Agricultural Degradation and Migration in Iran
How do we measure agricultural land changes in Iran, and is this a driver of migration?
Drought and Displacement
Tens of thousands of Iranians are being displaced each year as drought reduces the viability of agricultural land – both for subsistence and for profit. [1] Iranian authorities blame climate change for the long-term increased drought risk. While man-made climate change has played a key role in reduced annual precipitation and a rise in temperatures, other factors including the government’s ambitious hydroelectric energy targets, and the mismanagement of water sources have also profoundly exacerbated the issue. [2]
Climate change is driving increasing levels of internal displacement in Iran, with approximately 42,000 displaced in 2022. [3]
This report will look at where drought is occurring in Iran, where future drought risk is concentrated, and how land use has changed as a result. While water scarcity is likely to be the primary driver of internal displacement within Iran in 2024, when looking at migration out of Iran, water scarcity is just part of the equation.
Population and Power Demands
The population of Iran is approximately 89 million. While most concentrated in urban centres such as Tehran and Ahvaz, the western, northern and south-western regions have a significantly higher population density than in the east. Iran's arable land is located primarily in the far west and north of the country. The majority of the east is rough grazing land that is not viable for crop growth.
Driven by higher temperatures in summer months placing unprecedented demand on the energy grid, Iran has sought to rapidly increase the production of hydroelectric power. [4] Iran's ambitious dam-building initiatives have led to reduced water flow downstream, impacting agricultural irrigation and drinking water supplies for communities reliant on river systems. From 2018 to 2019 hydroelectric power generation increased rapidly, approximately tripling. From 2019 to 2021 production declined gradually to be near its 2018 level. [5] It is likely that scarcity of water and overproduction in 2019 was the primary contributor to this decline.
Hydroelectric Dams and Water Scarcity
The overexploitation of water resources for hydroelectricity has intensified drought conditions, with consequences ranging from diminished agricultural productivity to heightened socio-economic challenges for vulnerable populations. The massive increase in water usage to power hydroelectric has even led to conflict. Iran's demands of neighbouring Afghanistan to allow more water from upstream rivers between the two countries to flow into Iran has resulted in cross-border skirmishes.
Drought Index
The map shown represents drought severity across Iran during 2022*, derived from the Palmer Drought Severity Index. This is a tool used to measure and monitor drought conditions in a specific area. It takes into account factors like temperature, precipitation, and soil moisture to assess how dry or wet an area is compared to its normal conditions. The index provides a standardised way to understand the severity and duration of droughts.
According to the Index, drought was significantly more prevalent in the north, north-west, west and east of Iran compared to the south and south-east. What factors might be causing this disparity?
*the latest data available
Relative Drought Risk
While the Palmer Drought Severity Index showed us the prevalence of drought in Iran, analysing the consequences of this for each province requires a bespoke risk model.
In this analysis, the Palmer Index formed part of a wider set of factors that included population data, environmental and economic factors to produce this map that shows the severity of consequences of drought for each of Iran's provinces.
The consequence of risk was found to be higher in the north-east, north-west, west, and central provinces, meaning that drought is not only prevalent here, but its consequences are likely to be the most severe.
These consequences increase the likelihood of internal displacement from higher risk areas to lower risk areas where drought may occur less frequently or severely - or where fewer people are placing demand on strained water sources.
Increasing Maximum Temperature
Shrinkage of Lake Urmia
Land Use Change
Droughts have drastically changed the landscape of Iranian agriculture in recent years. This map shows areas where land use has changed, primarily from being agricultural land to being unproductive. The areas where this change has occurred correlate with areas that have experienced the greatest prevalence of drought.
Significantly, the north-west and north-east regions were previously key wheat growing areas. The inability to grow food crops is likely to compel people to move to areas where farm labour is available, and where food sources are more consistent.
Despite drought and domestic energy production placing unprecedented strain on water sources, Iran is increasing its domestic production of both food crops, and cash crops for export. This will depend to some extent on the construction of new dams to facilitate irrigation. This will almost certainly intensify water stress further in coming years.
The Decision to Leave
While the desertification of formerly productive agricultural land is likely to be a sufficient driver of migration internally, the decision to leave Iran likely requires additional push factors. A poor domestic economy with high inflation, poor employment prospects forworking-age Iranians, and the strain placed on the labour market and national infrastructure by a growing population are examples of these factors.
Migration outside of Iran is likely to take place along the West Balkan route. This well-established route takes migrants through Iran to the increasingly fortified Turkish border. If they manage to enter undetected, migrants will travel through to the Bulgarian border with Türkiye. Migrants who aim to reach destinations within the EU will typically employ the assistance of facilitators who will help them to navigate policed and fortified border crossings between countries including Bulgaria, Hungary, and Serbia. Some border areas are controlled by different organised criminal groups (OCGs). Violence resulting from competition between OCGs is common, particularly in the forests in northern Serbia where shooting is frequently reported and controlling migrant movement is a lucrative business.
The journey is arduous, expensive, and dangerous. A combination of push factors are needed for prospective Iranian migrants to take the risk and seek better prospects abroad.
There are a number of potential indicators and warnings for a large-scale outward migration from a country that is experiencing agricultural degradation, or from drought and water mismanagement. The likelihood of a protracted outward flow of migration increases with the addition of factors such as those shown in the diagram below.
Diagram showing various push factors and how they can lead to internal (moving within the country) or outward migration (leaving the country). Drought may be sufficient to compel internal migration, but outward migration, with its high cost and risks highly likely requires further push factors to produce.
As shown in the diagram, severe and regular droughts are likely sufficient to drive internal migration from primarily rural to primarily urban areas of Iran. However, this forms just one factor in a wider set of push factors that are likely to drive migration out of the country. While Iran’s population growth rate has fallen each year since 2015, its population continues to grow creating further stress on the distribution of scarce resources including water. [12]
In Iran, limited opportunities for employment present a large challenge for young working-aged people too. While official statistics claim unemployment has fallen from 10.6% to 7.6% between 2019 and 2024, this is reportedly a result of large numbers of people who were previously seeking work giving up on their search due to a long-term lack of opportunities. With 43% of those seeking work holding higher education degrees, the desire to seek better economic outcomes abroad is almost certainly a key factor compelling people to migrate. [13]
Dissatisfaction arising from the prospect of indefinite unemployment is further compounded by, and to a great extent caused by, very high levels of inflation of around 55% and a weakening currency. [14]
In fact, Iran’s misery index (a measure combining inflation and unemployment rates) rose to its highest ever point in 2023. In the province of Lorestan where agricultural land has become less viable and drought risk is high, the index has reached almost 70% compared to a national average of 60%. Inflation may have even made a large proportion of Iranians indifferent to democratic processes, with many distrusting the government and believing that elections in the country have become purely symbolic. In recent elections many commentators boycotted the poll amid record low turn-out. [15] An increasingly authoritarian government is strongly exacerbating this discontent. Weeks of protests followed the death of Masha Amini in police custody. She was detained by the Iranian 'morality police' for failing to wear the Islamic headscarf in accordance with the law. These police vans are now back on patrol in Iranian cities such as Tehran and Shiraz.
These factors in combination are highly likely to reach a threshold by which Iranians will seek to leave the country, either applying for work or study opportunities or seeking asylum abroad.
This report and its underlying analysis are a product of the Geo-Intelligence team at Prevail Partners, who are experts in the analysis, manipulation and visualisation of many different types of geo data. They are particularly experienced in environmental problem-sets, like the one outlined above. To learn more about these capabilities follow the link below.