The Mechanics of Foreign Surveillance

 >>العربية 

As the survivors of two deadly earthquakes in southern Türkiye and northern Syria were only beginning to process the devastation in spring 2023, a diplomatic campaign was well underway in Damascus. In February, President Bashar Al-Assad traveled to Oman for only his second official state visit since 2011. Later that month, he  welcomed  the Foreign Ministers of the UAE, Jordan, and Egypt to Damascus. By April, the severance of diplomatic ties with Syria by a range of Arab countries between 2011 and 2013 seemed a distant memory, with a  formal invitation  for Syria to attend an Arab League Summit in May appearing to seal the government’s regional rehabilitation. States further afield now risk following suit.  

For the Syrian government, normalizing diplomatic relations and re-opening foreign embassies will provide a critical means to tighten control on Syrian citizens abroad. Since 2011,  reports have proliferated  of government officials using embassies as a launchpad to conduct surveillance and intimidation of Syrian political opponents. Until now, however, scarce substantive evidence of these practices has been available and few cases have made it to trial, with the Syrian government categorically denying involvement in foreign surveillance. In this context, the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (SJAC) is publishing internal state communications which shed light on how the Syrian government uses its foreign embassies to exert control over Syrian communities at home and abroad.

Between 2013 and 2015, SJAC gained access to approximately 483,000 pages of classified documents from abandoned Syrian state facilities. SJAC subsequently narrowed these documents down to approximately 19,000 high priority pages based on the date of issuance and content. Documents issued prior to 2000 were deemed low priority while those issued between 2000 and 2010 were deemed low priority unless they included information regarding the surveillance or targeting of political dissidents and/or ethnoreligious groups. Documents issued after 2011 were deemed high priority unless they were already publicly available or issued by state officials outside of the security services. For its 2019  Walls Have Ears  report, SJAC subsequently analyzed a sample set of 5,000 pages of priority documents, including several pages relating to the surveillance of Syrians abroad. On the back of this analysis, SJAC published  Shadows of Surveillance  in 2020, including original documentation on the surveillance of Syrians in Saudi Arabia and Spain.  

Now, after analysis of the remaining 14,108 pages of priority documents, SJAC has discovered 43 new pages relating to the surveillance of Syrians across Belarus, Belgium, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and Yemen. These documents – which provide source material for this report – were issued between 2009 and 2012 by several intelligence agencies housed under the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense.  ^[1]   They also include copies of original intelligence reports furnished by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Syrian embassies across the globe. While this report focuses on human rights implications, the documents offer a wealth of further insights, ranging from the Syrian government’s geopolitical maneuvering throughout the conflict to its strategic use of disinformation.

• For a list of documents appearing in this report, see  Annex I .

• For a full list of documents related to surveillance, including documents not cited in the report, please refer to  Annex II. 

Initially, the report presents findings on the mechanics of Syrian foreign surveillance, including through coordination between a global network of foreign embassies and security agencies. It also assesses the implications of these findings for the safety of Syrians residing abroad and their relatives at home in Syria. Subsequently, the report reflects on the significance of the findings for critical issues in the present day, including the protection of witnesses in universal jurisdiction cases, refugee returns, and the government’s current normalization campaign.

Documents acquired by SJAC illustrate that overseas surveillance was conducted systematically across the Syrian government’s network of diplomatic missions. Rather than focusing exclusively on countries with high volumes of Syrian expatriates or refugees, the Syrian state surveilled its citizens systematically across the globe. For example, in a single document disseminated by the Chief of the Political Security Directorate to heads of the directorate’s local branches, a request is made for information on opposition ‘inciters’ based across France, Belgium, Türkiye, Russia, and Lebanon.

Document  50022618 

Numerous other countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa are mentioned in the wider set. Even Syria’s embassy in Japan, a country with a tiny Syrian expatriate community, is recorded as providing crucial intelligence on Al-Jazeera journalists as well as opposition activists engaged in Local Coordination Committees.

Documents  50012666  –  50012674  

In countries with a more established Syrian diplomatic presence such as Türkiye and Lebanon, the full range of state resources are mobilized to facilitate surveillance. In one case from early 2012, information on a political dissident who reportedly shouted insults about the president and army is shared by the country’s consulate in Gaziantep.

Document  50024294 

Across the board, the documents corroborate a claim made by Syrians for years – surveillance of the diaspora is conducted systematically across all of Syria’s foreign embassies. In doing so, the documents unequivocally repudiate the Syrian government’s  repeated denial  of engagement in foreign surveillance. 

Exchanges of information between embassies and internal security agencies also illustrate the depth of government surveillance. In one set of documents from July 2011, the Head of Political Security’s Deir Ezzor branch responds to a request for information from the Directorate’s leadership about six individuals spotted at an opposition protest in Kyiv by the Syrian Embassy in Ukraine.

Documents  50020919 ;  50021171 ;  50021024 ;  50020902 

The subsequent depth and detail of information provided are astonishing. For all but one of the six individuals in question, Deir Ezzor Branch provides comprehensive personal information, including the individuals’ full names and dates of birth; parents’ names and their dates of birth and professions; ethnicity; marital status; education; professional occupation; financial means; social class, status, and reputation; political and religious views; past political activism and criminal record; political activism and criminal record of close friends and relatives; as well as a biography of key events in the individual’s life from childhood through to the drafting of the memo. While most of the individuals’ families have spotless criminal records, the Deir Ezzor branch does not neglect the fact that one activist’s uncles were arrested in 1983. Although Syrian state surveillance infrastructure, including  monopolies  on telecommunications and internet service provision through the state-owned Syrian Telecommunications Establishment (STE), has been widely reported on, these exchanges provide documentary proof that the Syrian state not only possesses extensive surveillance infrastructure but it is also able to leverage it swiftly and effectively in the service of political repression. 

Equally, SJAC’s sample of documents indicates that the government has amassed extensive intelligence on refugee and diaspora political activists, particularly in countries with significant refugee populations. In Lebanon, for instance, one dispatch in March 2012 shares information on intense coordination meetings between opposition groups in Tripoli and Akkar, including through surveillance of Syrians attending mosque in northern Lebanon.

Document  50023542 

As time goes on, the government appears to strengthen its surveillance capability and build increasingly detailed information on opposition activities in Lebanon, including the locations of operation rooms and observation centers, and names of individual combatants based in the area.

Documents  50013272 ;  50024612 

With numerous Syrians reported to have been  abducted in Lebanon  following opposition political activism, the existence of this information itself represents a significant threat to the individuals’ well-being. Meanwhile, in Türkiye, the documents reveal details of deep government penetration in opposition political ranks. One document describes a Syrian government agent posing as an opposition supporter who manages to infiltrate opposition ranks, meet a range of political activists, and obtain information on the formation of a new political movement. He later receives financial backing to travel to Türkiye and attend the opposition group’s launch event, showing concrete evidence that the Syria government paid for and dispatched informants from inside the country and abroad to spy on meetings.

Documents  50013283 ;  50013287 

Despite evidence of inter-agency competition within the Syrian state’s security structure, the documents illustrate that, when necessary, intelligence agencies coordinated effectively between and within departments to collect information on persons of interest. In assessing Ba’athist Syria’s resistance to the cycles of coups that had previously plagued the country,  James Quinlivan  cites ‘the development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor the loyalty of the military and one another,’ as a key means to ‘coup-proof’ the Ba’athist political leadership. Nonetheless, SJAC’s documentary evidence provides nuance to this claim illustrating that, at a time when the Syrian government faced a fight for survival amidst a growing tide of military defections, security services collaborated effectively to gather intelligence on political dissidents and shore up the flailing state. In one document issued in April 2012 and marked as urgent, a request for information on a Syrian prisoner in a Saudi jail is passed smoothly down a long chain of transmission from the Syrian Embassy in Riyadh to Foreign Ministry officials before being sent to the Ministry of Interior and Chief of the Political Security Directorate. Finally, it is passed on to the heads of local branches of Political Security. As in the example from Ukraine, local branches appear to be used as key sources of local intelligence and background on political dissidents active abroad.

Document  50023316 

Information gleaned a few months later from Syria’s embassy in Tokyo on Al-Jazeera journalists and local Syrian activists is transmitted down a similar line to local branches of the Political Security Directorate which, within a space of a few weeks, return with a substantial dossier on each of the individuals in question.

Documents  50012666 ;  50012668 ;  50012670 ;  50012667 ;  50012671 ;  50012673 ;  50012672 ;  50012674 ;  50012669 

 Although the documents do not indicate whether – or in what way – the government acted on these foreign intelligence reports, circumstantial evidence and various instructions enclosed within the communications point to an intention to leverage the intelligence for repressive purposes. Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, diaspora communities have become accustomed to the families of opposition activists abroad being targeted at home in Syria. In 2011, as protests in solidarity with the Syrian people were staged by diaspora communities across the globe, reports emerged of the government mobilizing embassy staff to target and intimidate those engaged in the demonstrations. Opposition activists in the United Kingdom cited government agents  visiting their homes  while, a few months later, Amnesty International published claims of government surveillance and intimidation made by  more than 30 activists  living across Europe, North America, and South America. Victims alleged embassy staff physically assaulted them and made death threats, while their families in Syria were intimidated, detained, and even tortured as retribution. That same year, the elderly parents of Malek Jandali, a Syrian-American,  were beaten  at their homes following the musician’s performance at an opposition rally in the U.S. Elsewhere in the U.S., Mohammad Anas Haitham Soueid, a Syrian naturalized U.S. citizen was convicted of an ‘extensive and systematic’ operation to target and monitor opposition protesters in collaboration with the Syrian government. In Germany, the authorities  expelled four Syrian diplomats  from the country for engaging in activities ‘incompatible with their diplomatic status’. 

Although there is abundant evidence of the government’s use of foreign surveillance for repressive purposes, the documents also illustrate limits to its ability to silence individual dissenters abroad. In one extraordinary case, an opposition activist based in Cyprus is described as tricking the Syrian Military Attaché’s office in the country into hiring him as an informer in 2012 only to continue openly supporting the Syrian opposition. After the individual volunteers to infiltrate the opposition, Syrian intelligence sources describe – to their bemusement – that he not only refuses to deliver information about the opposition activists with whom he fraternizes, but subsequently begins to offer them material support, leads opposition coordination groups, and even organizes a rally outside the Qatari Embassy in support of the country’s efforts to combat the Assad government. When asked to explain himself to the military attaché, the individual admits that he has always been a fervent opposition supporter and had only volunteered to ‘buy time for his brothers’ in the opposition and continue to secure work visas for Syrians employed in his restaurants. The report notes that, at the time of writing, the individual has begun hanging signs up on the front of his restaurant with the frank instructions: ‘Entry Forbidden to Supporters of the Criminal Regime.’

Document  50024411 

Despite this example, the documents substantiate concerns about the threats that intelligence from embassies abroad pose to Syrians who have engaged in opposition activism, as well as their families. Several documents, for instance, end with ominous instructions to ‘do the necessary’ in response to foreign intelligence reports.

Documents  50012666 ;  50022618 ;  50023598 ;  50023542 ;  50024612 ;  50024815 ;  50026256 

While little is known about the follow-up on intelligence transmitted in SJAC’s documents, a Human Rights Watch  report  based on interviews with military and intelligence defectors revealed that ‘by all means necessary’ was ‘universally understood’ by officers to imply ‘authorization to use lethal force’ in the context of domestic protests. Likewise, SJAC’s 2019  Walls Have Ears  report concluded that instructions to ‘do the necessary’ could include the use of lethal force and gave security actors a broad range of discretion in executing orders. Therefore, as foreign states consider re-opening Syrian embassies in their capital cities, the documents generate a range of concerns about the direct threat Syrian embassies may pose to the diaspora and refugee community at large, as well as their families at home.

Based on the documents’ extensive evidence of government surveillance and activity through its diplomatic missions abroad, the re-opening of Syrian embassies also generates obstacles to prosecutions under universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction cases have proven amongst the most fruitful avenues for justice and accountability efforts. In February 2021 for instance, Eyad al-Gharib, a former Syrian intelligence officer, was sentenced to four and a half years imprisonment for aiding and abetting crimes against humanity in Koblenz, Germany. Less than a year later, Anwar Raslan received a life sentence for co-perpetrating crimes against humanity, alongside other crimes, in the same courtroom.  

Despite these small – but crucial – steps forward in the pursuit of justice, even successful prosecutions have proven fraught due to fears and threats of witness intimidation. In preparation for the trial in Koblenz, the  reluctance of witnesses  to participate in the investigation due to fears that they – or their families in Syria – would face reprisal presented a major hurdle to evidence-gathering. One witness, P3,  reported  personal intimidation and threats being made against his family, while others expressed serious concern for their families’ safety. At trial, numerous witnesses declined to testify in open court due to security concerns and a lack of trust in protection measures. Meanwhile, one witness previously interviewed by the German criminal police (Bundeskriminalamt) and receiving special protective measures from the authorities, decided to leave the country during the trial. In a dark irony, the case itself was only made possible when Anwar Raslan  voluntarily appeared  at a German police station to file a complaint and seek protection from Syrian government agents operating abroad – a bleak indication of how pervasive fear of the Syrian intelligence services remains outside the country.  

In the ongoing trial of Alaa M. in Frankfurt, Germany, a former Syrian doctor alleged to have tortured, killed, and sexually abused victims in military hospitals, witnesses (including  P4  and  P11 ) have reported personal threats and intimidation of their families in Syria. One Syrian resident in Norway was recently extradited to Germany for a presumed link to witness intimidation.  ^[2]   Therefore, even in Germany, a country leading universal jurisdiction efforts and in which witnesses benefit from relatively robust protection measures compared with elsewhere in Europe, the fear – or persistence – of intimidation by government-aligned actors abroad has had a noxious influence on justice efforts. Moreover, during the trial itself,  a report  by the Federal Criminal Police Office revealed that Alaa M. has received ongoing support from an embassy official. This support includes connections to Syrian officials and journalists, as well as the offer of flights back to Syria to help him flee the country. Re-opening Syrian embassies more widely, therefore, will pose ever greater challenges to accountability efforts under universal jurisdiction.

With several regional governments pushing for the return of Syrian refugees and European governments tightening restrictions on Syrians qualifying for refugee status, information acquired by the Syrian government abroad is likely to generate significant protection issues for returnees or ensure they are never able to return at all. Alongside a wealth of historical cases of individuals being detained at Damascus airport based on informant reports abroad, evidence is emerging of even more brutal practices in the present day. Scores of returnees have already been  arrested upon return  and forced to inform on their own family members, while others have been subjected to torture to prise out information about opposition activities in their countries of refuge. Moreover, growing security and intelligence coordination between the Syrian government and  Jordan ,  Türkiye , and  Lebanon , which collectively host approximately six million Syrian refugees, is only likely to strengthen the Syrian government’s ability to exact retribution on political opponents in the diaspora, as well as their families. As part of any future return deals with  Lebanon  and  Türkiye , Syrians are thus likely to face extensive vetting by Syrian intelligence services. As a result, the extent of information possessed by the government on Syrians abroad must inform strengthened refugee protection measures and deter premature collaboration in the Syrian government’s normalization campaign.  

Documents analyzed by SJAC offer overwhelming evidence that, for each embassy reopened, Syrian government surveillance will increase alongside risks to the safety of Syrians abroad and their families at home. Foreign surveillance is a pillar of the Syrian state’s foreign policy and is facilitated by a coordinated network of embassy staff, intelligence sources, and security agencies. This will not change in the immediate future. Additionally, foreign governments and prosecutors should be aware that normalization will markedly increase risks of witness intimidation and may undermine prospects of securing convictions in universal jurisdiction cases, a crucial avenue towards justice and accountability. Finally, with many regional and international governments clamoring for the return of Syrian refugees, documentation presented in this report offers clear evidence of the threats they face upon return – the Syrian government has amassed substantial information on opposition political activism abroad and has a track record of using such information to repress dissent ruthlessly. In response to these facts and threats, foreign governments must ease the criteria for Syrians seeking refugee status, strengthen protection measures, and resist premature calls for normalization.

 [1]  The individual was subsequently released by the German police. At the time of writing, it is not yet apparent whether this was due to charges being dropped or the individual being released on bail.

 [2]  Officially, these agencies are housed under the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense. In practice, they operate with considerable autonomy and, in many cases, wield more influence than ministers themselves.