The Quest for Arctic Power

Changing dynamics in the greater Arctic region, brought on by climate change and in turn increased great power competition, may present possible challenges to Norway’s sovereignty on the archipelago and Svalbard’s status as a demilitarized and free economic zone.

Source:  The Foundations of Russian Federation Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond 

The Arctic is Russia’s backyard; about 53% of the Arctic coastline is Russian territory. And around two and a half million people occupy the Arctic within Russian borders, which accounts for half of the total Arctic population.

Sources:  CNBC ,  Arctic Council 

Russia is also sensitive to security developments in the Arctic, demonstrated by its significant military presence on the coastline. Russia has “over 80 percent of its sea-based nuclear deterrent, including at least 7 of its 10 SSBNs, along the Kola Peninsula” alone.

Source:  CSIS 

Source:  The Arctic: Key Strategic Points 

For Russia, maintaining a strong presence on the Arctic coastline is pivotal to securing access to the Northern Sea Route, a shipping route within Russia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that is considered the shortest route between Europe and Asia.

All of Russia's cultural, political, territorial, and security interests relating to the Arctic converge on the Svalbard archipelago.

China’s involvement in the Arctic region began with scientific research in the 1990s, when Chinese scholars began undertaking Arctic expeditions on the icebreaker Xue Long 1. In 2018, this was upgraded when China launched its first domestically built polar icebreaker Xue Long 2, which has completed one mission to the Arctic as of November 2020. 

Sources:  The Arctic Institute ,  The Diplomat 

As a signatory of the Svalbard Treaty, China established its Arctic Yellow River Station in Ny-Ålesund, a small town in Svalbard in 2004. The station can house up to 25 people and has been used for conducting research projects including high-altitude atmospheric physics observation, glacier monitoring, and nearshore marine environmental monitoring.

Sources:  Guoqing China ,  people.cn 

China’s increasing engagement in the Arctic region over the past decade is no longer limited to scientific research, though. In 2017, China and Russia agreed to cooperate on developing the economically-oriented Northern Sea Route along the Russian Arctic coast--a collection of projects China calls the “Polar Silk Road.” This policy was formally launched in January 2018 with China’s first official Arctic policy white paper.

Sources:  CIIS ,  Reuters ,  China's Arctic Policy 

Sources:  DOD 

Regarding the first Arctic objective, geopolitical changes concerning Svalbard are unlikely to directly affect American security in the near future. The United States no longer operates any mines or research facilities on Svalbard, so its soft power connections are implicit.

With increased investments and posturing from competitors in the region, the US is likely to support other countries countering Russian and Chinese influence in Svalbard, such as Norway, along with many other traditionally non-Arctic nations with research facilities on Svalbard.

It is in America’s interests to minimize growing Russian and Chinese influence to minimize the costs of any future conflict.

The Government of Canada states that there is “no immediate threat” in the Arctic while noting that the region is becoming a point of “strategic international importance,” with Arctic and non-Arctic actors expressing diverse military interests. With national geoscientific data predicting an additional 1.2 million square kilometres to Canada’s imposed Arctic land of 9.98 million square kilometres, the country poses adequate reason to be a stakeholder in Arctic affairs. At the same time, Canada faces a dissimilar threat from Arctic-boundary states, including Svalbard, Norway. Svalbard illustrates a probable soft-power turned hard-power threat to Canada’s national sovereignty. 

Sources:  NAADSN ,  Government of Canada