Documenting a North Korean missile in Ukraine

On 10 and 11 January 2024, a Conflict Armament Research (CAR) field investigation team physically documented the remnants of a ballistic missile that struck Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, on 2 January 2024. Based on several unique features observed during documentation, CAR determined that this missile was manufactured in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and is probably a  KN-23 or KN-24 , both of which were first tested in 2019 and reportedly  entered service with North Korea in 2020 . The North Korean designations for these missiles are the Hwasong-11A and Hwasong-11B respectively.

The Russian Federation’s reported use of such missiles is another demonstration of its intent to sustain its war efforts in Ukraine, even at the cost of undermining global nonproliferation regimes, as  previously seen  in the transfer and deployment of Iranian uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). North Korea is the subject of a longstanding  United Nations arms embargo . Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), and 2270 (2016) prohibit UN member states from procuring arms or related materiel from North Korea and prohibit North Korea from exporting this materiel.

CAR determined that the missile documented in Ukraine was manufactured in North Korea and is probably a KN-23 or KN-24.

This dispatch, CAR’s 12th since Russian forces invaded Ukraine in February 2022, documents the apparent use of a North Korean missile in Ukraine. It is the first detailed public analysis of images related to the recent attacks.

A CAR field investigation team documented the missile’s rocket motor and its tail section (without fins). Based on the following four characteristics, CAR reached the conclusion that the missile was of North Korean origin:

• its distinct jet vane actuators;
• the bolt pattern around the igniter;
• the presence of a Korean (Hangul) character on one of the rocket’s barometers; and
• the repeated presence of marks that may refer either to the ‘February 11 plant’ in North Korea,  which reportedly assembles these missiles , or to the year 2023 in the Juche calendar.   

This is the first North Korean ballistic missile that CAR has documented anywhere in its global operations. As part of the assessment, CAR compared images taken during the documentation of the missile with official pictures of KN-23 and KN-24 missiles taken at the February 11 plant. CAR investigators also compared the characteristics of this missile against features of similar systems manufactured by the Russian Federation. For example, CAR identified several properties that clearly differentiate this missile from the Russian-made Iskander system, a ballistic missile that CAR investigators also documented in Ukraine. One distinction relates to the tail sections: the North Korean missile’s tail section has a diameter of 110 cm, while the Iskander’s is smaller at around 95 cm. 

Overall, the analysis indicates that the missile CAR documented in Ukraine on 10 and 11 January 2024 is of North Korean origin. While the item is probably a KN-23 or KN-24 ballistic missile, the remnants available for documentation do not permit CAR to confirm which variant it is.

The tail section of the missile documented by CAR investigators on 11 January 2024 featured four jet vane actuators (two still attached and two separated). These jet vane actuators direct a missile’s thrust and thus influence its trajectory.

CAR investigators documented the presence of the mark ‘112’ on several different components found in the missile wreckage. This mark may refer to the February 11 plant in North Korea, where these missiles are reportedly assembled, or to the year 2023 in the Juche calendar (North Korean calendar).

CAR’s documentation and analysis strongly support  the assertion —made in a joint statement issued on 9 January 2024 by a group of more than 50 foreign affairs ministers— that the Russian Federation has used North Korean ballistic missiles in Ukraine. The use of such missiles leads to further erosion of global nonproliferation regimes, following the Russian Federation’s earlier use of Iranian UAVs, which CAR first  reported  in November 2022.

Any exports of ballistic missiles from North Korea carried out following the introduction of UN embargoes on the country in 2006 represent violations of the sanctions regime. UN Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), and 2270 (2016) prohibit all member states from procuring arms or related materiel from North Korea and prohibit North Korea from exporting arms or related materiel. Security Council resolutions also forbid North Korea from developing its ballistic missile programme, meaning that individuals, entities, and networks involved in the facilitation of these transfers may also have committed violations.

The use of such missiles leads to further erosion of global nonproliferation regimes, following the Russian Federation’s earlier use of Iranian UAVs, which CAR first  reported  in November 2022.

CAR will continue to document evidence of the use of ballistic missiles and will report further on any new findings regarding arms and related materiel supplied by North Korea to the Russian Federation for use in Ukraine.

Favourite or share this Dispatch:    https://conflictarm.org/NorthKoreanMissile 

CAR thanks the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey for its support in the development of this Dispatch.

•  Ukraine iTrace Resource Centre  : Explore the weapons and ammunition data documented by CAR in Ukraine and read interactive case studies from our field reporting.   Access the Resource Centre  .

•  Russia develops guidance modules for air-dropped munitions:   CAR's latest investigations in Ukraine show that Russia has started integrating UMPK guidance modules into air-dropped munitions.

Established in 2011, Conflict Armament Research generates unique evidence on weapon supplies into armed conflicts in order to inform and support effective weapon management and control. CAR field investigation teams document illicit weapons, ammunition, and related materiel in conflict-affected locations and trace their supply sources. The teams inspect weapons in a variety of situations—whether recovered by state security forces, surrendered at the cessation of hostilities, cached, or held by insurgent forces. They document all items photographically, date and geo-reference the documentation sites, and incorporate contextual interview data gathered from the forces in control of the items at the time of documentation. CAR occasionally uses information and photographs from social media as background information but does not base its investigations on them, since the provenance of such data is often difficult to verify. Moreover, open-source information does not always provide the detailed physical elements—notably external and internal markings required to trace weapons and ammunition. For more information on CAR's methodology, go to www.conflictarm.com