A Blueprint For The Modern Russian Disinformation Landscape

Disinformation is defined as “false information that is deliberately created or disseminated with the express purpose to cause harm” (Moy and Gradon, 2020). It has a far-reaching impact as it can increase polarization and have a negative effect on demographic institutions (Lessenski, 2022). There are numerous structural factors behind why some countries are more impacted by disinformation campaigns than others. Education levels, trust in institutions and the media environment are the three main variables that contribute to a country being susceptible to disinformation. Countries that are more resilient have higher education levels, more trust in democratic institutions and a robust media environment with press freedom (Lessenski, 2022).

Russian influence operations leverage individuals’ basic psychological tendencies and match them with appropriate historical and political contexts in different countries to carry out successful disinformation campaigns. We review research on motivated reasoning, reappraisal, ambiguity aversion, conformity, metacognition, and extreme persuasion. Our analysis suggests that individuals are susceptible to committing to goals automatically and prioritizing information that fulfills their goals; cognitively transforming an aversive situation to regulate its emotional impact; increasing consumption of immediate and unvalidated information at times of ambiguity and stress; rewarding norm-confirming behavior; failing to correct overconfident judgments and seek information to reduce uncertainty; and overestimating the co-occurrence of coincidental events. All of these tendencies make individuals targets of disinformation.

When analyzing pathways towards building resilience to disinformation, it is important to consider the variety of narratives employed in the spread of disinformation. Different typologies of disinformation narratives have been proposed by scholars and organizations alike; the EU Disinformation Lab, for example, identifies narratives specific to the Ukrainian conflict. For the purposes of this project, however, we propose another typology of narratives that is designed to be applicable in a variety of contexts. These include:

The practice of appropriating, distorting and falsifying history to further one’s political aims

The practice of responding to an accusation by raising a counter-accusation: “but what about X?”

Theories that attribute events to a plot carried out by a covert influential group

A broad category of narratives that aim to emphasize differences and intergroup rifts

While some context-specific disinformation strategies may fall outside of this typology, these 4 main types of disinformation narratives are helpful in unpacking and countering malevolent actors’ disinformation toolkits. Below, we examine these types of Russian disinformation narratives in three different contexts: Ukraine, Finland and the Global South.

Key Russian disinformation narratives concerning Ukraine have emerged long before the 2022 invasion, with many of them dating back to the 2014 Euromaidan protests and even the 2008 conflict in Georgia; the overarching strategy underlying these narratives has thus remained largely unchanged after the invasion. Below, we categorize some of the recent Russian disinformation narratives by the four types outlined above.

Notably, some of these narratives often contradict each other. These inconsistencies are a result of Russia’s overarching strategy, described by RAND as the “firehose of falsehood”. Through this strategy, Russian disinformation - ranging from misrepresentations to blatant falsifications - is disseminated through a high number of channels at the same time with no regard for consistency between the narratives.

From 2014-2022, Russia conducted a series of disinformation campaigns in Finland, with most of the messaging centered on themes of historical revisionism, conspiracy theories, and Us vs. Them narratives. The objectives behind these campaigns was to increase the level of mistrust the Finnish populace had in their institutions and their opinion of the West, while justifying Russian activities.

After February of 2022 with the invasion of Ukraine, the anti-Russian sentiments across Europe drastically lowered the level of resonance that Russian disinformation campaigns had. Therefore, Russia did not launch as extensive campaigns as before given that their resources could be used more effectively elsewhere, but there were some disinformation narratives still present.

As Russia began losing the disinformation war in the Western world, it spent most of its efforts on incoluating its own citizens and the Global South in their narrative. Countries in Asia and Africa in particular have been targets of Russian disinformation since the recent Russia-Ukraine conflict. Russia has capitalized on anti-west and anti-colonial sentiments to garner mass support for Russia as an innocent victim and bearer of justice, which consequently villainizes Ukraine.

What largely keeps, and sometimes suspends, these countries’ neutrality is the reminder of their histories of colonialism, imperialism, and the reckless conquest of multilateral empires. Here, we use the same framework of conspiracy theories, us vs them, economic disinformation, and historical revisionism to analyze the prominent narratives following the 2022 invasion of Russia into Ukraine and their effects on the Global South.

1. Student Hostage: The Russian Defense Ministry and the Russian Embassy in India claimed that a large group of students from India was being forcibly held in Kharkiv by Ukrainian authorities. The student hostage conspiracy theory was picked up and amplified by various Indian news channels.
2. Biological Research Labs: The Russian government has pressed allegations against the US government for funding and engaging in secret bioweapon labs in Ukraine The biological research labs in Ukraine narrative is echoed throughout the Indian media space.
3. Golden Billion: In July, Russia re-invoked the decades-old conspiracy theory that accuses western elites of “having amassed wealth by exploiting the rest of the world”. Putin even exclaimed that “India has been plundered [by the Golden Billion]” to further appeal to the Indian audience using false anti-colonial rhetoric.

There is the pro-Putin Us vs. Them narrative in India: many Indian right wing groups (eg. Hindu Sena, a right wing Hindu nationalist group) expressed support for Russia and multiple popular Indian news media (Republic TV,  India’s top rated news channel) have declared anti-West or anti-US positions.

 As Russia continues to strangle Ukraine, the country's exports have drastically fallen. Grains, in particular, are a commodity that many countries in the Global South are dependent on, and combined barley, corn, and wheat exports have fallen by over 46% due to the closure of Black Sea ports linking the country to Africa and the Middle East as well as the land available for farming due to the Russian invasion: the country has exported 1.75 million tons of grain this year, as compared to the 1.88 million tons exported in August 2021 alone.

In July 2022, the UN brokered a deal between Russia and Ukraine to allow Ukraine to use the Black Sea and its three major ports (Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Yuzhny) to export 9 million tons of grain. In its announcement, the UN called this deal “unprecedented,” also mentioning that it would allow Russian food and fuel products to once again reach the world market. However, in late October, Russia temporarily backed out of the deal due to a Russian-suspected “British-led drone attack” on its Black Sea Fleet at the port, which caused spikes in global grain prices and general food shortages. The “drone-attack” was deemed by authorities in Kyiv to be fabricated. Though Russia rejoined the deal a few days later, Russia's temporary suspension of the agreement showed the world its power in weaponizing food as the world’s biggest importer of grain, and that it views its relationship with Africa as a “theater” rather than a place to forge meaningful diplomatic bonds.

Here is a comparison map that summarizes these findings at a country-specific level before and after the 2022 crisis:

The intensity of red color indicates the level of disinformation/the number of narratives present