From the Graveyard Shift to the Benzene Plume

"When people got a job at B.F. Goodrich, they thought they had a job for life."

"In their report, the contractors have indicated four sites being drilled. But [site manager Terry] Butterfield says the contractors drilled only one hole. He had to tell them to stop after only one hole since the smell coming out was so strong that he was concerned about possibility of an explosion."

Easily recognizable with its distinctive remaining carbon black tank, faded yellow siding, and brick-lined powerhouse, the site of the Miami B.F. Goodrich Plant, located on Goodrich Boulevard, is a testament to the workers who once toiled here in pursuit of the American Dream. Although today mostly reduced to rubble, open pits, and scattered bits of metal, B.F. Goodrich’s Miami Tire Plant once served as one of the largest employers in Ottawa County. Thousands came from Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, and Arkansas to work in its offices, curing rooms, X-Ray research labs, tire building areas, part warehouses, and shipping bays. In operation for forty years, the plant churned out a series of farm equipment, off-road vehicle, car, and earth-moving equipment tires. The Miami factory was not B.F. Goodrich’s largest plant (that would be the one in Tuscaloosa, Alabama), but it was still a vital economic engine for the region. Its closure in 1986, caused by increased foreign competition and outdated infrastructure, dealt a blow to Miami. The closure devastated the economy, created lasting emotional tolls, and left the community to deal with its toxic legacies.

Steel belted tires (tires that have a metal ring inside of them) were a common tire manufactured at the Miami plant. These tires are often used on farm equipment or other vehicles riding on rough terrain, as they are less susceptible to puncture. The steps to producing these are as follows:

The first step in the manufacturing process is to take raw material (rubber) and heat and mix it together with various types of chemicals and compounds (including carbon black, oils, and other additives) until it forms the desired consistency. The exact mixture used is considered to be a trade secret by many manufacturers. However, this mixture typically includes chemicals used for abrasion resistance (to help stop the tires from falling apart when rubbing on the surface of the road) and others depending on the use of the tire. In Miami, this mixing was done in a machine known as a Banbury Mixer. After the mixture meets required safety and company standards, it is then “sent to machines for further processing into the sidewalls, treads or other parts of the tire” ( US Tire Manufacturers Association n.d. ).

The next step is to build the tire. The first item to be placed on the tire building machine is the innerliner, “a special rubber that is resistant to air and moisture penetration and takes the place of an inner tube” ( US Tire Manufacturers Association n.d. ). After this, come the body plies and belts (often made from polyester and steel respectively). Plies and belts are an extremely important component in a tire because they, “give the tire strength while also providing flexibility” ( US Tire Manufacturers Association n.d. ). Once the innerliner, body plies and belts have been assembled, it is time for the bead (bronze-coated strands of steel wire) to be manufactured. The bead is implanted into the sidewall (the side portion of the tire featuring tire information) and “assures an airtight fit with the rim of the wheel” ( US Tire Manufacturers Association n.d. ). Finally, all the different sections are added together to create a “green” (uncured) tire. ( US Tire Manufacturers Association n.d. ) details that, “the tread [the surface of the tire with groves in it) and sidewalls are put into position over the belt and body plies, and then all the parts are pressed firmly together.”

Once the tire has been built, curing or heating the tire to a specific temperature to bond all the components together takes place. In this process, “the ‘green’ tire is placed inside a mold and inflated to press it against the mold, forming the tread and tire identification information on the sidewall” ( US Tire Manufacturers Association n.d. ). Once the tire is inside the mold, the mold is then heated to an extremely high temperature. On average, tires are heated, “at more than 300 degrees Fahrenheit for twelve to fifteen minutes, vulcanizing it to bond the components and cure the rubber” ( US Tire Manufacturers Association n.d. ). The time spent in curing often depends on the size of the tire (larger tires take longer to cure than smaller ones).

Once the tire has completed curing, quality control takes place. Tires are are X-Rayed, cut apart, road tested for flaws, submerged in water to check for leaks, or run through other tests to make sure that they are safe for usage. Once the tires pass these tests, they are either stored in large warehouses or shipped via truck or train car to various tire stores and facilities around the nation.

Descriptions of day-to-day activities and stories of workers and residents are a unique component of the presented research. The following section recognizes this by delving a bit further into the personal work experiences of some interviewees to provide a glimpse of what life in Miami and at the factory was like. In addition to providing new details about how the plant operated, the interviews touch on the personal aspect of work and the connection people have to their jobs. During the interview sessions, people were excited to share what their first few years on the job were like, the friends they made, impactful events and accidents that occurred, and what happened after the plant closed. The interviews were conducted with people who had worked and interacted with the plant in a variety of ways; allowing to capture different experiences. Upon approval of the IRB in April 2022, the AW&W team interviewed six people who had a connection to B.F. Goodrich. Interviews from Oklahoma State University (OSU)'s Oral History Project were also utilized. It is in these small details that the true story and lived experiences of B.F. Goodrich’s Miami plant emerge.

Many interviewees mentioned how dangerous tire construction and storage can be. There were several stories of accidents and near misses that interviewees had witnessed or heard about during their time at the plant.

The Dangers of Tire Building

John Mott described how his spear bar got stuck in a machine and threw him around. As he recalled,

"These ladies that were building the bands were supposed to cement them together where they wouldn’t come apart. This one lady didn’t use her cement like she was supposed to. When I stuck the tire into the machine, my spear bar got caught between the bands. There I was, going up and down, and I got my wings that day (laughs). It didn’t hurt me, but, boy, I learned a lot in that minute."

James Graves mentioned how B.F. Goodrich was a dangerous and sometimes deadly place to work. As he noted, “one of the things you find out when you work at Goodrich for a while, is that they’re not a company that has a lot of people that retire from there. Because they don’t live long enough to do so.” This quote clearly illustrates what a dangerous job factory life could be. Many people joined B.F. Goodrich because it was a way to make a good living. However, few of these workers were aware of the toll that their work would take on their bodies.

Larry Tippit recounted another incident where a tire almost crushed him to death. As the tires he was working on were extremely large and heavy, there was great danger if one fell over. One day, when he was inspecting one, it fell off of the mechanism designed to hold it, fell onto his body, and crushed two of the discs in his back. He recalled how,

"One day, I was inspecting a field engineering tire that I had built. It was leaning against the rail. It was a 3651. That was the big tire. I was checking the liner splice in it. Across the way from me, an SQC man (quality control), had picked up a 2100 tire on a jack stacker. The job of the jack stacker was to pick the tire up and raise it off the ground while the SQC inspected it. The snout on it rotated, so the tire would rotate, and he could inspect it with a flashlight. Anyway, on that day, I'm behind that 2100, looking at the 3651. That jack stacker is supposed to have a safety plate on the end of the snout so the tire can't come off. This jack stacker didn't have that safety plate on it. I'm inspecting the tire and I hear somebody yell, "Look out!" I started to turn to my left, and that 2100 fell off of that jack stacker and it crushed me from the small of my back, to my knees – against that other tire, bang! They quickly got that tire off of me. I was down on the floor. I said, "Okay. I'm going to give you your emergency evacuation course, right now!" I talked him through how to put me on the backboard and get me out of there. I had two crushed discs."

Thankfully, Larry was not killed when the tire fell on him, but his story provides further evidence of how dangerous working around tires can be.

Blown Gaskets and Hot Steam

Larry Tippit detailed how people were at risk of being scalded from the hot water inside of the pot heaters as part of the tire curing process. Finished tires would sometimes come out of the pot heaters with massive blisters on them. If people popped them, the water would immediately turn to steam and burn.

"Tires were cured in pot heaters stacked on top of each other. The water inside was between 272 -278 degrees and under pressure. What would happen is that the water bag would bust, and that water under pressure would be forced out into the rubber. This created a tire with blisters on it. If it had blisters on it, and you busted one of them, it’d scald you. The water would just immediately turn to steam. I had two friends that were killed that way. The tire came out and it had blisters on it, and they were standing over it. One of them punctured it with an awl and it scalded both of them, and they both died. Then my supervisor at that time, Harry Matthews, did the same thing. He punctured a blister on a tire. It scalded his chest. He was in the hospital for an extended period of time."

Jerry Wyrick also mentioned the excessive levels of noise and the dangers of the hot steam, especially if a tire mold blew a gasket. As he described,

"Each mold had a rubber gasket around it, and if that gasket got old, there would be so much pressure that it might blow a hole through the mold. You did not want to get near the steam because it would burn and boil your skin."

Excessive Noise

James Graves mentioned hearing loss resulting from the excessive noise of constantly running machinery. As he detailed,

"The noise levels in the plant were tremendous. I had 37 tractors down there running 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Also, there was noise from shipping and warehousing operations. You have to realize that it is a lot of noise. A lot of people didn’t like to wear safety devices like hearing aids. And I was one of them, because if I could run from my shipping office and be back in 10 minutes, I wouldn’t bother to put hearing protection in. However, sometimes I’d get down there and it would take a lot longer because somebody else had something new to take care of. What was really sad though, was that Goodrich had you checked for hearing, but it wasn’t really an accurate test. When you went into a clinic, they would talk really loudly so you could hear them. Then they would tell you that your hearing was fine."

Jerry Wyrick described how another source of noise was when a mold blew a gasket. The gasket would get old and rupture. Steam would come out and it would be extremely loud.

While steam leaks were one of the major sources of noise in the plant (steam was transported around the factory in piping), they were not the only ones. There was a buildup of different noises that created a deafening roar.It was just a multitude of different noises and when you got them all together, it was deafening. They came from everywhere. If I dropped a wrench; it made noise. There was a conveyor belt throttle that made a lot of noise. There were cracks in the floor that forklifts would run over, and they bounced up and down.

Rebecca Jim, our research partner, also described the loud noise of the plant. She worked for many years as a school counselor at Will Rodgers High School in Miami. Throughout the year, students and staff at the school could hear the noise from the plant. As she detailed, “I worked at Will Rogers, which was about a block away from the plant. You could hear the noise of the plant from the school.” The plant operated 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, which meant that the noise was non-stop.

Prior to the closure, some workers were aware that the substances they were being exposed to at work were potentially toxic. However, in the years immediately following the shutdown, residents and former workers began to become increasingly concerned about the lingering toxins on the site. Miami residents knew that the plant was causing health concerns, especially after many workers were given medical cards stating that they had worked at B.F. Goodrich (which made it easier for doctors to identify the root causes of medical problems). As the years progressed and the plant changed ownership, the environmental hazards at the plant became increasingly notable and concerning.

There are five main areas of concern that continued to come to light. These are: benzene, asbestos, carbon black, underground storage tanks (USTs), and the solid waste disposal site/incinerator. In the following sections, each concern is broken down individually. A June 1991 site report provides further elaboration on how many toxic and non-toxic substances were stored and used during manufacturing in Miami. Waldemar S. Nelson and Company 1991a detailed,

"The primary raw materials used by BFG during tire manufacturing were blocks of raw rubber (natural and synthetic), sulfur, zinc oxide, carbon black and organic acids. These materials were blended and mixed in the manufacturing process to meet specific recipes for rubber compounds. The materials were used as liquids and dry goods. Raw materials were stored in dry sacks, drums, above and below ground storage tanks, and large dispensing hoppers."

Benzene plumes are one of, if not the largest, issues impacting the remediation of the former B.F. Goodrich plant. A 2014 Miami Record newspaper article detailing the impacts of benzene describes the substance as, “a natural constituent of crude oil and an organic chemical liquid compound that is either colorless or light yellow, highly flammable, and has a sweet smell” (Miami Record 2014).

Benzene was often used in the manufacturing process at the Miami plant. One of the most frequent applications was at the tire molds themselves. Freshly mixed rubber was often very sticky and would adhere to the molds and the hands of the workers removing the tires. To reduce the stickiness, benzene would be applied inside of the machine and to the arms and hands of workers. As former worker Larry Tippit explained, “tire builders did everything but bathe in it. In fact, we washed our hands with it at the end of each shift.” Dale Taylor also mentioned how benzene was used to fix mistakes while building tires. At every machine there was, “a five-gallon bucket that was used to fix mistakes. If you stuck a part of the tread on wrong, you’d have to use benzene to help pull it apart to redo it. Every night, we washed up with benzene because that was the only thing that would take the rubber off. Everybody did it for years and years.” Additionally, excess benzene was sometimes disposed of directly into the street via the storm drain. Rebecca Jim mentioned how former workers told her that people at the end of their shifts would take buckets of benzene and dump them down the storm drainage system. Some would also dump it outside near the solid waste disposal.

In recent years, the usage of benzene in an industrial setting has decreased due to its classification as a carcinogen. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recognizes benzene as a Class A carcinogen, which means that they are certain that the chemical causes cancer in humans and animals (1995 Michelin Court Petition, 5-6). However, Benzene can still be found in a number of household products including but not limited to: glue, paint, furniture wax, and some dry shampoos.

Exposure to benzene for extended time periods (greater than one year) is known to lead to a variety of health concerns, especially in terms of blood-related processes and cancers ( Morris 2023 ). Benzene directly targets the immune system. It causes, “harmful effects on the bone marrow and a decrease in red blood cells, leading to anemia. It can also lead to excessive bleeding and can affect the immune system, increasing the chance for infection” (1995 Michelin Court Petition, 6). Furthermore, as mentioned above, benzene is a known carcinogen. “The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)…notes that benzene exposure has been linked with acute lymphocytic leukemia, chronic lymphocytic leukemia, multiple myeloma, and non-Hodgkins’s lymphoma” (1995 Michelin Court Petition, 6). Many of these cancers are chronic, meaning that they are uncurable (they will never go away).

Several people with whom I spoke or who interviewed with the Miami News-Record newspaper described how benzene personally impacted either their health or that of a family member. Many workers mentioned how they noticed skin irritation from the benzene. Larry Tippit recalled how,

"I knew one man who had to work days in order to support his daughter after his wife died in a plane crash at the end of Goodrich Boulevard. The only job that would guarantee him days was building tires, and his hands were terrible from the benzene. His skin looked like a leper or something. I and another foreman tried and tried to get him to take another job, but he always refused because he was worried he would lose his job. Yeah, benzene would make your skin peel."

In addition to the skin concerns Larry mentioned, other workers were diagnosed with cancers likely due to their exposure to benzene. Dale Taylor was diagnosed with, “kidney cancer. I’ve lost a kidney from the cancer. There’s benzene at the plant and I think it was probably the benzene that caused my cancer.” Workers with cancer often had to try and find some way to pay for the costs of their treatment because they did not have health insurance (when the plant closed all benefits went with it). This creates an additional burden that they must now handle.

Residents living close to the plant or plumes with basements, crawl spaces, tornado shelters, or other underground structures are at risk of buildup from benzene fumes. As Don Davis, a project manager for remediation company URS detailed, “underground structures could pose a hazard because benzene vapors could build up in a basement or cellar” (Miami News-Record 2010). As underground structures are usually not well-ventilated, fumes are given time to accumulate to dangerous levels. Unaware persons are then exposed to high levels of contamination, increasing their risk of health implications such as cancer.

Unfortunately, many Miami residents were never made aware of the dangers of benzene fumes or groundwater contamination. When health issues eventually emerged from exposure, it resulted in job loss and further aggravation of an already terrible situation. As long-time Miami resident and Miami Heights Subdivision homeowner described, “we were never made aware of the dangers lurking in the contaminated groundwater. My wife has had a lot of medical diagnosis and tests and everything and a lot of it has been linked to over exposure to benzene; it’s cost her her job” ( Utecht 2017 ). Not only do residents need to worry about the health concerns stemming from their living environments, but they also must face the corresponding job loss that occurs when working is no longer feasible due to poor health.

Furthermore, the existence of benzene on the factory site can decrease the value of neighboring homes, making it harder for resale and investment. As was noted during trial, “the existence of benzene further poses a serious risk to the property of Plaintiffs as well as others, rendering it less useful and/or decreasing its value.” (1995 Michelin Court Petition, 6). Many who purchased homes in this region were not aware of the issue until it was too late. Once they expressed concern, they were informed that they were no longer eligible for compensation or help of any sort, and then they were warned to keep their mouth shut or face legal repercussions. On a sunny Saturday afternoon in October of 2022 during a trip to Miami, I had the opportunity to have a conversation with a nearby resident who described this issue in detail.

Martin, (Rebecca Jim’s co-worker), Rebecca Jim, and I were walking along the outside of the fencing surrounding the plant, and I was taking pictures. Noticing that the gates were open (they are usually closed because of the danger of open pits), a nearby homeowner drove by in his truck. Seeing us, he pulled up and asked if we were thinking of buying the site. I said no and began to talk about my thesis project and that I was a student at the University of Oklahoma. As we chatted, he mentioned that he had purchased his first home in the Miami Heights Subdivision (neighborhood right next to the plant) about three years ago, but no one had told him about the benzene contamination. Neighbors said that he was too late to get in on the compensation, so he should just keep his mouth shut and not let his kids play in the dirt. “Don’t let them play in the dirt, '' he said, shaking his head in disbelief, “they're kids, I can’t keep them out of the dirt!” He also mentioned how he had noticed an oily shine on the surface of the water in his sump pump. He expressed frustration that no one had told him about the benzene. Had he known, he probably would never have purchased the house. He was now stuck because he couldn’t afford to buy a new one. A simple home purchase then became a compounding issue because in addition to taking a loss on his home, he now the additional burden of worrying about the safety and health of himself and his children.

  Unfortunately, benzene in the working environment was not the sole source of contamination. Within the last couple of decades, benzene has been discovered in the groundwater, likely from an old underground storage tank that had leaked during a hurried removal after the plant closed in 1986. Benzene contamination at the site began to become a notable environmental problem for the State of Oklahoma during monitoring in 2009, when it was discovered that an underground storage tank had ruptured, spilling it into the ground. ODEQ found benzene, “during routine monitoring at the plant. Tests in October revealed benzene had seeped into ground water south of the plant” (Miami News-Record 2010).

Once benzene was confirmed, residents and the City of Miami began to place increased pressure on ODEQ and Michelin to create a plan to remediate the benzene. Several site visits in the 1990s enhanced this. During a 1994 tour, manager Terry Butterfield put a match to a soil sample contaminated with benzene; and it burned for ten minutes (Deposition Exhibit #1: Site Inspection 1994). Afterwards, officials renewed pressure. In the early months, Michelin stalled for as long as possible, trying to delay action. They hired contractors who claimed that the benzene issue was not really that bad, or that benzene had no way of getting into the drinking water. City officials became increasingly frustrated with the inaction and accused Michelin of stalling efforts in an attempt to not have to pay. Officials eventually gave Michelin an ultimate deadline of August 11, 2006, to have a workplan submitted to the City and the State. Michelin did not submit their workplan until July of 2007 (Miami News-Record 2014).

Once it was approved, remediation efforts began on the site, and continue to this day. “Contaminated soil was excavated from the former underground storage tank pit in 2007” and the OKDEQ approved the workplan on “August 3, 2007” (Miami News-Record 2014). On March 15, 2010, “the Groundwater Remediation Work Plan prepared by United Research Services (URS) (the contractor Michelin hired) was accepted (Miami News-Record 2014). Remediation efforts then proceeded for several years. In 2013, an amendment specifying progress and new concerns, “was added to the Settlement Agreement on September 25, 2013” (Miami News-Record 2014). In the years following 2013, Michelin developed a new remediation plan to monitor the movement of benzene plumes through the groundwater. In 2014, Michelin and the DEQ developed a new remediation plan that, “proposes putting in additional wells at the site and injecting different chemicals to mitigate the compounds. They plan to put in 14 injection wells starting in 2015 and to monitor them for three years. They will also close specific monitoring wells where the concentrations have diminished” Miami News-Record 2014). These monitoring wells were installed in 2015 and continue to be monitored somewhat regularly. Remediation work was limited during the COVID-19 pandemic, but in January 2021, Michelin and the ODEQ came together to establish a new remediation plan known as Multi-Phase Extraction/Air Sparge (MPE/AS).

MPE/AS is a relatively new remediation technique whereby air is pumped through wells to enhance the biodegradation of benzene. As the ODEQ explained in a May 24, 2022, community briefing, "MPE involves the pumping, extraction, and treatment of both groundwater and subsurface soil vapor which contain mineral spirits and benzene. Air sparging, which is the injection of air, will provide oxygen to the subsurface to promote the removal of mineral spirits and benzene and enhance biodegradation of the ground water plume" ( Hatfield 2022 ). The DEQ plans to run the system for as long as needed (or until the benzene contamination reaches “safe” levels).

While ODEQ, Michelin, and City of Miami officials are very excited about the MPE/AS remediation system, some residents are wary, and wonder if it will cause further harm. As Lance Hines inquired, “in 10 years are we going to hear oh, the chemical that we used to treat the benzene is actually worse for you”( Utecht 2007 )? If residents have historically not adequately been made aware of what is occurring, how can they trust these efforts? The May 2022 briefing was the first community outreach paper that I had seen the ODEQ produce. Why was one not distributed earlier so that residents could be made aware of the risks, and take action to avoid them (if possible)? Other residents felt that their voices and opinions were not being considered. As Dale Taylor detailed, “That whole place is still sitting over there. I saw trucks, and occasionally they’ll send somebody from ODEQ to drill wells and check, but I wish it was just all torn down. I don’t guess it ever will be.”

Asbestos at the B.F. Goodrich plant has been a health risk and barrier to remediation efforts. The EPA defines asbestos as “a mineral fiber that was commonly used in a variety of building construction materials for insulation, and as a fire-retardant. Because of its fiber strength and heat resistant properties, asbestos was used for a wide range of manufactured goods…[and] must be airborne to cause a health risk through inhalation”( US EPA, OSC 2019 ). Asbestos had many uses at the plant. It was commonly found in piping, especially in the powerhouse and autoclave regions. It was also used as a fire-retardant in high-risk areas and to insulate items such as curing machines and molds. As it was often wrapped around items, it would sometimes fall off onto the floor. As James Graves recalled in his interview, “whenever a large chunk of asbestos would fall, a janitor would be sent to clean it up. They would be exposed and often get sick.”

Asbestos is generally defined as being either friable or non-friable. The key difference is whether or not the dry material can be crumbled using hand pressure. “Friable asbestos material, when dry, can be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to powder by hand pressure.” Non-friable asbestos, “when dry, cannot be crumbled, pulverized, or reduced to powder by hand pressure” (State of Oklahoma, n.d.). Asbestos is an airborne hazard. If it can crumble easily, the fibers get into the air, and be inhaled directly into the lungs causing severe damage. As they are inhaled, “the fibers become trapped in the lung tissues. The human body attempts to eliminate asbestos fibers by producing acid. Due to the chemically resistant nature of asbestos fibers, the acid has little effect, instead causing scarring of the surrounding tissue. Over time, these scars reduce lung function” (State of Oklahoma, n.d.). If large amounts were inhaled, it can often lead to the development of mesothelioma (a type of lung cancer). Asbestos is prevalent in older buildings and factories around the nation, and both types of asbestos have been found at the plant.

The asbestos concerns began to emerge after B.F. Goodrich donated the plant site to Mr. Wayne Ford, president of Save Our Children’s Environment (SOCE). Initially, this transfer seemed to be a charitable move on BFG’s part. In November of 1993, B.F. Goodrich held an auction at the plant where, “equipment and fixtures containing asbestos were sold to third parties and proceeds paid to BFG. Asbestos was stripped from fixtures and equipment at the plant before shipping” (Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Injunctive Relief 1996). Once this transfer and auction had taken place, Wayne Ford/SOCE began to conduct what is known as a “rip-and-run” at the plant in March of 1994. Essentially, a “rip-and-run” is a process whereby any salvageable materials (copper wiring, steel piping, and machinery) are stripped from the plant and scrapped. However, many of these materials, especially the piping, were covered in asbestos. Ford/SOCE simply pulled off the asbestos, stuffed it into black plastic trash bags, and left it piled in various corners of the plant. The asbestos was then left out in the elements, allowing it to blow around and become airborne, exposing nearby residents to the toxic fibers. As inspectors noted during a February 23, 1996, site tour of the plant,"Severely deteriorated and friable asbestos insulation and dust was observed throughout the buildings. In certain circumstances, the material is crumbling onto the floor. Turbulent/moderate velocity winds experienced throughout the buildings as a result of inferior exterior shelter integrity increases the potential for fugitive emissions within the buildings. In addition, asbestos is being significantly deteriorated by stormwater pouring through the faulty roof. The emissions generated within the buildings are significant enough to generate a health risk to occupants, inspectors, etc." (Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Injunctive Relief 1996).

Neighbors submitted numerous complaints about asbestos to Mr. Clyde Mason at the Miami office of the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ). The ODEQ began to conduct site inspections and investigations, and it soon became apparent that there was a massive concern. ODEQ stated that Wayne Ford was responsible for cleaning up the asbestos. This quickly escalated into a situation whereby Wayne Ford accused B.F. Goodrich/Michelin of failing to disclose the costs of remediation (Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Injunctive Relief 1996) and said that they, not he, should not be responsible. Wayne Ford then hired two remediation companies Asbestos Removal and Maintenance, Inc. (ARMI) and Schoonover to assist in clean-up initiatives (Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Motion for Injunctive Relief 1996). Meanwhile, he tried to get ODEQ to force him to stop so that he would not be held responsible. In 1997, residents had had enough and filed a lawsuit against SOCE/BFG/Michelin to stop salvage operations and receive compensation for damages.

Residents were ultimately successful in stopping salvage operations, but cleanup never occurred because there was no funding left. There were some attempts to remove asbestos in the following years, but by late 2014, “the owner filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy”(Hefner and Robbie 2021). Residents continued to alert the ODEQ about the asbestos situation and their concerns, and ODEQ eventually involved the EPA due to the large scope of the problem.

In 2018-2019, “EPA conducted a $4.6 million emergency removal action to remove asbestos debris piles and several structures due to the amount of asbestos-containing materials scattered across the site and inside abandoned structures” (Hefner and Robbie 2021). In addition to remediating a large amount of asbestos, the EPA also removed other hazardous substances (including paints and acids) that had been left over from earlier efforts. In total, 25,120.74 tons of asbestos-containing material were removed, 53.82 tons of carbon black were disposed of, and 1,675 trucks worth of waste was carted away (McAteer 2019). Following the EPA’s involvement, ownership of the site was transferred to the City of Miami. While most of it is gone, there is still some asbestos that remains in piping in the powerhouse and in the warehouse buildings in the southwest corner of the plant.

Carbon black is the third major area of concern at the former B.F. Goodrich plant. The U.S. Department of Labor defines carbon black as, “a pigment used for rubber tires that serves as a reinforcing filler for rubber and improves various properties of mixes (breaking, tear, and abrasion resistances)” (U.S. Department of Labor 1989). In addition to providing the standard black color of tires, it increases abrasion resistance. This helps to stop the tire from falling apart as it rubs on the surface of the road. Outside of its use in tire manufacturing, carbon black is used to color electrical wiring and leather.

Carbon black is a known carcinogen, skin irritant and can easily enter the airways and cause respiratory illness. The Wisconsin Department of Health describes how, “inhaling carbon black particles can irritate the lungs and cause coughing. When people are exposed to high levels of carbon black over many years, the particles may lodge deep in their lungs, causing cancer or respiratory disease” ( Wisconsin Department of Public Health 2018 ). 1989 federal standards recommend that people limit their exposure to 3.5 mg/m3 for a 10-hour shift, 40-hour workweek (U.S. Department of Labor 1989). Carbon black would reportedly get onto almost everything, and was often airborne, making it extremely challenging to meet the CDC’s recommended guidelines.

At the Miami B.F. Goodrich plant, carbon black was stored in large towers on the northeastern corner until it was transported by conveyor belt to a hopper for use in the plant. Larry Tippit mentioned how people who used to work in that department would need to wear heavy coveralls and black T-shirts to avoid having it wreck their clothes. Ben Bingham’s father worked at the plant, and he would often share stories of managers getting “carbon blacked.” Workers would get on the roof of the plant with a bucket of carbon black. Once the unsuspecting person walked below, the bucket would be dumped on top of them, covering them in carbon black. Many people reported that if they parked their cars in the lot on the east end of the plant, it was not uncommon for them to walk back and find their cars covered in carbon black. Rebecca Jim mentioned how carbon black would get on cars that were parked a block away at the school.

During meetings with interviewees and informal conversations with community members, many recalled carbon black as a part of daily life, especially for those living near the plant. Long-time Miami, OK resident Carolyn Cook Sweeney recalled how, “growing up two blocks from the plant, I remember how our roof was always black from the powdered carbon black they used in the tires.” Another resident, Pam Grunewald Keyes, recalled “yeah, during the summertime, you couldn’t play barefoot in the grass in that neighborhood without your soles getting as black as if you’d been playing in a coal mine.” Jerry Wyrick remembered how, “there was always carbon black on the grass. It was a fine powder and it just got in the air and then all over everything.” Others expressed how they could run their fingers along the siding on their house and pick up a noticeable residue of carbon black on their fingertips or hang laundry out to dry and come out to find that it had accumulated a light grayish black coating.

Although carbon black accumulation while the plant was in operation was notable, the greatest concern emerged when the plant was being demolished. During the demolition process, the carbon black storage tanks were taken down by letting them fall and then cutting them into sections. However, there were concerns that not all of the residual carbon black had been removed prior to demolition. When the tanks fell, there was a massive cloud of residual dust noticeable from the road. “[The tanks] were emptied of product. But what they found out was when they cut up the towers into sections, there was a residue of carbon black that clung to the insides of the towers. And so, when they dropped the pieces of metal, that carbon black then was released into the air” ("Schoonover Carbon Black Report,” n.d., 34) As Clyde Mason, an ODEQ official and local resident noted, “I did drive by at one time when the towers were being cut up and saw a cut piece of tower being dropped. And you could see the carbon black dust from the street coming off the product, as it was visible from the public road” ("Schoonover Carbon Black Report,” n.d., 34).

Residents quickly began to file complaint reports with the ODEQ to try and bring attention to the issue. Many noticed it on their patio furniture, house siding, garages, and other outdoor locations. A report on August 24, 1995, provides details on the extent of carbon black fugitive dust from the demolition. It details how, “there is a fine, black powdery substance present on patio furniture, outdoor carpet, metal storage buildings, house siding and other items on the complainants’ properties” (ODEQ 1995). There was a total of six carbon black towers that needed to be removed. However, five had been demolished when the complaints started to come in from concerned residents and staff members. Heeding these concerns, ODEQ stopped demolition immediately, and told Schoonover (the demolition company) to not remove the last tank (ODEQ 1995). This frustrated many because it not only served as a reminder of the lingering environmental concerns the community faced, but also posed a safety hazard. If the tank rusted enough, it could collapse, sending additional carbon black into the air and possibly injuring someone. Jerry Wyrick detailed in his interview. "I don’t know why they haven't torn that other carbon black tower down. I semi-blame the neighbors on that one. They threw a fit and it’s just sitting there. If they’d just let the cleanup people do their job for one more day, that tower would've been down and gone. Now it's sitting there, and it's going to rust and fall one of these days. Why didn't they just wait one more day and then gotten rid of the last one?"

Another concern emerging during the various remediation processes at the site are the Underground Storage Tanks (USTs). The EPA’s UST program notes how, “The greatest potential threat from a leaking UST is contamination of groundwater, the source of drinking water for nearly half of all Americans” ( OLEM US EPA 2013b ). Groundwater contamination from leaking USTs has occurred at the Miami plant. The benzene plume that now exists resulted from a leaking UST, as mentioned above. Other tanks have been found in numerous locations underneath the plant. These storage tanks were typically used for waste oil, benzene, and acids needed in the tire manufacturing process (Waldemar S. Nelson and Company 1991a).

While B.F. Goodrich had removed most of the tanks in 1985, they had not removed all of them. Additionally, there were feedlines (pipes that ran materials around the plant) that had either not been drained or contained residue. During a 1995 site tour, inspectors saw a “nearby storage tank where the bottom had rusted out and sulfuric acid had spilled out all over the floor.”(Deposition Exhibit #1: Site Inspection 1994). Additionally, the plant manager who led the tour, Terry Butterfield, expressed concern about exactly how much material had leaked from the tanks due to the extremely strong odor present in the area. Butterfield, “showed us a gravel covered area where he indicated three underground storage tanks had been pulled out of the ground and solvents (wastes from the tire process including benzene) had leaked into the ground.” When industrial hygienists and contractors came to the plant to test the soil, they had to drill holes. Butterfield reported that, “the contractors only drilled one hole. He had to tell them to stop after only one hole since the smell coming out was so strong that he was concerned about the possibility of an explosion” (Deposition Exhibit #1: Site Inspection 1994).

While many UST were removed prior to the plant closure, remaining tanks began to leak over time. Remediation company Waldemar S. Nelson & Co. detailed in their Phase 1 Environmental Assessment how, “the Underground Storage Tanks (UST’s) that stored gasoline, diesel fuel and fuel oil were removed in 1985, just prior to the plant closing” (Waldemar S. Nelson and Company 1991a). When the tanks were removed, residues of previous chemicals stored there remained. In addition, B.F. Goodrich decided to utilize lead-infused chat to fill in the holes left behind by the tanks. Erik Johnson, the City of Miami’s attorney, reported “chat was brought in to fill the site after the tanks were removed. The chat has since been tested “hot” for lead, indicating that the fill material exceeds the state’s acceptable level of lead-content” (Miami News-Record 2007). This poses a compounding problem of the residue of whatever had been stored in the UST and also the possibility of the lead from the chat getting into the groundwater. The discovery of these tanks and chat slowed the remediation process at the site. Johnson detailed how, “the discovery of the lead contamination, concerns of an unidentified source flowing into the pit site and objections raised by the current owners regarding plans to treat contaminated soil on site slowed the launch of Michelin’s work plan (Miami News-Record 2007).

Not only are these leaking tanks contributing to the benzene concerns at the site, but they are also hindering remediation efforts and the potential reuse of the site in the future. It is costly and time-consuming to find and remove all tanks and subsequent piping. Manufacturers will not want to purchase the site if they know that they might be responsible for any cleanup or damage associated with further issues. Therefore, Miami not only loses out on the economic benefits that use of the site would provide but is also forced to continue to bear the burden of environmental contamination from leaks.

The final concern at the site has two parts: the solid waste disposal site and the incinerator. B.F. Goodrich operated a solid waste disposal site from 1976 to 1983. The main purpose of this site was to collect waste materials such as tires and fabric scraps. The B.F. Goodrich landfill was permitted (Permit #3558014) on October 26, 1976, for, “the disposal of scrap rubber tires, fabric, wastepaper, and any trash generated from the plant. The waste was transported to the landfill in company-owned trucks” (Waldemar S. Nelson and Company 1991b, 11) . The following is an estimate of what and how much was contributed to the disposal each day: Rubber Tires - 11,000 lbs./day, Rubber Other Than Tires - 1,200 lbs./day, Scrap Fabric - 7,200 lbs./day, Polyethylene - 1,000 lbs./day, Scrap Paper, Wood, etc. - 8,000 lbs./day (Waldemar S. Nelson and Company (1991b), 11).

Employees and sometimes other members of the community would dump their waste in the disposal as well. In 1979, B.F. Goodrich officials received a letter from ODEQ officials congratulating them for a productive and safe landfill. “As all citizens benefit from such programs, we would like to congratulate you on providing this service and encourage you to continue to provide your employees with an environmentally acceptable solid waste system” (Oklahoma Department of Health 1979). There were also unconfirmed reports from former employees that abandoned mine shafts and several waste pits had been used for dumping while the plant was in operation (Waldemar S. Nelson and Company 1991b, 11). There was an investigation into the shafts and pits, but nothing definite emerged and other concerns (such as benzene) took precedence.

In late 1980, B.F. Goodrich found that the landfill was nearing capacity and was becoming extremely expensive to operate. Therefore, in 1981, B.F. Goodrich applied to close the disposal site. Operations ceased in mid-1981 and “final closure was received from the Ottawa County Health Department in June of 1982” (Waldemar S. Nelson and Company 1991b, 11). As part of the agreement for operating a landfill, B.F. Goodrich had to apply for a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit (permit # OK0001040) and send monthly monitoring reports to ODEQ. If this was not completed, Goodrich risked having to pay fines and the possibility of forced closure. Compliance was maintained up until the plant closed, but reports went missing after that. In 1988, ODEQ sent a letter to B.F. Goodrich alerting them that, “Discharge Monitoring Reports have not been received for July-September 1988, which constitutes a violation of the conditions of your NPDES permit” (ODEQ 1988). In the confusion following the sale and B.F. Goodrich’s attempt to transfer permit responsibility to Wayne Ford/SOCE, many of these monitoring reports were not conducted. This meant that there was no record of how much discharge was going into the nearby Neosho River and eventually to Grand Lake.

After the closure of the landfill, B.F. Goodrich needed to find an alternative way of disposing of waste, especially very large defective tires. They investigated a variety of options including a shredder, transport to another landfill, and an incinerator. At the time, the shredder and incinerator seemed to be the best options. “Initially, very little interest existed due to the cumbersomeness of landfilling whole tires. Only one firm was interested if BFG would shred or slit the tires circumferentially” (B.F. Goodrich 1981). B.F. Goodrich then decided to purchase a Saturn Model 62-40, 300 H.P. Shredder. The shredder, “will destroy tires up to and including large farm tires and is scheduled for installation in January 1982” (B.F. Goodrich 1981) The shredder remained in use until the plant closed in 1986.

In addition to disposing of waste via shredder or landfill, B.F. Goodrich also operated an incinerator. B.F. Goodrich initially planned to use the incinerator during the rainy season as, “the landfill being utilized at this time is inaccessible”(B.F. Goodrich Petition for Variance-Incinerator 1972). However, it soon became a useful tool for getting rid of bulky tires, recovering expensive materials, and producing steam to generate electricity. As Noble Rose, a former plant manager explained, “the incinerator was used to recover curing water bag valves, which are extremely expensive to replace” (B.F. Goodrich Petition for Variance-Incinerator 1972). James Graves mentioned that the incinerator was also used to produce steam. “At the incinerator, they burned tire scrap besides the city’s household garbage. Goodrich would use this steam in their manufacturing process.”

While beneficial for Goodrich, usage of the incinerator was detrimental to the surrounding neighborhoods. As resident Twyla Stanley Yandell recalled, “we had to be aware of when the incinerators were operating before we hung laundry out to dry. Our home was two blocks from the north end of the plant, and the incinerator would bring soot to our yard and dirty the clothes.” The incinerator was smokey and sooty because of the oil in the burned tires. This generated a series of complaints, and the Oklahoma Department of Health came to investigate. The Department ultimately decided that the poor air quality resulting from burning was significant, and that resident complaints were warranted. Therefore, “the landfill operation should be continued at all times, especially in light of public complaints that have been received when burning was utilized” (B.F. Goodrich Petition for Variance-Incinerator 1972).

To my knowledge, there have been little-to-no remediation efforts taking place at the site of either the solid waste disposal or incinerator. Rebecca Jim and the LEAD Agency are very worried about what could be lurking in these areas, especially because waste acids and benzene were put into barrels and dumped there. Leaking barrels could be another source of groundwater contamination.

One of the main questions on the minds of residents, officials, and remediation companies is: what’s next for Miami and the site? In the Fall of 2019, following the EPA’s asbestos remediation project, Community Involvement Coordinators (CIC)’s and the Remedial Project Manager (RPM) conducted a site remediation assessment and a series of conversations with community members on what they would like to see the site become. It was noted that the site was located in a prime area with access to rail (the rail spurs could be redone) and I-44, a major thoroughfare for commerce in Oklahoma (Hefner and Robbie 2021).

During these conversations, it came to light that the site might be ideal for solar power usage. The Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA) has expressed interest in broadening their portfolio to include more sustainable means of electricity generation. The site features a large concrete base, which would provide an adequate foundation for solar panels. There is also an electrical substation which was recently upgraded and could handle the load that a solar farm would require. (Hefner and Robbie 2021). While it can be relatively expensive to install, there are programs which could make it more feasible. One of these is the EPA’s Brightfields program. Brightfields are meant to, “encourage productive use of brownfields and advance the use of clean and climate-friendly energy technologies, and the Department of Energy is working with local governments and industry to link solar energy technologies to brownfields redevelopment” ( US EPA 2012 ). Brightfields have been implemented at former factory sites across the country and are an excellent solution to the issue of how to repurpose a brownfield site for good. In Miami, a solar farm at B.F. Goodrich would not only create desperately needed jobs (technicians would be needed to install and maintain the panels), but it would be a clean source of energy and economic growth for the county.

In 2019, Miami was also named one of Oklahoma’s 119 Opportunity Zones. Opportunity zones are areas, “designed to stimulate long-term private investment in low-income urban and rural communities by allowing investors to realize significant federal tax benefits through investing capital gains in Qualified Opportunity Funds” ( Oklahoma Department of Commerce n.d. ). In other words, this program tries to attract industry and business to areas where it might be faltering. This is sometimes easier said than done. Dale Taylor mentioned that there was a company called Canoo who was trying to establish operations in the Miami area. However, “they’ve been talking about making a fortune, but it recently came out that they might not be able to make their first van before they go broke.” Besides the possibility of installing a solar farm, there are a few warehouses which can be rented out for storage on the site. Miami Warehouse is currently located there and when I made my trip up in October, I saw that they were in the process of fixing up the warehouses to use for local trucking companies.

Regardless of whatever happens with the site, any plan should include the voices and desires of residents and what they would like to see the site become. They have an intimate knowledge of what is and is not possible or wanted, and they can bring this to the table during discussions. The EPA spoke with residents and summarized their findings in the City of Miami Comprehensive Plan. When asked what they thought the community needed the most, many highlighted more jobs. As the report described, “residents view more jobs as central priorities. There is a desire for jobs that contribute to quality of life and enhance Miami’s sense of place. High quality jobs that pay a living wage are viewed as imperative to Miami’s long-term economic sustainability” (Hefner and Robbie 2021). The people I interviewed echoed this. Dale Taylor said, “our population's declined here, and I hate to say that. We need manufacturing jobs.” James Graves echoed this by saying, “I hope we get more jobs in here because if we don't, it's going to drive people away. That's what I'm more concerned about than anything. We've got to have jobs because we're losing our youth. They're having to go out to other places, other towns.”  If people leave for elsewhere, Miami loses out on that income and the population of the town will continue to decrease.

The B.F. Goodrich Tire Factory has and continues to have a complex history with Miami and Ottawa County. During the course of several decades, it transitioned from being a leading economic engine to a source of environmental contamination and concern. For many, the factory was a part of everyday life. They worked there, were directly impacted by its pollution, or served the workers in Miami’s many businesses. The closure of the plant devastated the economy and caused lasting societal and environmental issues. While various remediation efforts have occurred, there is still much work to be done, and many are hoping that the new Brightfields initiative will prove to be the boost that Miami needs.