Al Qaeda: from Hierarchical to Decentralized Organization
Introduction
Background:
Al Qaeda creates formalized relationships with select groups, affiliates. This process accelerated after 9/11 as U.S. counter terrorism pressure on Al Qaeda increased. Al Qaeda was forced to find ways to stay active and relevant on the international stage and within the jihadist movement.
Research Question:
How has the evolution of Al Qaeda from a hierarchical organization to a decentralized organization affected its patterns of attack?
Relevant terms:
- Terrorist attack: the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation
- Affiliate group: a previously independent group that takes on the Al Qaeda label, pledges fealty to Al Qaeda leadership, and integrates Al Qaeda leadership into its structure
Data:
I used data from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism's Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland. I broke up the data into four time periods, based on the addition of affiliate groups, in order to investigate my research question:
- Hierarchical: 1992-2003
- Less Hierarchical: 2004-2008
- More Decentralized: 2009-2013
- Decentralized: 2014-2018
For more information on the data collection and methods see the GTD Codebook . For more information on the Global Terrorism Database, see their homepage .
Al Qaeda Overview:
Al Qaeda is an Islamic extremist group, formed in 1989, that became the group it is today after the Saudis turned to the Americans for help countering Saddam Hussein. Al Qaeda's goal is to end U.S. influence in the Middle East and to eventually build an Islamic Caliphate. It is a Sunni group; however it does not believe in targeting other Muslims. Al Qaeda is unique in that it has multinational membership—most other groups are mono-ethnic. It is active all over the world, much through its affiliates.
Time Enabled Map: Al Qaeda Area of Operations
Al Qaeda and its affiliates' area of operations over time.
Leadership
Osama Bin Laden
Bin Laden, part of a wealthy Saudi family, was integral to Al Qaeda’s creation and longevity. He founded Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization after the Saudis rejected Bin Laden’s offered foreign fighters to counter Saddam Hussein. Bin Laden was further offended when the U.S. troops remained in the region even after the overthrow of Hussein. This fueled his resolve to build Al Qaeda and drive the United States from the Middle East.
Osama Bin Laden was instrumental in organizing Al Qaeda in a centralized structure with decentralization capabilities. Specifically, Bin Laden focused on:
- Selecting patient leaders
- Careful planning of attacks, even if it took years
- Re-attempting attacks if they failed the first time
- Attracting team-players for members
- Remembering the ultimate enemy, the United States
- Gaining regional support
- Building financial connections and popular training camps for Islamic fighters
Arguably, Bin Laden’s greatest accomplishment is that like-minded organizations have formed throughout the Muslim world and Al Qaeda survived his death.
Ayman al-Zawahiri
Zawahiri comes from a family of Egyptian elite. He originally worked with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and began working with Al Qaeda in 1998. He worked closely with Osama Bin Laden. Much of what we associate today with Al Qaeda – such as videos of martyrdom and suicide bombs – actually came from Zawahiri.
Scholars and policymakers doubted Al Qaeda could survive without Osama Bin Laden. However, Zawahiri has kept Al Qaeda together and even strengthened its position in the terrorist world.
After assuming leadership of Al Qaeda, Zawahiri prohibited external operations in the West so that they could rebuild without interference. He adopted a new strategy with three pillars:
- First, strengthen the decentralized franchise approach by increased communication between groups to form an all-encompassing grand strategy.
- Second, he issued an order in 2013 to avoid mass casualty operations, especially ones that might kill Muslim civilians (differentiate itself from ISIS).
- Third, he focused on rebuilding Al Qaeda’s military strength and letting ISIS absorb all the blows from the Coalition organized against it.
Al Qaeda Organizational Chart
Key Events for Al Qaeda
- 1989: Birth of Al Qaeda
- 2 August 1990: The First Gulf War - This marks the beginning of Al Qaeda's resistance to U.S. involvement in the Middle East.
- 1991-1996: Al Qaeda operational node to Khartoum, Sudan - Their shipping network prospered and Khartoum became a vital transit point to terrorists and weapons.
- 11 September 2001: 9/11 - After years of planning, Al Qaeda put themselves on the West's radar with unprecedented large-scale coordinated attacks on U.S. soil.
- October 2001: U.S. invasion of Afghanistan - The United States put pressure on the Taliban who worked closely with Al Qaeda and threatened Al Qaeda's operational node in Afghanistan.
- March 2003: U.S. invasion of Iraq - U.S. involvement motivated a new generation of jihadists to travel to Iraq and Al Qaeda's operational node moves to Pakistan.
- 2011: Start of the Arab Spring - Brought a lot of political instability into the Middle East that is still apparent today.
- March 2011: Beginning of the Syrian Civil War - President al-Assad was challenged by pro-democracy protests and opposition militias formed.
- 2 May 2011: Osama Bin Laden is killed by a U.S. SEAL team - This is a big blow to the organization. Ayman al-Zawahiri becomes the leader.
- August 2011: African Union Offensive into Mogadishu - Al Shabbab lost its control of Mogadishu, however it dominated many rural areas.
- January 2012: Mali Civil War - Several insurgent groups fought a campaign against the Mali government for greater independence or autonomy for Northern Mali.
- 2014: Al Qaeda of Iraq splits from Al Qaeda - There is a bloody disagreement between Al Qaeda of Iraq and another affiliate. Zawahiri goes against Al Qaeda of Iraq, severing ties. Al Qaeda of Iraq goes on to become ISIS.
- March 2015: Beginning of Yemeni Civil War - The failed transition of power from the Arab Spring comes to a head with war breaking out between the two governments claiming authority.
- Present: Al Qaeda has a powerful leader, Zawahiri, with a strategic vision, as well as tens of thousands of forces loyal to it and its affiliates.
Analysis: Frequency, Cities
To identify changes in Al Qaeda's patterns of attack as its organization became more decentralized I analyzed the attacks through different lenses.
Frequency of Attacks
Number of attacks in each time period.
The number of attacks increased as Al Qaeda gained more affiliates. See below for when each affiliate group joined Al Qaeda and their main area of operation:
- Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): 2004 - Yemen
- Al Qaeda of Iraq (AQI): 2004 - Iraq (split in 2014)
- Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): 2007- Algeria and Mali
- Al Shabbab: 2012 - Somalia
- Jabhat al-Nusra (JN): 2014 - Syria (before was subsidiary of AQI)
- Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM): 2017 - Mali
Number of Al Qaeda attacks in each year. Blue lines delineate the four time periods (Hierarchical / Less Hierarchical / More Decentralized / Decentralized).
Al Qaeda Attacks around Major Cities
First, I looked at the percentage of attacks that occurred in major cities. An attack was classified as happening in a major city based on its distance from the city center. The requisite distance was either 5, 10, or 15 miles--distance was based on the population of the city.
Hierarchical: 1992-2003
(no affiliates)
Attacks within a major city (red) - 20.3%
In this time period, 9/11 is the most significant attack. It marks a turning point for Al Qaeda as they become well-known throughout the world and on the terrorist stage.
There were not many attacks during this time (only 74 attacks), likely because Al Qaeda was still establishing itself and focusing on thoroughly planning out large and successful attacks.
Less Hierarchical: 2004-2008
(2-3 affiliates)
Attacks within a major city (red) - 33.7% (increased)
While the majority of attacks are not within major cities, there are large clusters on the Northern coast. This is likely because of the Algerian terrorist connections to groups in Europe and transit points off the coast.
There are some attacks within major cities, but most are not. Al Qaeda of Iraq became active during this time due to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
More Decentralized: 2009-2013
(3-4 affiliates)
Attacks within a major city (red) - 43.0% (increased again)
There was a decrease in attacks, but they follow a similar pattern along the coast.
Iraq follows a similar pattern as the last period. Now, Al Qaeda is active in Syria and there are clusters of attacks around Damascus and Aleppo, likely due to the start of the Syrian Civil War.
There is a cluster of attacks in the southwestern region. Al Qaeda was taking advantage of the Yemeni political crisis when groups turned against President Saleh in favor of his Vice President, Hadi. Specifically, in the south, there was civil unrest from separatist groups.
There is now more activity in Somalia with the addition of Al Shabbab. Attacks are concentrated in the South because their aim is to control territory and they had control of the capital, Mogadishu, until the African Union offensive in 2011. The other cluster, further south, at Kismayo was another city that Al Shabbab controlled and coveted due to its strategic port.
Decentralized: 2014-2018
(4-5 affiliates)
Attacks within a major city (red) - 40.4% (slightly decreased, could be plateauing)
Overall, there was no change in the pattern of attacks in Syria, Yemen, and Somalia. As seen in the maps, there is no more activity in Iraq as Al Qaeda of Iraq separated to become ISIS.
With the addition of Jamaat Nasrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), there was new activity in Mali. In accordance with Al Qaeda ideals, JNIM minimizes attacks on the population. Thus, there are few attacks within major cities.
I was surprised that there were so few attacks on major cities. I expected more because, often, terrorist groups aim for maximum impact through mass casualties. Al Qaeda's pattern of attacks aligns with Zawahiri's three pillars--avoiding Muslim casualties, being more palatable than ISIS, and minimizing counter-terrorism interference.
Al Qaeda Attacks and Average Civilian Casualties
After seeing that the proportion of Al Qaeda attacks on major cities was consistently below 50%, I compared the average civilian casualties to see if it is consistent with Zawahiri's recent goal of minimizing civilian casualties.
Orange lines delineate the four time periods (Hierarchical, Less Hierarchical, More Decentralized, and Decentralized). Blue: average killed & Gray: average wounded
As Al Qaeda became more decentralized, its average civilian casualties per attack decreased. In the beginning, Al Qaeda was still establishing itself as a leader in the Islamic extremist world. Osama Bin Laden focused on thorough planning and execution of large attacks. Thus, there were more average civilian casualties per attack, though there were fewer attacks. After the death of Bin Laden in 2011, Zawahiri aimed to strengthen Al Qaeda in its new decentralized form. Zawahiri did not want to attract attention from the West. The best way to do this is to scale back civilian casualties, which is reflected in the data.
I excluded pre-9/11 in the previous graph because as seen here, the two extremely large-scale attacks (U.S. embassy bombings and 9/11) make it difficult to see patterns within the data after 2001. The orange lines delineate the four time periods (Hierarchical, Less Hierarchical, More Decentralized, Decentralized).
Analysis: Economic, Ethnic
Attacks and Natural Resources
Less Hierarchical: 2004-2008
(2-3 affiliates)
There were no noticeable patterns in the Hierarchical maps. There were too few attacks to see a pattern.
Attacks in Algeria clearly align on the coast, without relation to the onshore oil fields. Once again, increased activity on the coast suggests economic interests on shipping routes. Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is specifically known for its European ties.
Here, the attacks align more with the oil fields. Oil is key to the Iraqi economy and valued by the United States. This likely impacted Al Qaeda's pattern of attacks.
More Decentralized: 2009-2013
(3-4 affiliates)
No change from before.
There is no change in Iraq's attack pattern. However, in Syria, the attacks do not align with the oil fields. This is consistent with the major cities map analysis in that the Al Qaeda attacks follow the pro-democracy protests in Damascus and then the fighting in Aleppo.
The pattern of attacks centered on onshore oil reserves, does not hold up as well in Yemen. Instead, there is a concentration of attacks in the southwest, especially centered on Aden. However, this relates to economic interests because the port of Aden is strategically important. Aden sits on the strait linking the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and most of the world’s oil shipments pass through here.
Here, the map shows the agricultural sectors of Somalia. Most of the agricultural economy resides in the south, similar to the Al Shabbab presence. This is because Al Shabbab has traditionally had the best success with gaining control over rural villages. Additionally, Mogadishu and Kismayo are important economically for trade. Specifically, the Kismayo port was vital to Al Shabbab finances. Al Shabbab would take a cut of the lucrative coal trade that went through the port.
Decentralized: 2014-2018
(4-5 affiliates)
Here, the attack patterns are reinforced from the last time period. Al Qaeda remains attacking along economic lines.
As the organization became more decentralized, Al Qaeda and its affiliates maintained original patterns of attacking regarding oil and agricultural sectors. Key transit ports also appear to be of value to Al Qaeda (e.g. Aden and Kismayo).
Attacks and Cultural Divides
Less Hierarchical: 2004-2008
(2-3 affiliates)
There were no visible patterns for the Hierarchical period as there were too few attacks.
There is a concentration of attacks in the Iraqi provinces that are bordering the opposite group and they center in on the central province of Baghdad. There seem to be more attacks on the Shia side which makes sense because Al Qaeda is a Sunni group and Iraq is a Shia majority country.
More Decentralized Overview
More Decentralized: 2009-2013
(3-4 affiliates)
Attacks in Iraq continue to center on Baghdad and on the Sunni majority provinces bordering Shia provinces. Attacks in Syria do not appear to coincide with cultural divides.
The majority of the attacks are in the Southern Sunni provinces. They could be done along with the unrest from the separatists. Houthi rebels reside in the Shia provinces and are thought to be supported by Iran. Thus, the Houthis are also carrying out attacks in the South. Al Qaeda is taking advantage of the Yemeni crisis and civil war.
More Decentralized: 2009-2013
(3-4 affiliates)
The attacks in Somalia do not seem to coincide with ethnic divides.
Decentralized: 2014-2018
(4-5 affiliates)
There are no changes in the patterns of attacks here, they are only more apparent.
Decentralized: 2014-2018
(4-5 affiliates)
In Somalia, the attacks center mostly on Mogadishu, indicating that Al Shabbab attacks are more likely motivated by territorial control aspirations rather than cultural divides.
Decentralized: 2014-2018
(4-5 affiliates)
The attacks in Mali center on the portion of the country with the most variation of ethnic groups. This aligns with ethnic conflict in Mali that resulted in the Mali Civil War. During this time, the Tuareg and Arab Nomads rebelled against the Mali government. Al Qaeda got involved, taking advantage of the political instability.
As Al Qaeda decentralized, its pattern of attacks along cultural divides remained consistent.
Analysis: Attack Type, Targets
As Al Qaeda becomes more decentralized, its success rate for attacks stays consistently within 5% of the original rate. However, Al Qaeda's proportion of attacks that are suicide attacks decreases by 22% over the time periods. The proportion of suicide attacks decreases by about 10% in the two middle periods and then gets into the single digits, falling to 8% for the 2014-2018 attacks. Typically, Islamic terrorist groups are associated with suicide attacks, though Al Qaeda seems to be steering away from that. This could be related to the fact that the average civilian casualties per attack are decreasing. Suicide attacks are associated with large-scale attacks victim-wise. Also, suicide attacks attract more attention. Therefore if Zawahiri wants to minimize counter-terrorism interference, it is strategic to minimize suicide attacks.
Attack Types
Hierarchical: 1992-2003
(no affiliates)
There is very little variation in the attack types. Excluding 9/11, The vast majority of Al Qaeda attacks are Bombing/Explosion, shown in yellow.
Less Hierarchical: 2004-2008
(2-3 affiliates)
There is more variation in this period as well as an increase in the number of affiliate groups. However, Bombing/Explosion (yellow) remains the predominant attack type--approaching or surpassing 50% of Al Qaeda attacks. Armed assault (light blue) is the second most frequent attack type, hovering around 20% of Al Qaeda attacks.
More Decentralized: 2009-2013
(3-4 affiliates)
Here, there is once again, an increase in the variation of attack types. In all years, except 2011, Bombing/Explosion (yellow) remains near or above 50% of Al Qaeda attacks. Armed Assault (light blue) remains the second most frequent attack type and still hovers at 20% of Al Qaeda attacks.
Decentralized: 2014-2018
This period has the greatest variation in attack type. Bombing/Explosion and Armed Assault (yellow and light blue) remain the top two attack types, but the difference between them is closing. There was no majority attack type for any of the years (no attack type reaches 50%).
As Al Qaeda becomes more decentralized, it continues to use Bombing/Explosions as a significant portion of its attack types. Also, Al Qaeda varies its attack types more as more affiliates join. This suggests that the affiliates are given some freedom in deciding their attack type of choice.
Attacks and Target Types
Hierarchical: 1992-2003
(no affiliates)
Top Three Targets:
- Private Citizens and Property - 18.9% (red)
- Military - 17.6% (yellow)
- Business - 14.8% (purple)
During the Hierarchical period, the top three targets are close to each other proportion wise. There is only a 1.3% difference between the first and second most target type, and a 4.1% difference between the first and third.
*Note that the "Other" target type category (white dots) is comprised of all target types that were less than 5% of Al Qaeda attacks (there were 22 possible target types).
Less Hierarchical: 2004-2008
Top Three Targets:
- Military - 22.6% (yellow)
- Police - 21% (green)
- Private Citizens and Property - 20% (red)
Military targets (yellow) has now moved to the most frequent target, but once again the top three are extremely close. There is only a 2.6% difference between the first and third target types. Private citizens and property targets (red) remain in the top three target types. There is still great target variation.
Iraq has more attacks on private citizens and property targets (red), while Algeria has more military targets (yellow).
More Decentralized: 2009-2013
Top Three Targets:
- Military - 30% (yellow)
- Private Citizens and Property - 21.3% (red)
- Police - 13.5% (green)
Military targets (yellow) remain the top target type, and the gap grows between the top three. Now, there is a 8.7% gap between the top two and an overall 16.5% gap.
There is a cluster of military targets (yellow), aligning with the overall trend of Al Qaeda attacks. However, unlike the other countries, there is a cluster of attacks on police targets (green).
Iraq is unique in that it has a concentration of attacks on private citizens and property (red). This was part of the reason that Zawihiri cut all ties with Al Qaeda of Iraq. Zawihiri found them to be too brutal and did not believe it was strategic to target other Muslims. AQI also did not want Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) operating in Syria, but Zawahiri sided with JN. AQI went on to become ISIS, notorious for attacking civilian targets.
There are a majority of attacks on military targets (yellow). This is consistent with Al Qaeda becoming involved in the Yemeni Civil War.
Military targets (yellow) are predominant, however there also are a concentration of private citizens and property targets (red). This is likely because Al Shabbab was attacking for territorial control, similar to the strategy of Al Qaeda of Iraq.
Decentralized: 2014-2018
(4-5 affiliates)
Top Three Targets:
- Military - 46.5% (yellow)
- Private Citizens and Property - 16.6% (red)
- Government - 12.9% (blue)
Military targets (yellow) remains the top target and private citizens and property targets (red) are second. The gap between the top three grows significantly. There is a 29.9% gap between the top two and an overall 33.6% difference.
Now, all countries clearly have attacks predominantly on military target types (yellow).
As Al Qaeda became more decentralized, its attacks are increasingly on military target types. Rather than becoming more varied in its target types, as it did with its attack types, its targets became less diverse. In the Hierarchical period there was an overall 4.1% difference among the top three, while in the Decentralized period there was a 33.6% difference.
As Al Qaeda becomes more decentralized, there is an increase in its variation of attack types used and increased unification on target types. This suggests a mission command style as Zawahiri provides the overarching mission and targets and the affiliate groups are given autonomy and initiative in choosing which attack type to use.
Main Takeaways
Overall, many of Al Qaeda’s pattern of attacks stayed consistent, often with the More Decentralized (2009-2013) and Decentralized (2014-2018) periods reinforcing and strengthening the patterns and trends seen in the Hierarchical (1992-2003) and Less Hierarchical (2004-2008) periods. However, there were also differences in their patterns of attack as Al Qaeda became more decentralized.
Similarities:
- Maintained original patterns of attacking for economic motivations. Ports seem to be important for several affiliates as a source of finances (e.g. Aden and Kismayo)
- Attacks are driven by regional events and take advantage of political instability
- Pattern of attacks along cultural divides remained consistent: went along lines of preexisting ethnic conflicts
- Consistent success rate between 89% and 94% over the four time periods
- Military and Private Citizens and Property targets were in the top three for all time periods
- Bombing/Explosion and Armed Assault comprised a high proportion of attack types over the four periods.
Differences:
- Number of attacks dramatically increased as affiliates joined
- Attacks within major cities increased, but never above 43% of its attacks. This is consistent with Zawahiri’s new strategy for minimizing counter-terrorism efforts.
- Average civilian casualties per attack decreased over the time periods, down to between 2.3 and 3.8 average civilians casualties per attack in the Decentralized period.
- Significant drop in proportion of attacks that are suicide attacks (from 30% to 8%) over the four time periods
- There was significantly greater variation in its attack types, by the Decentralized period no attack type reaches 50%.
- Target types became less varied as military targets moved up to number 1 and the gap grew between the top three. In the Decentralized period, almost half of the attacks were on military targets (46.5%). Al Qaeda became increasingly unified in its selection of targets
Conclusion
Despite undergoing an organizational change, Al Qaeda has continued to successfully carry-out its attacks for its regional aims. Often in experiencing decentralization, an organization's leadership has trouble maintaining control over the entire network and peace among the groups. However, Bin Laden, and now Zawihiri, have been able to retain their strategic aims and launch attacks throughout the world. It has remained unified and facilitated coordination of a vast terror network. Zawahiri has led Al Qaeda in a heavy refocus on military targets. Al Qaeda has survived longer than many expected, but the true test of Al Qaeda's longevity will be with the next leadership transition. Zawahiri has always been a key player for Al Qaeda, so it was not difficult for him to ascend to the top. The next leader may face difficulty in maintaining the control and peace that Zawahiri has achieved. Finally, with Zawahiri's three pillars strategy, it is hard to gauge if the minimal external operations are due to organizational weakness and lack of capabilities or only a strategic choice by Al Qaeda.
Interactive Map
Below is an interactive web application with all of all the layers from the prior sections.
ArcGIS Web Application
