Iraq: Lives in transition

During the past five decades, Iraqi society has been navigating through a complex combination of political upheaval, sectarian violence, unemployment struggles, and educational disappointments. This has led many people to migrate—first, from rural to urban areas, and later, abroad in search of stability, peace, and jobs, motivated by the hope for a better life. From where do these migrants come, and where are they going? And what are the factors driving their mobility?  

This storymap will provide insights into migration drivers and trajectories, based on the interviews conducted in Iraq between January and March of 2021. The study is funded by the Horizon 2020 project  "Future Migration Scenarios for Europe" . Explore migration stories from Iraq in the storymap below.

The stories of migration within Iraq are often reactive stories of families who, finding themselves in unstable conditions, must seek safety and peace elsewhere. As a major city in the KR-I, Iraqi Kurds perceive Duhok as a relatively safe place where they can escape religious or ethnic persecution experienced in Baghdad or Mosul. Due to existing family networks in the Kurdistan region, many Kurdish people living elsewhere in Iraq are able to migrate to these places with some prior sense of belonging to the region.

Migration patterns are often non-linear and fragmented, and this is undoubtedly true of the mobile populations in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. While the whole of Iraq has a high urban population with large numbers of people congregating in cities along the Tigris or Euphrates (such as Baghdad and Al Basrah), Kurdistan’s urban population is higher due to conflicts in the region’s rural areas (such as the destruction of villages during the 1970s and 1980s) forcing families to migrate to cities such as Erbil, Duhok, Zahko, and Mosul.

Several key events have influenced the stories of internal migration from rural areas to urban centres in the Kurdistan region, as well as external migration from the Kurdistan region to outside of Iraqi borders.

Migration is not an individual activity. Culturally, families often live several generations together in one household. Movement, internally as well as externally, often happens as a family unit. This creates a unique reality for women who are culturally dependent on men in Iraq—either their husbands (if married) or their fathers or other dominant male figures in their multi-generational households. Very few women live independently, thus very few women migrate independently, especially abroad. The migration journey for women is therefore often linked to broader cultural discussions of women’s opportunities to lead autonomous lives in urban areas or outside of Iraq. Many envision urban areas as the site where such ambitions may be realised.

Political instability, armed conflict, and religious persecution were the main factors instigating internal and external migration for the past decades in Iraq. While some political instability remains today, additional economic factors driving migration from rural to urban areas have emerged over the years. Many migrants cite the desire to pursue education and employment opportunities as reasons to relocate to urban centres or look abroad to Europe, in addition to the possibility to make a better life. Many areas—both urban and rural—in Iraq suffer from poor water quality (due to ageing and ill-maintained infrastructure) and water accessibility (due to droughts and river contamination or blockages). These concerns are predicted by some experts to be catalysts for future migration scenarios.

The economic situation has become a significant driver for Iraqi migration in recent years. However, migrants within and from Iraq cannot be characterised by a singular driver, as economic migrants are often simultaneously forced to relocate for myriad reasons that contribute to or are entangled with economic conditions. There are several circumstances in Iraq that lead to internal economic migration as well as external migration to European countries that can grant people greater economic opportunities. The Iraqi economy is predominantly state run, with around 80-90% of employment in public sector jobs. The private sector, in contrast, is extremely weak. This imbalance has led to high unemployment rates, especially for young Iraqis (15-24 years old), one-third of whom are unemployed. Kurdistan has pushed for decentralisation, but this has not yet come to fruition. Economic conditions have also been influenced by the parallel stories of Syrian refugees seeking stability in Iraq. Insufficient government policies have led to complex unemployment issues due to wage dumping. These realities create internal tension as ‘local’ migrants are forced to compete with migrants who have relocated to Iraq from abroad.

“I think [Syrian refugees] had a large impact, especially in Duhok. A local employee will not be able to afford a work for less than $500 per month while a Syrian refugee, for example, will settle for $300 per month. This is because they don’t pay any rents or taxes, and they constantly receive support from humanitarian organisations. This causes competition of labour for the local labour force and affects local people in Duhok for access to jobs.” (IQMigSM07)

Oil industry

Furthermore, the economy relies heavily on the oil industry, with more than 90% of government revenues and 65% of the country’s GDP stemming from it. This mono-industrialisation creates a volatile economic condition that is vulnerable to global shifts in the oil industry, as witnessed in 2014.

Ethnic persecution

Some economic concerns for Kurdish Iraqis have stemmed from ethnic persecution in the labour market. In the early 2000s, some employers perceived Kurds as too risky to employ due to their position in society at the time. Kurds have experienced higher unemployment rates than other Iraqis.

“Especially after 2003, many places weren’t hiring Kurds. Kurds were always receiving death threats and so job owners did not want to risk the threat affecting their workplaces as well.” (IQMigSM07)

“We had a lot of positive points after living here as it is my birthplace, and we didn’t face ethnicity issues with others and felt more comfortable. My husband was able to find a better job and my children had better educational and job opportunities than they did back in Mosul. Safety is crucial in stabilizing lives.” (IQMigSF01)

Looking for better opportunities

Poor economic conditions in villages or southern cities are viewed in relation to perceived opportunities existing elsewhere. Those who faced unemployment in Baghdad after 2003 or Mosul after 2014 have found relative job stability after relocating to Iraqi Kurdistan.

“We had a stable life [in Baghdad] till the war started in 2003, and we decided to go to Syria in 2003 before the US army attack … After three months living in Syria, we spent all the money we had. Then we came back to Baghdad. I lived [2003-2006 in Baghdad] till I decided to move to Zakho looking for a better life.” (IQMigSF20)

Religion

It is difficult to overstate the significance that religion has played in Iraq, both in terms of culture as well as migration. The population is organised geographically, largely according to ethnicity and religion, with the two main Islamic sects divided into the Northern (Sunni) and Southern (Shia) regions. The majority of the Kurdistan region is part of the Sunni Muslim sect, in accordance with this divide, and the Sunni Muslim population is generally more ethnically diverse. While 97% of the country’s population is Muslim, there are also people who identify as Christian, Yazidi, Turkoman, and Zoroastrian throughout the country.

Politics

As described, the political climate of Iraq has sharply influenced where these ethnic and religious populations congregate due to persecution, extremism, and violence, leading to many internally displaced people populating the KR-I. Social and cultural perceptions of cities also play a role for migrants, and Duhok and Zakho are often perceived as peaceful cities within the Kurdistan region where migrants facing socio-cultural instabilities can live a more secure life.

Decades of internal conflict have led to a decline in Iraqi education, especially in rural areas where children, often from poorer backgrounds, lack educational opportunities or do not have access to quality education compared to what is offered in urban areas. Combined with other push and pull factors of internal migration, education is one motivating factor for families relocating to urban areas like Duhok and Zukho in the KR-I. Higher education opportunities are also linked to the desire of young adults to branch out from their family unit in order to start a life of their own or seek better opportunities for their future families compared to what they have been afforded in their upbringing. These patterns simultaneously contribute to a ‘brain drain’ effect as those who migrate to obtain greater educational and future employment opportunities are unlikely to return.

“There are not many services here [in the village of Bakhtme], no health centers, nothing. There are schools, but only some teachers work in them. There are no job opportunities here and you have to go either to Duhok or somewhere else to find a job.” (IQMigNM09)

In contrast to the southern portions of the country, the northern region of Iraq experiences a semi-arid climate, and the land is rather fertile due to high precipitation levels in the winters. Iraq is facing extreme drought which has reduced agricultural production by 30% in the years following ISIL, forcing those who depend on agriculture for their livelihood to uproot their lives in search of arable land. While erosion and drought are not often cited as major reasons for migration on their own, factors like a drop in crop yield production influencing economic migration find their origin in larger climate concerns. Water availability is also a major concern due to drought as well as dam construction activities in Turkey which affects the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in Iraq. This lack of water (and specifically lack of clean water due to ageing water and waste management infrastructure) is expected to concern the Iraqi population in the future. Many other circumstances (such as social and political factors) act as compounding factors for environmental conditions as well. Overall, rural-urban migration due to environmental reasons is only marginal compared to economic, social, or political reasons, but remains a pressing issue for the future of Iraq.

The pathways for migration abroad are exhausting at best and illegal or deadly at worst. In recent years, the Iraqi government has developed more advanced border control to detect irregular migration incidences such as occasions of human trafficking or forced labour. However, there are still gaps in policies and procedures for overseeing migration and for protecting the rights of migrants when they are in transit across Iraqi borders. Some complications also exist for Iraqi migrants who are turned away at the borders of destination countries, for example, Iraqis whose asylum applications are rejected. One proactive policy has been a collaboration between Iraq and Germany that facilitates the safe return of Iraqis who experience border rejection and are otherwise stuck in a complex, liminal space between origin and destination.

For highly educated Iraqis who, having obtained a job abroad, successfully migrate to other countries, the Iraqi government has attempted to enact policies that encourage their return as a way to prevent ‘brain drain’ for the nation; however, such policies are mostly unsuccessful. Those who do return may attempt to make a difference in their home country or come back for family purposes. With skilled residents feeling the need to seek employment opportunities elsewhere, the country’s potential to improve its conditions is under threat. For refugees migrating to Iraq, immigration policies need to be improved to ensure human rights are upheld, especially when it comes to labour. The Kurdistan Region is particularly overburdened by the management of internally displaced peoples and refugees from elsewhere in Iraq, which manifests itself in the region’s infrastructure, educational systems, housing, and labour market.

Despite finding some refuge in the urban settlements of Iraqi Kurdistan, many Iraqi people do not see cities like Duhok or Zakho as the final destination in their migration journeys. Armed conflicts, political turmoil, and lack of opportunities are all motivators for residents to look beyond the nation’s territory. The image of life in western European countries has been described by migrants as a hopeful alternative to their current circumstances, particularly for those born around the time of the fall of Saddam Hussein and are now coming of age and seeking education or jobs.

“Yes, my friends have always encouraged me to leave the country because they have greater employment options now that they have automobiles and nice jobs. They also tell me that if I move to Germany, there will be a lot more work prospects.” (IQMigSM18)

Some individuals feel as though they have no choice but to leave in order to establish a more secure life for their families—economically, socially, and politically.

“I am willing to leave because there is no future here to live for. Because there are almost no work options for the youth, many students graduate with no plans for the future, especially since the 2014 ISIS crises worsening the country's economy.” (IQMigLF25)

For many, the notion of migration to Europe is an ideal but elusive dream. All 30 of the interviewees in this research stated that they would move to Europe or another international country if given the opportunity. However, residents of Iraq do not always have a precise location in mind, nor a plan of action, other than a vague perception of something ‘better’ that exists elsewhere. The exercise of migrating abroad is unrealistic for most Iraqi people due to various legal barriers (such as strict immigration policies from receiving countries) and illegal routes are too risky for most to attempt. Even for those who obtain a visa to move abroad, the logistics of such moves, such as language and cultural barriers, pose additional challenges. For those who do migrate, the UK, Germany, and Scandinavian countries with strong economies and well-established English language skills are cited as the most appealing for Iraqi migrants seeking long-term stability. But for most, Europe remains an ambiguous and unattainable dream.

Push and pull migration factors for the Iraqi people have tended to build upon one another, creating complex layers of insecurity, persecution, economic instability, internal conflict, and visions of an alternative life from the present lived experience. Potential lack of water accessibility also concerns experts who foresee this environmental issue becoming an additional push factor for Iraqi people who may be required to seek fundamental human needs like clean water beyond their homeland. Finally, Europe’s internal refugee crisis due to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022 may also limit capacity in countries previously open to immigration from receiving migrants beyond the continent. If this is the case, the situation may prevent those outsides of Europe from accessing employment previously open to them, thus closing a migration door that was already only slightly ajar to begin with.