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Salafi-Jihadi Area of Operations in the Sahel: November 2024
As of November 1, 2024
[Notice: The Critical Threats Project frequently cites sources from foreign domains. All such links are identified with an asterisk (*) for the reader’s awareness.]
The Salafi-jihadi movement in the Sahel has roots in the Algerian Salafi-jihadi movement of the early 2000s, from which al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged. AQIM gained influence in the Sahel throughout the 2000s, eventually infiltrating and co-opting a 2012 rebellion driven by long-running ethnic grievances in partnership with Ansar al Din, which is based in northern Mali. A French-led response rolled back AQIM and its allies’ conquest of northern Mali in 2013. Thousands of French and UN troops remained in the Sahel over the following decade in an effort to stem the resurgence of these insurgents.
Four Salafi-jihadi groups merged to create JNIM in 2017: AQIM’s Sahara Emirate, Ansar al Din, the Macina Liberation Front, and al Murabitoun. A fifth group, based in Burkina Faso, Ansar al Islam , is a de facto member of the group despite not formally being part of the merger. The group maintains a top-down hierarchy that orients its strategy and coordinates between the different subgroups. However, it also gives the subgroups significant operational freedom to best exploit their local contexts —such as appealing to local ethnic constituencies. JNIM has embedded itself in local governance structures and implemented various forms of shadow governance through local agreements across the Sahel. JNIM is most active in Mali and Burkina Faso, though it is present in Niger and expanding into the northern Gulf of Guinea states.
ISSP formed when a faction of an AQIM splinter group pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015. The Islamic State did not recognize ISSP as a formal province until March 2022. ISSP is most active in the tri-border region between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. ISSP and JNIM, unlike other al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates globally, did not initially fight each other. However, the two groups have engaged in phases of conflict since 2020. JNIM and French military pressure substantially weakened ISSP in 2020, but ISSP has significantly strengthened since the departure of French forces in 2022.
JNIM and to a lesser extent ISSP are gradually expanding south, toward the coastal Gulf of Guinea states. Overlapping issues —including climate change , poor governance, and communal tensions—are enabling the Salafi-jihadi movement to embed in local communities.
November 2024 Update
The latest update reflects extensive changes based on the strengthening of the regional al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates—Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) and IS Sahel Province (ISSP), respectively. There has been significant political upheaval in the central Sahel since the last update, in 2022. Burkina Faso and Niger experienced coups that installed junta governments, joining Mali’s junta, which took power in 2021. The new juntas cut ties with Western partners, leading to the withdrawal of thousands of French, UN, and US troops, whom a fraction of Russian soldiers have attempted to replace. The juntas have also adopted highly militarized counterinsurgency strategies that have failed to address underlying issues with the Western-backed approach of the last decade while simultaneously spreading indiscriminate violence and abuses that further fuel the insurgencies. These capacity and strategy blunders have contributed to the rapid growth of JNIM and ISSP capabilities , reach , and control . JNIM carried out its first attack in the Malian capital in nearly a decade and attacked the suburbs of the Nigerien capital . Meanwhile, ISSP’s growth has elevated the group’s role as a regional hub and increases the risk of the branch eventually supporting global IS activity, including financially or logistically facilitating attacks in Europe.
Western partners have shifted their focus to insulating coastal West Africa against spillover from the Sahel. The continued strengthening of Salafi-jihadi insurgents in the Sahel threatens to overwhelm this containment strategy. Furthermore, the political challenges with the authoritarian and anti-Western central Sahel juntas create challenges for the coastal countries and their Western partners by limiting coordination with these countries at the epicenter of the conflict.
You can read regular in-depth analysis on the fight against al Shabaab in CTP’s Africa File .
Map updated November 1, 2024.
Attack Zone: An area where units conduct offensive maneuvers.
Contested Support Zone: An area where multiple groups conduct offensive and defensive maneuvers. A group may be able to conduct effective logistics and administrative support of forces but has inconsistent access to local populations and key terrain.
Support Zone: An area where a group is not subject to significant enemy action and can conduct effective logistics and administrative support of forces.
Methodology Note: The Critical Threats Project adapts its mapping definitions for insurgencies from US military doctrine, including US Army FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations. Our maps are assessments and reflect analysts’ judgment based on current and historical open-source information on security incidents and political and governance activity as well as population and geographic factors. Please contact us for more information on specific maps.
Please email criticalthreats@aei.org for inquiries related to the map or its sourcing. For additional analysis from the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute visit criticalthreats.org and follow us on Twitter @criticalthreats and @liam_karr. For inquiries, please email criticalthreats@aei.org.
Copyright 2024. Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.