"Drinking Poisoned Milk"

There are about 7,000 languages in use around the world. By 2100, around   3,000 of them could go extinct  . The deaths of these languages will impact more than communication; mother tongues are foundational to the identity of thousands of linguistic minorities. Languages manifest a group’s history and traditions. When they disappear, they take with them the heritage and culture of the group. Safeguarding them is a vital part of protecting and promoting cultural diversity.  

Languages are dying faster than ever before as speaker communities choose or are forced to assimilate into dominant languages, such as English, due to  globalization  . While some language death is to be expected as a result of cultural transmission, some extinct languages were subject to targeted extermination campaigns, or linguistic genocides. Linguistic genocide often accompanies other forms of cultural genocide. It was defined in the initial draft of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as:   

“Any deliberate act committed with intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of national or racial origin or religious belief, such as (1) Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group...”  

This clause did not make it into the final draft of the CPPCG. Still, linguistic genocide could qualify as genocidal under the existing definition because it causes “serious… mental harm to members of a group.” 

However, not all extinct languages underwent a genocide. Minoritized languages are difficult to preserve, as they are variable by nature. There is a constant push and pull between speaker communities, seen, for example, in loanwords and other forms of linguistic convergence. Languages evolve, and a certain degree of language loss is a natural result of this evolution. Certain languages or dialects have become socially, politically, or economically salient with the rising global power and influence of nations where they prevail. Some languages fade away naturally as the number of speakers diminishes. Linguistic genocide, though, involves others that were driven to extinction through the exercise of such forces as colonialism and imperialism over minoritized language users.    

Linguistic genocide is not always the result of physical destruction of a group. In fact, it more often accompanies forced assimilation than extermination, as a dominant group – often a state apparatus – attempts to take control of a minority population. This is usually done through legal means. Language planning policies have tangible effects on minority group identity; as such, linguistic suppression measures such as language bans are considered genocidal, as they destroy, by design, a group in whole or in part, even though that destruction is not necessarily physical.   

Linguistic genocide against Indigenous minorities has a long and wide-reaching history. Under the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan state perpetrated a linguistic genocide against the indigenous Amazigh minority. This article examines Gaddafi’s ethnophobic policies with specific regard to linguistic genocide against the Amazigh minority and the lasting effects of those policies. The article also examines what can be done to promote meaningful change to preserve linguistic diversity in Libya. 

 North Africa contains a wealth of languages  . French remains a tangible legacy of colonial rule, especially in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and brings with it complicated political dynamics. On the other hand, Italian, which was once the colonial language of Libya, is almost non-existent today in North Africa. Modern Standard Arabic is the language of politics, whereas regional or national dialects of Arabic take precedence in everyday life. Indigenous languages enjoy some recognition, but are largely marginalized in the North African sociopolitical landscape.    

Because of the diversity of languages and their impacts on national identity, language planning in North Africa has been an important part of post-colonial politics. Language has been one way that states have attempted to foster nationalism; instead of creating a state that matches the borders of a certain language, they have attempted to institutionalize a language – in this case, Arabic – to fit the existing bounds of a linguistically heterogeneous state. In a region as linguistically varied as North Africa, the focus on one language to define both a national and supra-national Arabic identity has meant that minority languages are perceived as threats to national unity.    

North African states have addressed the language question in different ways. Some have codified multilingualism; others have repressed their ethnolinguistic minorities and forced them to assimilate. The issue of multilingualism persists amidst growing calls for formal recognition of Berber languages in many states.  Tamazight  is the collective name for all Berber languages, though regional names are used for local variants. The script is called Tifinagh, but it is not as widely used.  Tamazight is not standardized  across North Africa, which has made the fight for its institutionalization an uphill battle in different countries.   

The Amazigh people, also called the Berbers, are the indigenous groups of North Africa. They are not one people; there are several distinct ethnolinguistic groups across the Maghreb region, but they are referred to as a collective due to their common use of Berber languages. In Libya, the Amazigh are the largest non-Arab minority, making up about five to ten percent of the population. Larger Amazigh settlements exist in the northwest, including in the Nafusa Mountains. There are about 285,890 Tamazight speakers in the country, mostly concentrated in Libya’s border regions with Tunisia and Algeria.   

The Amazigh people can trace their culture back to the Stone Age, though Berber kingdoms arose across North Africa closer to 2000 BCE. They predated Arabs in North Africa but were suppressed during the Arab conquests of the 7th century CE; the subsequent process of Arabization led to a loss in cultural diversity.   

Arabization campaigns focused heavily on the promotion of the Arabic language at the expense of Amazigh linguistic diversity. Not only was Arabic the primary language of communication among the Arab conquerors, but it held a special status due to its religious significance. Arabic was and continues to be  seen as sacred  because it is the language of the Qu’ran. Its expansion during this period was tied to the conversion of the Amazigh to Islam. Arabic changed the linguistic landscape entirely; Latin, which had been a language of earlier Berber kingdoms, went extinct in cities, and Tamazight survived mainly in rural Amazigh villages. Compared to Arabic, indigenous languages lacked both prestige and utility. 

From 1912 to 1947, Libya was an Italian colony. Arabs and Amazigh alike formed a strong resistance movement to colonial domination, especially during the   Second Italo-Senussi War   that solidified Italy's hold over Libya. During that period, Italian troops “pacified” Libya through genocidal warfare, massacring both Arab and Amazigh Libyans. By 1934, indigenous resistance to Italian colonization had been crushed, and Italy continued to repress and attempt to destroy Libyan culture. After Italy’s defeat in World War II, Libya was administered by the Allies until 1951. In 1951, Libya declared independence and decolonization efforts began.     

The United Kingdom of Libya, a constitutional monarchy, was the first government of post-colonial Libya. It lasted only 18 years before Muammar Gaddafi’s 1969 coup. Gaddafi established the Libyan Arab Republic, a new Arab nation. As with many post-colonial states, the creation of a unified national identity was a top priority for Libyan leadership. Nation-building projects often rely on  fostering nationalism   by homogenizing the population; the Libyan Arab Republic was no exception. Gaddafi’s   Cultural Revolution  , which began in 1973, constructed “Libyan” to mean “Arabic,” despite the presence of ethnolinguistic minorities, including the Amazigh. Those minorities were suppressed, often violently, as perceived threats to national unity. The Amazigh were forced to abandon certain cultural practices, especially in public, so as to better assimilate with the newly-Arabized Libyan identity and avoid further persecution. 

For the Amazigh, Gaddafi’s Arabization policies were genocidal. Part of his strategy was the othering of the Amazigh and their culture. Where he acknowledged their existence, he framed them as an existential threat, dangerous to good, Arab families and the state itself. However, Gaddafi mainly pushed the narrative that the Amazigh were “  a product of colonialism  ” created by the West to divide Libya. They were not a group distinct from Libyan Arabs; even if they wanted to think of themselves as such, they were not allowed to make such a distinction in public. In 2008, Gaddafi told Amazigh leaders and activists, "  You can call yourselves whatever you want inside your homes – Berbers, Children of Satan, whatever – but you are only Libyans when you leave your homes.  "    

Gaddafi targeted Amazigh linguistic culture, too. He used genocidal rhetoric to eradicate the Amazigh identity by claiming that Tamazight was “  a mere dialect  ” of Arabic, rather than a separate language belonging to a separate group. He also declared that those learning Tamazight were drinking “  poisoned milk from their mother’s breast  .” Part of his Arabization campaign aimed to supplant minority languages such as Tamazight with Arabic.    

In Libya, the challenge presented by multilingualism has been central to nation-building efforts that have existed since independence. Multilingualism is intertwined with complex discussions of nationalism, indigeneity, and the legacies of colonialism. Under Gaddafi, nearly all Libyans, regardless of ethnicity, were fluent in Arabic, and had been for centuries. The ubiquity of Arabic in Libyan daily life already meant that children could often recite Qu’ranic verses before they could ask for water in their mother tongue. Arabic was the sole and uncontested official language of Libya. Still, Gaddafi saw minority languages as threats to the linguistic supremacy of Arabic.   

As a result, Tamazight was suppressed in the early years of Gaddafi’s regime; in 1984, legislation was introduced that de facto banned the language in its promotion of Arabic.  Law No. (12) on prohibiting the use of foreign languages and numerals in all transactions  mandated the use of only Arabic in the public sphere. All official documents, signs, advertisements, and publications had to be in Arabic. Any foreign institution operating in Libya had to provide Arabic translations for their materials. The punishment for the use of non-Arabic language was up to a month of jail time or heavy fines.    

Law No. (12) effectively relegated Tamazight to unofficial settings. While medical and scientific reports were exceptions to the law, such reports were rarely, if ever, published in Tamazight. By making Arabic the sole language of economics, Amazigh parents were disincentivized from teaching their children anything but colloquial Tamazight. Since all media had to be in Arabic, Amazigh children also lost the ability to practice their language skills outside of their homes. The law accomplished its goal: it repressed the growth of language-based Amazigh culture with the intent of forcing the Amazigh to assimilate.    

Eighteen years later, Gaddafi’s government passed an even more restrictive language law:  Law No. (24) of 2002 on the prohibition of unauthorized use of languages other than Arabic in all transactions . Law No. (24) reaffirmed the terms of the bans on languages other than Arabic set forth in Law No. (12), but expanded the scope to mandate the use of Arabic for street names; any writing on vehicles, buildings, and roads; posters; medical prescriptions; and the names of institutions. Punishments for infractions included fines and commercial license cancellations for a full year. The key difference between the two laws was Article 3 of Law No. (24): a ban on non-Arabic, non-Islamic names. Article 3 of Law No. (24) of 2002 states that:   

“The use of non-Arabic, non-Islamic names is forbidden, along with Arabic names not sanctioned by Islam and names that have a particular significance that is not in accord with the spirit of Islam and the identity of the Libyan people. It is forbidden to record such names in records and documents of any type.”   

Appropriate names were determined by the General People’s Committee, the executive branch in Gaddafi’s government. Those who attempted to use traditional Tamazight names were punished with hefty fines and the denial of personal documents, such as passports. Children with Tamazight legal names were barred from enrolling in schools. The grace given to those who already had Tamazight names was minimal; they were granted a year to obtain a legal name change.     

Law No. (24) not only reinforced the existing prohibition on Tamazight in public, but extended the law to regulate its use in private, too. While Tamazight had been repressed for decades under Gaddafi, this law represented a new phase of Gaddafi’s attempt to eradicate it and Amazigh identity as a whole. By banning Tamazight names, a fundamental part of any culture, the law took aim at intergenerational transmission. One of the most important indicators of language vitality is intergenerational transmission – whether or not a language is taught to children by their parents. Law No. (24) did not ban Tamazight outright, because it did not have to; its provisions disincentivized the teaching of Tamazight to Amazigh children with Arabic names who could not legally use it anywhere but behind closed doors. As a result, Tamazight began to weaken, showing the early stages of language death.      

The Amazigh did not give in to forced assimilation pressures. Many continued to covertly teach younger generations Tamazight and pass on other forms of cultural knowledge. Even as Amazigh activists were detained, tortured, and executed, and Arabization policies became harsher, Amazigh resistance to Gaddafi’s genocidal policies persisted. It came as no surprise, then, that the Amazigh were key actors in early anti-Gaddafi protests. In 2011, the “Arab Spring” swept through Libya, inspiring a rebellion against Gaddafi. The Nafusa Mountains, where most of Libya’s Amazigh lived, became a   hotbed for rebel activity  .   Amazigh rebels were on the front lines  , fighting loyalist forces.     

In rebel-held villages and towns, there was a   cultural and linguistic renaissance   as Amazigh culture emerged from hiding. Without Gaddafi to jail the teachers, Tamazight classes popped up, taught by people who had learned it from their parents in secret. Signage in the banned Tamazight script, Tifinagh, decorated streets and storefronts. There was even a Tamazight newspaper launched in liberated areas. With restrictive laws not yet repealed, the use of Tamazight was still a punishable offense, and the teaching of it even more so. The survival of Tamazight became a symbol of Amazigh resistance to Gaddafi.     

In the aftermath of the 2011 civil war, many Amazigh hoped for   more representation   in post-Gaddafi politics. However, the interim constitution of 2011 only vaguely alluded to Amazigh rights. In 2013,   only two seats   were reserved for Amazigh representatives out of the 60 that made up the Constitutional Drafting Committee. Further, Tamazight was   not made an official language   in either the 2015 or 2016 draft constitutions. It was recognized as being a part of Libya’s cultural and linguistic heritage, but was granted no official linguistic rights. This came as a   disappointment to Libya’s Amazigh  , who were pushing for Libya to become a multilingual state like Morocco and Algeria.    

Tamazight in Libya contains many Arabic loanwords due to centuries of contact and convergence.   There is no separating Tamazight from Arabic   – nor should there be. Recovering from the linguistic genocide of Tamazight should not involve an attempt at reversing centuries of cultural exchanges that have fundamentally shaped the contemporary Arab and Amazigh identities. Instead, Libya must cease Arabization at the expense of Tamazight and embrace the realities of its multilingualism.    

The Libyan government has taken some steps to promote Tamazight in the aftermath of Gaddafi’s decades-long campaign of linguistic genocide. In   2013  , it passed a law that upheld the right of ethnolinguistic minorities to receive education in their mother tongues, should they so choose. Still, the state must do more. Like Morocco and Algeria, Libya should make Tamazight an official language. Tamazight and Arabic can coexist as official languages in Libya, with the caveat of clearly identifying what it means to be an official language and what responsibilities that confers upon the state. Tamazight programs should be promoted from the top down, and speaker communities should receive targeted support in the form of education and funding for grassroots language efforts. Because of the links between language and culture, Libya must also create a space for Amazigh culture to flourish out of the shadows where it has been relegated for so long. 

After the fall of Gaddafi, Libya had another civil war that did not end until 2020. It is still an active zone of conflict, even if there is a ceasefire in place between the two warring sides. Libya also does not have an official constitution, despite several drafts being proposed. Understandably, the Libyan government is not prioritizing Tamazight education. However, linguistic rights must be included when Libya eventually codifies human rights in its constitution, as language is fundamental to society. In the aftermath of two civil wars, Libya has the chance to build a state more inclusive of all Libyans, not just the Arabic ones. Only then will Tamazight be able to meaningfully recover.