Just How Invincible Was Sparta?

This article will challenge the orthodoxy, held by contemporaries like Thucydides, that Sparta was undefeated in war for most of its history (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian war: 4.12). Challenging this orthodoxy does not suggest that Sparta had a weak military. It was strong and they won many victories. But, they also suffered many defeats. The Peloponnesian War is the epitome of Sparta’s military success, which resulted in victory and hegemony over Greece (Cartledge, 2002: 192-225). Sparta became the supreme authority through the effective use of their army, but they were by no means invincible. This article will consider the fallacy of Spartan invincibility and possible reasons for their defeats.

The distribution map above uses the dataset provided below to show Spartan military defeats between 659 BC and 371 BC. This data is taken from both primary and secondary sources, highlighting at least 71 Spartan military defeats over the period of 288 years. During the dual battles of Pylos and Sphacteria, 425 BC Thucydides represents the Spartans as 'invincible with their army' (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War: 4.12). Presuming he means in a conventional pitched battle, the dataset still contains nine such defeats, most notably the Battle of Thermopylae, 480 BC. Whilst a little unfair as a comparison of armies, due to it ending with only 300 Spartans and their Theban and Thespian allies facing off against the entire Persian army it must still be recognised for what it was. A defeat in a pitched battle (Herodotus, Histories: 7.220-222), which the majority of Greeks even today would be familiar with. Plutarch makes similar mistakes, describing the Spartan loss at Tegyra, 375 BC, as the first time the Spartans had been defeated by a smaller or equal army in pitched battle (Plutarch, Pelopidas: 17). However, the Battle of Champions, 545 BC, which saw 300 Spartans lose to 300 Argives (Herodotus, Histories: 1.82) contradicts this. So too does his own account of the Death of Lysander during the battle at Haliartus, 430BC (Plutarch, Lysander: 28-29).

The discrepancies in Spartan military invincibility is exacerbated when we consider that the dataset used to plot the above distribution map is by no means comprehensive. A major drawback of the data is that it can only show Spartan defeats where specific locations are mentioned. This has not, for example, included geographical locations for regions, such as 'South West Arkadia' in 659 BC (See Dataset). This is because the location given for a region could still be many miles from the actual battle. For this reason, many examples where regions alone were given were not included in the wider dataset (only two such defeats included in the dataset, with no geographical location recorded or plotted). Furthermore, in some cases we are told of Spartan defeats but not even given the regions. This is especially true when the primary sources tell us of ambushes. These cannot be used in the dataset, but give more evidence of the fallacy of Spartan invincibility. 

An additional drawback of the data comes with defeats such as at 'Perioikic' 431 BC (See Dataset) where the location given is unknown to modern databases, such as Pleiades and GeoHack, and so cannot be plotted. Furthermore, whilst not including all of the defeats mentioned by primary sources, this dataset can only depict the defeats which the primary sources or archaeological record tell us actually occurred. As we know that Sparta always tried to hide the number of war dead (Pausanias, Description of Greece: 9.13), there is reason to believe that Sparta may have suffered other defeats, to which we have no knowledge and so cannot plot. Sparta’s army, no matter how strong it was, was not invincible.

The previous section demonstrated that Sparta experienced many defeats throughout its history, averaging one every four years, between 659 BC and 371 BC. A variety of reasons exist, which contributed to these defeats such as the rise of the mercenary soldier (Trundle, 2005: 1) and an overreliance on the Spartiate Hoplite. Due to limitations on space, this article will focus on the lack of diversity within the Spartan military, caused by stunted military development in anything other than the Spartiate Hoplite. This not only contributed to defeats but was exacerbated by Oliganthopia (the decline is the Spartiate population).

A clear example of Sparta lacking military development can be seen within their navy. Not only did they consistently lose naval engagements, such as at Samos, 525 BC, and Pylos, but relied on their allies to supply the majority of any naval force. For example, during the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans instructed their allies in Italy and Sicily to provide 500 ships for the navy (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War: 2.7.2). Furthermore, in 371 BC in the aftermath of Leuctra, it was the Corinthians and Sicyonians who would transport the Spartan army across "the gulf" with no mention of Spartan ships (Xenophon, Hellenica: 6.18-19). It has been suggested that Sparta's lack of naval development stems from the costly defeat they suffered during the naval expedition to Samos(Cartledge, 2002: 123). This dissuaded the Spartans from making the costly investment that they saw as not in their interest(Jeffery, 1982: 257-258). As a result, Athens under Thumisticles was allowed to prioritise shipbuilding in the 480s BC later becoming the Naval Hegemon (Diodoros, Library of history: 11.50; Herodotus, Histories: 1.54-56; 8.3.2; Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War: I.93).

This lack of a strong navy not only caused Sparta to lose battles at sea but also to suffer military defeats on land in the form of pitched battles, lost sieges and lost territory. At no time was this more evident than during the Peloponnesian Wars where Athens used their navy to great effect by launching raids and sieges deep into the Peloponnese. The best example of the effectiveness of these raids being the dual battles of Pylos and Sphacteria, 425 BC (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War: 4.3-41). One can surmise that there was little development of the navy not only due to Sparta's military defeats but also the aforementioned raiding tactic adopted by Athens in the Peloponnesian War. This is what contemporary historians, such as Thucydides (History of the Peloponnesian War: 1.73) also suggest would have been the Persian method of war had their navy not been defeated at Salamis, 480BC. By neglecting the development of their navy, their rivals were able to outmanoeuvre and defeat the Spartans.

There was also a major lack of development of a strong cavalry corps. We know that the Spartan army contained a cavalry corps from at least 550 BC (image left) with the role of scouts (Xenophon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians: 12). We are told that the Spartan riders were only given their horses and weapons once the call up to war was announced (Xenophon, Hellenika: 6.4.11). This meant there was little time to train, making the cavalry useless for any role other than scouts and running down routing enemies. The Spartans did not even do the latter of these two possible roles as it was seen as shameful and un-Greek (Plutarch, Life of Lykourgos: 22.5). Even by the time of Leuctra the Spartan Cavalry is described as exceedingly poor, especially in contrast to their well trained and battle-hardened Theban counterparts (Xenophon, Hellenica: 6.4.10). The ineffectiveness of the Spartan Cavalry was a major contributing factor for the eventual Spartan defeat at Leuctra. Whilst King Cleombrotus was still organising the Spartan lines, the Spartan Cavalry had already routed and had crashed into the Spartan Hoplites causing havoc (Xenophon, Hellenica: 6.4.13) allowing Pelopidas and the Sacred Band to crash into the Spartan lines before they had time to fully organise or respond (Plutarch, Life of Pelopidas: 23). This lack of cavalry development was most likely due to Sparta's overreliance on their Spartiate Hoplites. As evidenced by Xenophon who makes it clear that those picked for the Spartan cavalry were those most physically incapable of Hoplite warfare (Xenophon, Hellenika: 6.4.11).

Furthermore, when the Spartans did develop their military systems, this tended to be slow, ineffective and follow a large defeat. This can best be seen with the makeup of Spartan armies. The Spartan Phalanx enjoyed many successes due to Spartan society being set up in such a way as to constantly prepare Spartiates for war, especially when compared to the armies of the other city-states who had little time for training (Cartledge, 2002: 179; 199; Cooley, 2017: 136). However, Sparta’s ranged units are noted as being adopted particularly late (Cartledge, 2002: 210). We can see the disdain the Spartans had for ranged units all the way up to the battles of Pylos and Sphakteria (Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War: 4.40.2). It was only after this defeat that the Spartans made sure to keep allied ranged units constantly present such as the 300 bowman and 400 slingers in their army of 394 BC (Cooley, 2017: 201; Xenophon, Hellenika 4.2.16). It is also of note that whilst as stated the well trained Spartan Phalanx was hugely successful against citizen armies their success when facing a well-trained, experienced and or mercenary force was rather more checkered. Be it against the mercenaries at the siege of Samos 525 BC (Herodotus, Histories: 3.54-55) or the Sacred Band at Tegyra 375 BC (Plutarch, Pelopidas: 16-17).

The effects of the lack of military development within Sparta are made worse when we consider the Oliganthropia throughout this period. This article will not be exploring, in depth, why the Oliganthropia occurred, but events such as the great earthquake (Diodorus, Library of History: 11.65.4) were a factor. The focus will instead regard how the Oliganthropia increased the occurrence of Spartan military defeats. As discussed above, Sparta did not develop their cavalry and navy due to its reliance on the power of the Spartiatae Hoplite infantry. As the name would suggest this Spartiate infantry could only be drawn from the population of full Spartan Citizens (the Spartiate). Therefore, any major decrease in the Spartiate population, for whatever reason, would greatly reduce the ability of Sparta to project military power as the size of their potential army shrunk. We know that the Spartans were very protective of their citizenship supposedly only conferring it on two outsiders (Herodotus, Histories: 9.35). We also know that in the period 480 BC to 370 BC, the Spartiate population shank from c. 8,000 (Herodotus, Histories: 7.234.2) to less than 1,000 (Aristotle, Politics: 1270a31). This meant that if like in 419 BC (Cartledge, 2002: 216) the Spartans were to march out in full force in 370 BC, the size of their citizen contingent on which they so relied would have been around 12.5% of the size just 100 years later.

The effect of a falling population on the Army as a whole can be seen at Plataea, 479 BC. The Spartans contributed to the allied army 10,000 Hoplites of whom 5,000 were Spartate (Herodotus, Histories: 9.28), compared to Leucta where, although deploying four of their six morai (main divisions), the total Spartan army only numbered 2,500 Hoplites (Plutarch, Pelopedas: 20) of whom only 700 were Spartiate and many were mercenaries (Hawkins, 2011, 401; Xenophon, Hellenica: 6.4.14-15; 6.4.17). It is clear, therefore, that through the combination of overreliance on Spartiate Hoplites, a lack of military development and Oliganthropia not only did defeat become more common as can be seen in the dataset but a defeat on the scale of Leuctra was inevitable.

This article has shown that the view of Sparta as virtually invincible in war is incorrect. This was done by displaying and analysing a distribution map of 71 Spartan military defeats between 659 BC and 371 BC. Also showing that whilst this is an incomplete dataset, this means Sparta averaged a military defeat worthy of note within the Ancient Historiography at least once every four years. This article has also demonstrated some of the major reasons for Spartan defeats. Firstly, by demonstrating the lack of military development of the Spartan Navy, cavalry and ranged troops. This resulted in rival nations, that had developed their military inflicting defeats on Sparta. Athens was the clear example, with their ranged troops at the dual battles of Pylos and Spacteria. This problem was amplified by Sparta's continued reliance on Spartiate Hoplites even whilst the pool of those able to serve within the corps shank rapidly in the period. Importantly, whilst not what this article set out to achieve, the article has highlighted that the Spartan defeat at Leuctra, which marked the beginning of the end for their Hegemony over Greece, may have been inevitable due to their lack of military development in the face of Oliganthropia.

• Aristotle. 1932. 'Politics'. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library.
• Diodorus. 1946. 'Library of History, Volume IV: Books 9-12.40'. Translated by C. H. Oldfather. Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library.
• Herodotus. 2008. 'The Histories'. Translated by Robin Waterfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pausanias. 1935. 'Description of Greece, Volume IV: Books 8.22-10'. Translated by W. H. S. Jones. Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library.
• Plutarch. 1914. 'Lives, Volume I: Theseus and Romulus. Lycurgus and Numa. Solon and Publicola'. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library.
• Plutarch. 1917. 'Lives, Volume IV: Alcibiades and Coriolanus; Lysander and Sulla'. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library.
• Plutarch. 1917. 'Lives, Volume V: Agesilaus and Pompey. Pelopidas and Marcellus'. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library.
• Thucydides. 1920. 'History of the Peloponnesian War, Volume II: Books 3-4'. Translated by C. F. Smith. Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library.
• Xenophon. 1921. 'Hellenica, Volume II: Books 5-7'. Translated by Carleton L. Brownson. Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library.
• Xenophon. 1925. 'Hiero. Agesilaus. Constitution of the Lacedaemonians. Ways and Means. Cavalry Commander. Art of Horsemanship. On Hunting. Constitution of the Athenians'. Translated by E. C. Marchant, G. W. Bowersock. Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library.

• Adcock, F. E. 1957. 'The Greek And Macedonian Art Of War'. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
• Cartledge, P. 2002. 'Sparta And Lakonia: a regional history 1300 to 362BC'. Second edition. New York: Routledge.
• Cooley, M. G. L. Cavanagh, W. G. Edwards, T. Harker, A. Hodkinson, S. Hughes, K. R. Pretzler, M. Wilson, B. W. J. G. 2017. 'LACTOR No.21 Sparta'. London: The London Association of Classical Teachers.
• Hawkins, C. 2011. 'Spartans and Perioikoi: The Organization and Ideology of the Lakedaimonian Army in the Fourth Century B.C.E.'. In 'Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies', volume 5. Available at :https://www.jstor.org/stable/638563?seq=16#metadata_info_tab_contents
• Jeffery, L. H. Cartledge, P. 1982. 'Sparta and Samos: A Special Relationship?'. In 'The Classical Quarterly', Volume 32. Available at: https://shibbolethsp.jstor.org/start?entityID=https%3A%2F%2Freading.ac.uk%2Foala%2Fmetadata&dest=https://www.jstor.org/stable/638563&site=jstor
• Parke, H. W. 1981. 'Greek Mercenary Soldiers'. Chicago: Ares.
• Trundle, M. 2005. 'Ancient Greek Mercenaries (664-250 BCE)1'. History Compas, Volume 3. Available at:  https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2005.00116.x 

• 'Lycurgus entering Athens'. Drawn by Edward Dayes in 1797. Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 from the British Museum. StoryMaps has removed edges. https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_2017-7052-2
• A basic distribution map showing Spartan military defeats both at land and sea between 659 BC and 371 BC. Created by author.
• Small lead figures representing warriors, wearing helmets and holding shields. Part of a collection of figures from the Spartan Temple of Artemis Orthia. Ure Museum. Taken by Alex, 21/08/2003. No copyright is given. https://uremuseum.org/cgi-bin/ure/uredb.cgi?rec=23.11.31F
• Ivory plaque, from the Sanctuary of Artemis Orthia, Sparta, end of 7th century BCE. National Archaeological Museum of Athens. licensed under CCASA2.5G. the edges of the image have been removed by StoryMaps. taken by  Marsyas  (2007).  www.namuseum.gr 
• 'Bronze figure of a horseman' c. 550 BC made in Laconia. licenced under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 from the British Museum. https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/G_1859-0301-18 This image is unedited.
• 'Bronze figure of a warrior' c. 6th Century BC. Made in Laconia found in Sparta. licenced under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 from the British Museum. https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/image/446633001 This image is unedited.
• Data used to create both distribution maps. Data in red was used on both maps whilst data in black was used only on the basic distribution map. Sources for both defeats and decimal degrees provided above. Years are all BC. Created by author.