other Kh-101 air-to-surface guided weapons used in different incidents earlier in the year. The markings on these weapon fragments also bore marks indicating their date of manufacture, which in these cases preceded the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The first missile, produced between April and June 2018, hit Kyiv in June 2022 (see Figure 3). The second missile, produced between October and December 2019, hit the walkway  near Kyiv’s Klitschko bridge on 10 October 2022 , according to Ukrainian authorities (see Figure 4).

As early as April 2022, analysts claimed that the Russian Federation might be  running low on precision weapons , although Russian attacks on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities continued to use these weapon systems. However, the expenditure of guided weapons manufactured just two months after their production might be  symptomatic of stockpile challenges  for some high-level assets such as cruise missiles. CAR’s documentations also demonstrate that the Russian Federation is still able to produce guided weapons such as the Kh-101 cruise missile, despite sanctions imposed following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

The expenditure of guided weapons manufactured just two months after their production might be symptomatic of stockpile challenges for some high-level assets

CAR has  previously documented the components of a Russian Kh-101  air-to-surface guided weapon and found that it was heavily reliant on components and technologies produced by companies based in the United States and Europe. Most of the components of Russian weapons for which CAR could identify a year of manufacture were  made between 2014 and 2021 .

This latest documentation demonstrates that the Russian Federation is still able to produce guided weapons such as the Kh-101 cruise missile, despite sanctions imposed following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Favourite or share this Dispatch:  https://bit.ly/newly-produced-russian-missiles 

On 21 November 2023, CAR documented the remnants of another seven Kh-101 cruise missiles. These missiles were recovered in Ukraine after attacks carried out between November 2022 and September 2023. Using the method described above, CAR determined that three of these missiles were used within two months of their production, and another three were used within three months.

The documentation of additional Kh-101 remnants and their production marks shows that the Russian Federation continues to use cruise missiles within a very short period after their production. For a high value asset such as the Kh-101 cruise missile, this is likely an indication of strains in the production process and supply chain for components, as CAR had first suggested a year ago.

•  Ukraine iTrace Resource Centre  : Explore the weapons and ammunition data documented by CAR in Ukraine and read interactive case studies from our field reporting.   Access the Resource Centre  .
•  Component commonalities in advanced Russian weapon systems   : CAR's investigations into Russian weapon systems used in Ukraine reveal their reliance on a narrow set of particular technology for production.

Established in 2011, Conflict Armament Research generates unique evidence on weapon supplies into armed conflicts in order to inform and support effective weapon management and control.

CAR field investigation teams document illicit weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in conflict-affected locations and trace their supply sources. The teams inspect weapons in a variety of situations—whether recovered by state security forces, surrendered at the cessation of hostilities, cached, or held by insurgent forces. They document all items photographically, date and geo-reference the documentation sites, and incorporate contextual interview data gathered from the forces in control of the items at the time of documentation.

CAR occasionally uses information and photographs from social media as background information but does not base its investigations on them, since the provenance of such data is often difficult to verify. Moreover, open-source information does not always provide the detailed physical elements—notably external and internal markings required to trace weapons and ammunition.

For more information on CAR's methodology, go to   www.conflictarm.com  

For further enquiries and media requests, please email   communications@conflictarm.com