Human Rights Violations in Syria - July 2024

In Suwayda governorate, civilians have held peaceful protests against the government since 2023, calling for reforms and regime change, which continued throughout the month of July. Syria’s parliamentary elections occurred in July, with civilians in Suwayda (and Daraa) boycotting the elections in protest - local media showed civilians in Suwayda throwing  ballot boxes  into the garbage. Prior to July, government response to the Suwayda protests had been somewhat restrained aside from the  killing  of a protester in February 2024. In July, government forces  fired  weapons near  Al-Karama square , a major protest site in Suwayda city, which injured a civilian man. He survived, and protests continued for the remainder of the month.

In another major incident this month, Murhij Al-Jaramani, the leader of Liwa Al-Jabal - a group of local men whose recent tasks included protecting protesters in Suwayda - was assassinated at his home on July 17. Outlets state that “unknown armed persons” carried out the assassination with a pistol equipped with a silencer, and SJAC will monitor media claims regarding the responsible party as more details become available. Al-Jaramani was a leader in the Suwayda protest movement, and earlier in the conflict, the faction he led was responsible for defending Suwayda residents and the Druze community from ISIS attacks. Outlets have hinted that his assassination could spark an escalation between the government and protesters in the area.

In  Daraa  governorate, assassinations and other violent attacks against civilian and military personnel represent a major threat to security, with SJAC documenters noting a significant increase in these attacks beginning in late 2023, with an even sharper increase beginning in spring 2024.  Conflicts and clashes also regularly occur between rival armed groups in Daraa, such as extensive clashes in Jassem in July, and civilians are often injured or  killed  in these clashes. The high volume of assassinations continued to persist in Daraa this month, which outlets generally attribute to “unknown militants.” Civilians assassinated this month included a  doctor , along with other men with no military affiliation, and at least one  woman . Assassinations also targeted members of the government’s  security forces  and often include people involved with local armed groups or drug trafficking. The untenable situation in Daraa, with civilians at risk of becoming collateral damage in clashes, or targeted victims of assassinations and kidnappings, continues to drive displacement. SJAC documenters have received increasing reports of Syrians from Daraa fleeing the country in an attempt to reach Europe.

Another major phenomenon increasingly endangering and causing financial hardship for civilians in government-controlled territory is kidnapping for ransom. SJAC has documented this pattern in Daraa governorate since 2023, and in July, documenters also received several reports of kidnapping in government-controlled areas near the Lebanese border. Armed groups reportedly kidnapped  three  young Tartous natives (two women and one man) in separate incidents in July, and demanded tens of thousands in ransom for each. The kidnappers published  photos  and videos of the victims, whose bodies bore visible signs of torture, to pressure families to pay the ransom. SJAC documenters note that Lebanese Hezbollah is active in the areas where the kidnappings occurred, in Homs governorate near the Lebanese border. Local media also reported that an armed group affiliated with the government’s 4th Division  demanded  $60,000 for the release of a woman and her children that they kidnapped from Wadi Khaled. The group released the woman and her children following negotiation by tribal leaders near their home in Daraa, but SJAC documenters note that such tribal intervention is not a likely scenario in most cases.

Rif Dimashq governorate, home to several former opposition strongholds, witnessed mass government brutality and violations earlier in the war, including sieges, chemical weapons attacks, and pillage. The government claims that individuals in some of these areas may return to their homes and “reconcile” with the government, however, incidents in Rif Dimashq in recent months demonstrate that reconciliation does not exempt these individuals from government violations and outright attacks. In early July, tension between the government and residents of  Kanaker  evolved into clashes and government shelling of the area, which  killed  three civilians. Following the clashes, the government’s military intelligence  offered  residents another opportunity for reconciliation, where residents would turn over 200 weapons to the government and those wanted for military service would join the government forces, in exchange for a truce. Many civilians in the area, who rely on their personal weapons as a defense against government violations and refuse to join the military, have refused the terms.

ISIS continues to pose a threat to government forces, affiliated militias, and civilians in desert areas of Homs and Hama governorates, along with parts of Deir Ezzor and Al-Raqqa governorates. ISIS frequently conducts attacks in these areas, killing  civilians  herding livestock or gathering truffle mushrooms, clashing with government military forces conducting  operations    to eliminate ISIS presence in the desert, and  attacking  oil tanker trucks, all of which occurred in July. ISIS conducts such attacks to demonstrate its continued presence in Syria and acquire resources to sustain its operations. Though weakened since 2019, ISIS threatens civilian life and stability in both government and SDF-controlled territory and therefore requires continued attention.

On July 17, the Autonomous Administration issued a new law that included a general  amnesty    that applied to more than 1,000 prisoners in Al-Hasakeh and Al-Raqqa governorates. Among other provisions, for the first time, the amnesty applied to many individuals accused of terrorism-related crimes, including ISIS affiliation, although the amnesty excludes ISIS leaders and those responsible for committing crimes resulting in death. SJAC documenters described the releases as a chaotic process, mirroring the style of previous Syrian government-issued pardons. Several lists allegedly containing the names of pardoned individuals circulated in the media, with many being fake.

Other critiques of the amnesty center around the fact that it released people charged with terrorism-related offenses, while keeping political prisoners (Which include members of the Kurdish opposition - the Kurdish National Council) in detention. On the other hand, it is  well-documented  that for many individuals held in SDF detention centers, the charges of ISIS affiliation are often baseless, and their release likely would not pose a danger to the community.

In the coming months, SJAC will conduct interviews with individuals released as part of this amnesty and gain further information about their charges, trials, and a better description of the release process.

One of the SDF’s primary objectives in the areas it controls is combating ISIS, which continued to demonstrate its presence via multiple attacks in June. Several attacks in SDF-controlled areas of Deir Ezzor governorate this month targeted  SDF members , civilians, and  oil tanker trucks  belonging to the Autonomous Administration. Attacks occur regularly in SDF-controlled parts of Al-Hasakeh and Al-Raqqa governorates as well. The U.S.-led Coalition, which partners with the SDF in operations to defeat ISIS,  predicts  that based on the number of ISIS attacks in the first half of 2024 in Syria and Iraq, ISIS is on track to double the amount of attacks it conducted in 2023.

In July, the SDF continued to condone child recruitment in the areas it controls, which is conducted by an affiliated group called the Revolutionary Youth. Media reports and statements to SJAC documenters in July discuss the Revolutionary Youth’s  kidnapping  of several children (aged 13-15) this month, and taking them to youth conscription camps. SJAC has conducted several interviews with families of those kidnapped in similar circumstances, and detailed this pattern of violations more thoroughly in a public  report . Documenters note that in July, instances of child recruitment by the Revolutionary Youth occurred on an almost weekly basis.

In response to a wave of attacks and riots targeting Syrian refugees in Turkey’s Kayseri on June 30, Syrians  protested  and at times attacked Turkish posts and checkpoints in  Afrin ,  Jarablus ,  Al-Bab ,  Al-Rai , and other Turkish-occupied areas of northern Syria. Many protests witnessed violence, and in early July, Syrians were  killed  and  wounded  in security forces’ response to these protests in northern Syria. Turkish security and intelligence forces also arrested Syrians who “desecrated” the Turkish flag, and coerced them into recording  apologies  for their actions on social media. After Turkish military vehicles were damaged in anti-Turkey protests in Syria, SJAC documenters also received reports that Turkey reduced salaries for members of various National Army factions in Turkish-occupied areas. SJAC assesses that this action could incentivize members of SNA factions and the military police to engage in greater repression of civilian protests in the future, in order to maintain their income.

In July, the military police and members of various SNA factions continued to  arrest  civilians (mainly Kurdish) in Afrin and the surrounding area, a pattern that has occurred since Turkey and the SNA factions gained control of the area in 2018. SJAC has witnessed an increase in these cases in the past several months. In most cases, the military police accuse detainees of past “cooperation with the Autonomous Administration,” which refers to actions taken when the area was controlled by the AANES prior to 2018. This charge does not always indicate that a person was involved with Kurdish politics or military factions. In addition to performing mandatory military service required by the Autonomous Administration, the military police have arrested people who were previously employed by the AANES in any capacity, including strictly civilian jobs as teachers, nurses, municipality employees, etc.

Since February 2024, civilians living in HTS-controlled territory, many of whom are displaced from other areas of Syria, have protested HTS actions including its widespread arbitrary detention practices and torture in its detention facilities. Key demands include calling for Al-Jolani to step down, for political prisoners to be freed, and for reforms to the security services. While protests continued throughout July, the frequency of these protests was markedly less than prior months. SJAC documenters note that a primary reason for this decrease involved residents’ focus on Turkey earlier in July, following a series of attacks against Syrian refugees in Turkey and resulting protests in northern Syria. Civilians living in Idlib also took part in protests against Turkey in Sarmada, Khirbet Al-Joz, Termanin, and other areas.

HTS/Salvation Government response to the protests has been relatively restrained since February, but occasional violent interaction between security forces and protesters has occurred. Security forces have consistently arrested leaders of the protest movement, a pattern that continued in July, although many of those arrested are released within a few days of their arrest. One notable instance of tension occurred in mid-July, when a member of the security forces who was attempting to leave the site of a protest in Binnish struck a female protester with his vehicle, injuring her. After multiple solidarity protests occurred throughout HTS-controlled territory following the incident, leaders of the protest movement in Binnish and the security forces agreed on a  truce  - a suspension of protests in Binnish, in exchange for HTS releasing protesters who had been arrested and the withdrawal of HTS security presence from the area.

Despite an official ceasefire truce signed in 2020, since late 2023, Syrian government forces and their allies, including Iranian-affiliated militias and Russian aircraft, continue to attack civilian targets in HTS-controlled areas and areas immediately surrounding it, including southern Idlib, along with parts of Hama and western Aleppo governorates. These attacks often result in civilian casualties and material damage to homes, livestock, farms, and vehicles.

According to SJAC documenters, these attacks aim to demonstrate the Syrian government’s continued presence and intent to regain control of the entirety of Syrian territory, and to cause ongoing hardship for civilians. Government forces also attack civilians in HTS-controlled areas as a means of retaliation for attacks that target government soldiers. In July, in addition to several Russian airstrikes, Syrian government forces continued to use various types of artillery, including mortars and rockets, to target civilian areas. In just one of several documented incidents this month, government artillery fire targeted a popular market in  Sarmin , wounding 6 people including women and children.

Drone attacks pose another  major threat  to civilians in this area, and Syrian government forces have increased their use of drones against civilian targets in recent months. In addition to Russian and Iranian drones used in northwest Syria, government forces use primitive, locally-built first-person view (FPV) suicide drones to attack their targets.

These explosive-laden drones, which operate by crashing into their targets, have caused civilian casualties and widespread material damage in recent months. In July, Russian soldiers reportedly  trained  government forces in operating FPV drones for use in northwest Syria. Drone attacks in July injured civilians in Afes, Majdaliya, and Kafr Nouran.

SJAC documenters reported fewer instances of civilian casualties resulting from drone attacks in both June and July, despite the fact that the amount of drone attacks appear to be increasing. Documenters noted that in some areas frequently targeted by drones, civilians have begun taking measures to combat the drones, such as firing shotguns filled with birdshot to take down the drones before they can reach their target (see video of residents shooting down a drone in Jabal Al-Zawiya in July).