Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center

The secretive entity behind Syria's chemical weapons program

Introduction

This StoryMap presents findings from an investigation report by  Syrian Archive  and  Open Society Justice Initiative , in collaboration with ArcticWind, into the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), the Syrian government agency at the heart of Syria’s chemical weapons program.

An investigation report from Syrian Archive and the Open Society Justice Initiative, working with ArcticWind, has revealed the inner workings of Syria’s chemical weapons program and the secretive agency at its heart:

Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center, or SSRC.

The report is the product of over two years of in-depth open source research and field investigations, including numerous interviews with former SSRC officials and other Syrian government officials with knowledge of the chemical weapons program. The report provides new information on the SSRC's structure and operations, its personnel and chains of command, and its role in the execution of chemical weapons attacks. 

The report has been submitted to the OPCW, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM), and prosecutors in Germany and France for use in support of criminal accountability.


History and Function

The Syrian government founded the SSRC in 1971 to advance scientific research within Syria. The SSRC was mainly a civilian research institution until President Hafez al-Assad proposed a military and security framework for the entity in 1973. This placed the SSRC under the direct supervision of the Presidential Palace: the President and his most trusted inner circle.

Graffiti of President Bashar al-Assad. Flickr @ Thierry Ehrmann

The Syrian chemical weapons program started in the mid-1980s under the direction of successive senior officers within Air Force Intelligence, including Ali Mamlouk and Jamil al-Hassan, the former director of Air Force Intelligence. Parts of the program worked closely with experts from Russia, North Korea, and Iran.

The SSRC has undergone significant changes since 2011. Major operational sites in opposition-held areas were forced to merge and/or relocate. A number of SSRC facilities were bombed, both by international forces and by the Syrian government itself. Widespread transfers were also undertaken to evade detection by the OPCW after the Syrian government was ordered to destroy its chemical stockpile. 


Structure

The SSRC is characterized by secrecy. Its operations are buried in underground tunnels and hidden in mountains. Its personnel are closely monitored and arrested or killed if considered a threat. Its parts are deliberately broken up so that no one person has the whole story.


Branch 450

Structure of Branch 450


Institute 1000

Institute 1000 is run by Dr Mohammed Khaled Nasri. The Head of the Security Office is Lieutenant-Colonel Firas Ahmad. Ahmad has been sanctioned for his role in transferring and concealing chemical weapons-related materials.

Brigadier General Tareq Yasmina is another key individual with Institute 1000. A Presidential Palace liaison to Institute 1000, Yasmina had clearance to access, supervise, and interfere in all areas of Institute 1000’s activities.

Structure of Institute 1000


Institute 2000

Structure of Institute 2000


Institute 3000

Institute 3000, also known as the "Chemical Institute", had laboratories located in the Jamraya Center, within the walls of Institute 1000.

Institute 3000 is responsible for producing chemical agents, including precursors and activators. Institute 3000 largely operates from secret centers scattered across the country. Many of these centers are dug deep into mountains or tunnels

Institute 3000 was renamed Institute 5000, likely after the 2013 chemical attacks, and later renamed Institute 6000

Structure of Institute 3000


Institute 4000

Institute 4000 was previously located outside of As-Safira, Aleppo. In 2012, as opposition forces advanced toward Aleppo, all machinery was transferred to Masyaf, Hama in large trucks accompanied by army elements and other military escorts. Institute 4000 personnel followed shortly after.

Following the transfer, the Syrian government dropped large bombs on one of Institute 4000’s former branches to prevent the discovery of top-secret weapons blueprints.

Structure of Institute 4000


Conclusion

Following chemical weapons attacks in Eastern and Western Ghouta on 21 August 2013, Syria was forced to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the OPCW oversaw the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal, chemical stockpiles, and production facilities.

By January 2016, the OPCW confirmed that all declared chemical weapons in Syria had been destroyed. The OPCW confirmed that all of the chemical weapons production facilities declared by the Syrian government had been destroyed in July 2018.

More can be done to ensure that states take the necessary steps to bring perpetrators to account.

When the 193 member states of the OPCW meet between November 30 - December 4 2020, they can take steps to advance accountability for Syria’s use of chemical weapons.

OPCW states have the authority to call for collective action against Syria, and to refer the issue to the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council.

They can call for states to take new steps to hold the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks accountable. Following the model of the Nuremberg Tribunal, states could consider forming a special tribunal for grave crimes committed in Syria, including crimes linked to the use of chemical weapons.

If they do this, they can open new avenues for justice.


Based on an investigation report by Syrian Archive and the Open Society Justice Initiative, with ArcticWind.

Graffiti of President Bashar al-Assad. Flickr @ Thierry Ehrmann

Structure of Branch 450

Structure of Institute 1000

Structure of Institute 2000

Structure of Institute 3000

Structure of Institute 4000