Russia develops guidance modules for air-dropped munitions

Conflict Armament Research (CAR) investigators working in Ukraine have documented the remains of two ‘universal planning and correction’ modules (универсальных модулей планирования и коррекции (УМПК, or UMPK)). The UMPK can be attached to Russian FAB-250 or FAB-500 general purpose air-dropped munitions to increase their range and add an element of guidance, allowing Russian bombers to mitigate the risk of being engaged by Ukrainian air defences near the front lines. The use of such ‘dumb’ bombs in this fashion was reported for the first time earlier in 2023 and has since become a more regular feature of the conflict in Ukraine. CAR documented one UMPK in May 2023 and the other in November. Both modules include components whose marks have been obliterated, suggesting concerted efforts to hinder trace investigations and obscure the modules’ supply origins. Notably, the UMPK documented by CAR in November 2023 was equipped with a Kometa satellite navigation module, which CAR has documented in other Russian weapon systems, including multiple uncrewed aerial vehicles. This finding once again highlights the modular nature of these systems, which are made almost exclusively of electronic components produced outside of the Russian Federation.

On 2 November 2023 the US Department of the Treasury  sanctioned the Russian manufacturer of the Kometa  satellite navigation module, VNIIR Progress.

Both modules include components whose marks have been obliterated, suggesting concerted efforts to hinder trace investigations and obscure the modules’ supply origins.

Public reports that the Russian defence industry was working on a guidance conversion kit for air-dropped munitions first appeared  in 2003 . The Ukrainian military  reported  that Russian forces started using unguided bombs fitted with UMPKs in early 2023, with regular use reported  a few months later .

CAR has documented the  Kometa satellite navigation module  in several other Russian weapons, such as the Orlan-10, Forpost-R, and Geran-2 UAVs. 

Microelectronics found in the SMART module had been obliterated, as had markings on the servo motors and connectors. 

The UMPK is attached to the munition with three clamps. Two rudders are also attached directly onto the munition’s tail (not documented). Moments after release of the munition from the aircraft, a squib will function and allow the deployment of the two main UMPK wings, which are kept under tension by two strong springs situated in the nose of the airframe. Two thermal batteries power the electronic system.

According to Ukrainian officers interviewed by CAR, the addition of this system to air-dropped munitions increases the effective range of engagement by as much as 35–40 km.

The SMART navigation module communicates with the Kometa satellite navigation module, coupled to an inertial measurement unit, to steer the UMPK with two ailerons connected to two servo motors. The UMPK-equipped munition then glides towards its target.

According to Ukrainian officers interviewed by CAR, the addition of this system to air-dropped munitions increases the effective range of engagement by as much as 35–40 km. This greatly enables Russian pilots to mitigate the risk of being engaged by Ukrainian air defence systems near the front lines.

CAR’s documentation of these UMPK modules is important for several reasons. First, it marks an evolution in the use of weapons by the Russian Federation, highlighting an effort to develop cheap and expedient methods, based in part on the acquisition of non-domestic commercial components, to convert stocks of older air-delivered ordnance. This conversion increases the ordnance’s range of engagement and its precision while allowing bombers to mitigate the risk of being targeted by Ukrainian air defences.

Second, it highlights concerted efforts to remove identifying markings from multiple components within these recently produced modules. This points to attempts to obstruct efforts to trace technology produced outside the Russian Federation and to notify manufacturers, where unaware, of the potential diversion of their products into Russian weapon systems for use in the conflict in Ukraine.

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•  Ukraine iTrace Resource Centre : Explore the weapons and ammunition data documented by CAR in Ukraine and read interactive case studies from our field reporting.  Access the Resource Centre .

•  Documenting the domestic Russian variant of the Shahed UAV:  CAR's analysis shows that the Russian Federation has started producing and fielding its own domestic version of the Shahed-136.

Established in 2011, Conflict Armament Research generates unique evidence on weapon supplies into armed conflicts in order to inform and support effective weapon management and control. CAR field investigation teams document illicit weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in conflict-affected locations and trace their supply sources. The teams inspect weapons in a variety of situations—whether recovered by state security forces, surrendered at the cessation of hostilities, cached, or held by insurgent forces. They document all items photographically, date and geo-reference the documentation sites, and incorporate contextual interview data gathered from the forces in control of the items at the time of documentation. CAR occasionally uses information and photographs from social media as background information but does not base its investigations on them, since the provenance of such data is often difficult to verify. Moreover, open-source information does not always provide the detailed physical elements—notably external and internal markings required to trace weapons and ammunition. For more information on CAR's methodology, go to  www.conflictarm.com