A Case For Tracing

Tracing weapon supply chains from the point of origin to the point of recovery is a powerful counter-diversion tool. When weapons or related materiel are recovered from unauthorised armed groups like Islamic State, tracing supply chains can reveal how those weapons were diverted, and expose weaknesses in existing trade controls.

Since its formation in 2011, Conflict Armament Research (CAR) investigators have documented more than 600,000 illicit weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in 28 different conflict-affected areas around the world. CAR was born out of a necessity to monitor illicit flows of weapons into armed conflicts, and to address the sources of weapon diversion. CAR's global diversion data is available to view on the EU-funded  iTrace®  portal: the world's largest publicly-accessible weapon-tracking database.

Formally tracing materiel is the most effective way to identify how diversion may have occurred. It entails issuing requests for information to manufacturers, suppliers, national export licensing authorities, and to any other party that has played an active role in its supply or financing. These 'trace requests' seek to identify the time and place from which an item left the custody of an authorised custodian, and when, where, and how an unauthorised user acquired it.

This story map illustrates three examples of CAR's tracing operations in action, showing how tracing, which has traditionally been conducted by national law enforcement agencies that focus on crime weapons, can be applied in situations of major armed conflict. The story map also dives into what factors make a trace request successful, and what factors hinder and limit tracing success.

The examples in this story map are taken from CAR's  "Diversion Digest Issue 3: A Case for Tracing."  Click the link below to access the full report on CAR's website.

In five full years of tracing operations (2015 - 2019), CAR issued 3,087 trace requests to national governments, manufacturers, private companies, brokers, and intermediaries.

These requests have generated 1,238 formal trace responses, representing a 40 per cent response rate. The numbers of trace requests CAR sends to national authorities varies significantly across different regions of the world, as do the rate of responses. Seven European states have a response rate to CAR that exceeds 95 per cent.

CAR analysed its archive of 1,238 formal trace responses to explore the extent to which these replies have either supported or limited its investigations into diversion.

Trace requests can be grouped into three categories:

• Permissive responses provide a basis for further investigations.
• Expansive responses provide either the full information requested, or provide more information.
• Dissuasive responses fail to provide any information required to permit further investigations.

Most of CAR's trace responses fell into the 'permissive' category. A quarter of those responses (26%) led to trace requests to parties further along the supply chain.

In this section, you can explore three case studies showing the importance and effectiveness of tracing in combatting diversion, not only of weapons, but also other related military materiel such as components for improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Although the scope of formal tracing instruments like the ITI are restricted to small arms and light weapons, tracing ammunition and related materiel is just as important - and the process can be just as impactful.

CAR's tracing covers a wide range of conventional ammunition, vehicles and aircraft, and large quantities of commercial products and dual-use materiel. Some of these latter items are not subject to export controls and fall well outside of the scope of arms control instruments like the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) or the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA). CAR has found it critical to its counter-diversion investigations to trace the provenance and supply of all types of materiel found in the possession of insurgent or terrorist forces. Insights gathered across supply chains, form a counter-terrorism perspective, play a critical role in 'attack the network' efforts, which deprive these groups from the resources needed to sustain their hostile activities.

Trace requests can assist companies, for example by 1) allowing them to address the misuse of their products and thereby limit possible reputational risks, and 2) making them aware of counterfeit products that undermine their legitimate business interests.

In response to CAR's trace investigations, a number of companies have implemented measures to prevent the misuse of their products or technologies, or to limit their export to certain areas of the world. Trace requests from organisations such as CAR can help support internal compliance measures.

In 2017, CAR documented commercial off-the-shelf drones that Islamic State forces operating in Iraq had modified to drop explosive ordnance on Iraqi troops. CAR traced the drones to various countries in Europe and the Middle East. While the manufacturer did not share precise sales or export records with CAR, it had electronically blocked the drones from operating in Iraq and Syria, prior to CAR's trace request, in a measure that it described as a 'no-fly zone'.

CAR issues 'counterfeit notifications' to well-known weapon manufacturers. At present, around two per cent of weapons traced by CAR are counterfeit. However, in certain regions of the world, like West Africa or Afghanistan, that percentage is much higher.

Below, you will see two pistols: a genuine pistol, and a counterfeit made to resemble it. Use the interactive slider tool to observe the differences between the two 'Girsan'-marked weapons.

In response to CAR's notification, the Turkish manufacturer, GİRSAN Machine and Light Weapon Industry, confirmed that it manufactured the pistol on the left, and that the weapon pictured on the right is an unlicensed copy.

Through this type of process, a trace request provides governments, companies, and other transfer parties with information to which they would not otherwise be aware.

Beyond weapons, CAR has also alerted manufacturers to other counterfeit commodities, including supplies of electronic components used in the manufacture of IEDs.

Effective record-keeping is a critical prerequisite of tracing. None of the above case studies, or any of CAR's successful traces, would have been possible without it.

Unique identifying marks (such as serial number) and collective identifiers (such as lot numbers) applied to materiel ensure its traceability, but only when they are registered in effective record-keeping systems.

Inaccessible records obstruct successful tracing. In 30 per cent of CAR's attempted traces, records have been destroyed or otherwise discarded; have reportedly 'expired'; or have been unobtainable because the state or company that held them has been dissolved.

These factors halt investigations and may allow future transfers to escape scrutiny.

International instruments give guidance to national authorities about how long records should be kept, but this guidance is inconsistent.

• The International Tracing Instrument stipulates a minimum retention requirement of 30 years for manufacturing records, and 20 years for all other records.
• The Arms Trade Treaty requires records to be kept for a minimum of just 10 years.

Of the 2,578 recovered weapons for which CAR has established a date of manufacture, 71 per cent exceed the ITI minimum 20-year export record retention period, and 64 per cent exceed the 30-year manufacturing record retention period.

The timeline below comes from a real case in CAR's archive and shows how the record-keeping gap in practice prevents effective tracing.

This example shows that weapons commonly outlive even the most generous record retention periods.

Digital advances mean that states have the capacity to keep records indefinitely. However, were states to stick to the minimum retention periods stated by these guidelines, many diverted weapons would not be effectively traced.

All trace requests serve as notices of potentially illicit activity. Regardless of whether they come from competent national authorities or from the non-governmental sector, they provide governments with information that is often instrumental in:

• identifying illicit activity;
• informing more effective arms control policies;
• fostering valuable information-sharing partnerships among states, industry, and civil society; and
• and ultimately helping to counter weapon diversion and secure national interests against the activities of terrorist and insurgent groups.

Tracing is at the core of counter-diversion efforts. It needs to be considered a critical element among a series of interlocking activities that are designed to fill knowledge gaps and address unauthorised access to weapons, ammunition and related military materiel.

Demonstrating the value of tracing is critical. Cooperation - one of the ITI's three pillars of successful tracing - represents the greatest obstacle to better understanding and addressing diversion. Some states continue to impose significant barriers to information sharing, arguably detracting from the capacity of all parties to tackle diversion and the political, social, and economic insecurities that it feeds.

Tracing parties and responders can work together to maximise the impact of tracing and utilise it to identify points of diversion, including by:

• engaging in accurate tracing, including at a minimum, identifying serial numbers and taking photos of all materiel seized or recovered from illicit actors;ensuring that manufacturers of non-export-controlled goods are made aware of any possible counterfeits and of any armed groups that may be repurposing or weaponising their products, while working with industry to promote preventive measures;
• maintaining accessible digital records indefinitely; and
• given that tracing benefits all parties concerned, cooperating effectively and responding in full, by providing the highest level and most expansive response requested.