Crime Levels in Jacksonville FL Following Hurricane Irma

This story map examines crime statistics in Jacksonville, Florida over a five-year period. Murder, rape, robbery, serious assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft are among the crimes recorded. Along with them, the overall number of crimes committed in the city throughout the course of the year is provided. Tropical storm Irma made landfall in the South Eastern United States as a Category 5 hurricane on September 11, 2017. Heavy flooding and severe winds were reported in parts of Jacksonville, Florida, notably in the downtown and Riverside areas. Jacksonville is Florida's most populous and largest city by geographical area, sustaining around $85 million in damage.

My objective is to look at crime levels in 2015 and 2016, then compare them to the years after the 2017 disaster, 2018 and 2019. This sort of study can help local/state police and Emergency Management Agencies (EMA) minimize criminal behavior in high-crime regions after catastrophes. Following a disaster, government and community financing might be stressed and restricted, so developing a strategy to safeguard residents and infrastructure from future harm can assist speed up the rebuilding process.

Hurricane Irma made landfall in Florida as a Category 4 hurricane on September 10, 2017, tearing off roofs, flooding coastal communities, and knocking out power to over 6.8 million people. Irma rapidly deteriorated severely to a tropical storm by September 11 as it moved north into Georgia and Alabama. Later that day, around 11 p.m., it had deteriorated to a tropical depression, and by Sept. 13, it had dissipated over western Tennessee. According to the National Storm Center, Irma is the fifth-costliest hurricane to impact the mainland United States, generating an estimated $50 billion in damage. Irma was a long-lasting Cape Verde storm with a Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale strength of 5. The devastating hurricane made seven landfalls, four of which were as category 5 hurricanes in the northern Caribbean Islands. Irma made landfall in the Florida Keys as a category 4 hurricane and reached southern Florida as a category 3 storm.

All crime data comes from the  Florida Department of Law Enforcement  

In the year of 2017, Jacksonville City reported 39,633 crimes committed. However, like many other Florida police departments that year, many fields in the report were filled in as "--" or "DNR" (DNR = Did Not Report for the period). Duval, the county that makes up Jacksonville, reported a few of these across the board.

Burglary is defined as the act of breaking into another person's property in order to commit a crime. For this reason, when talking about looting, this will be the statistic referenced. This involves breaking into a property (during the day or night) to conduct robbery. According to various state laws, burglary also refers to the unauthorized intrusion of a person's real or personal property. These properties might be used for residential or storage reasons. So, if someone breaks into a house or a shop, it is deemed a burglary. Trespassing into an occupied structure or building; theft or stealing from the property are all examples of burglary. Burglary is a felony punished by law, especially if someone was injured, the criminal broke into a residence, and/or the perpetrator utilized weapons.

Looking at the statistics and press stories on crime at the time, there isn't much evidence to suggest that Hurricane Irma caused a significant increase in crime rates in Jacksonville. If anything crime levels decreased following 2017. While this may not be true everywhere, the city used in this study supports these conclusions. Other cities in Flordia had reports of looting and similar crimes at the time of the storm but further and wider research would be needed to be done to analyze this. A future investigation examining crime levels across the state in the aftermath of the hurricane would make a compelling study, given significant areas of the state were affected, resulting in a large amount of data.

After doing more digging into crimes committed during a disaster, past studies have established that looting and other breakdowns of society are rare in most of the USA in post-disaster areas. According to popular thinking and media representations, catastrophe victims generally act unreasonably. They bolt in fear, roam aimlessly in shock, or submit docilely to authority's dictates. They are unable to protect themselves or others after being hit by a natural disaster, let alone safeguard their property from additional harm. As a result, individuals require support from government agencies or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the American Red Cross. The broad collapse of social order results in looting in evacuated communities as well as an increase in the rates of other crimes. As a result, martial law must be imposed in order to restore order in the affected area. Furthermore, concerned persons must travel to the affected region in order to provide blood, food, and clothes. Indeed, decades of disaster-related films, literature, and news coverage have emphasized the broad idea that a few individuals guide the crowds of terrified and passive victims to safety.

Social scientific research has frequently proved that none of these reactions match the majority of catastrophe victims' reactions. Indeed, most people do not experience shock reactions. Panic flight happens only on rare occasions, and people prefer to respond in what they feel is in their best interests, given their limited comprehension of the circumstance. Most individuals respond to environmental dangers constructively by obtaining information and following a generally rational series of procedures to determine how to deal with a harmful event. Furthermore, conduct during the emergency reaction phase is often both prosocial and reasonable. Uninjured victims are generally the first to seek survivors, care for those who have been injured, and aid others in preventing property from additional damage once a tragedy hits.

Myths about illogical and antisocial conduct in disasters are not just incorrect; they may also undermine the efficacy of emergency preparation by misdirecting resource allocation and information distribution. Expectations of panic, for example, are frequently used to justify providing the public with inadequate information about an environmental hazard or suppressing it entirely. This reaction to the myth of panic is particularly concerning because it has been consistently demonstrated that individuals are more hesitant to comply with recommended preventive steps when they are supplied with ambiguous or partial information in warning messages. Because officials believe that correct information will generate fear, they may disseminate information that actually reduces the chance of compliance.